

THE  
ART OF LOGICK,  
DELIVERED IN  
THE PRECEPTS  
OF ARISTOTLE  
AND RAMVS.

WHEREIN

1. *The agreement of both Authors is declared.*
2. *The defects in Ramus, are supplied, and his superfluities pared off, by the Precepts of Aristotle.*
3. *The precepts of both, are expounded and applyed to use, by the assistance of the best Schoolemen.*

By THO: SPENCER.

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TO THE READER.



*Eader*; The publishing of this Treatise, submits it to thy judgment. It may be thou wilt judge it of little worth, because thou esteamest  
1. the Authors credit to be small,  
2. the Art it selfe to be obscure, and  
3. of little vse, and 4. the worke to be imperfect, and 5. vnfitly put forth in the English tongue. But this Preface shall make it cleare, thou art mistaken in all these particulars.

I. Though my own credit be small: yet this neede not hinder thy good liking, because my labour is but to collect out of other Authors. So that if the credit of Authors will please thee, I need not feare thy displeasure, for here thou hast Authors of all ages, and of the best account, yea *Aristotle* himselfe, the Prince of Philosophers (as the learned vse to call

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him) leads thee the way, and guides the whole game.

2. Some account the art it selfe of *Logicke* to be obscure, and therefore hard to be attained : but though this were true, yet is it worthy of all that honour that is due to any humane art whatsoever, because the difficultie ariseth not from the thing it selfe: (for it agrees to humane reason, being no more but a comprehension of precepts, directing the vse of true reason) but from mans defect, as being either vnable for want of natural parts, or vnwilling through idlenes to learne it. But grant this Art were in it selfe obscure, yet is it no lesse honourable for that, because silver, gold, and other pretious mettals are hard to obtaine : yet are they highly esteemed of (as daily experience shews) for what labour will not men take, and what hazard will they not vndergoe to get and hold them? Nay

I adde

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I adde further, that the difficultie of attaining vnto this Art, makes it more honourable when it is attained ; for things hardly gotten are rare, and rare things are pretious, especially when they are of excellent vse : and such is this Art of *Logicke*, as my answer to the next will shew.

3. Many are of opinion, that *Logicke* is vnprofitable, & of little vse, as serving to exercise the witts of yong Schollers, and that therefore when they grow vnto yeares, they doe wholly neglect it. This judgement is erronious ; for whatsoever tends to some good, is truely profitable : and this is the case with the precepts of *Logicke*, because hereby ( in some sort ) is healed the wound we received in our reason by *Adams* fall : and this daily tryall teacheth, because by the precepts of *Logicke*, things hidden and darke, are clearly objected to our judgement. Truth

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and falshood is made to stand naked before our knowledge.

It may be some will conceiue that mans naturall *Logicke* will serue sufficiently for the foresaid ends, and that therefore there is no neede of precepts.

I answer. True it is, many mans naturall parts are ripe and prompt, so as they are speedy and sound in judging. But this is not every mans case, therfore vnto such the precepts of Art are needfull. Yea, I say, that such precepts are needfull to the promptest witts, for man hath not now so ample vse of reason as *Adam* had at his first Creation, and therefore he needs the helpe of artificiall precepts.

To conclude, since the Art of *Logicke* is no more but a Directour of true Reason: the more logicall a man is, the more is he like a man, and the lesse logicall, the lesse like a man who

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who is a reasonable Creature. If this be true (as it is most true) then must it be granted that the precepts of this Art, are profitable for the vse of man in the highest degree.

4. This worke is not imperfect, because no precept, essentiall vnto *Logicke*, is wanting. I haue indeed omitted the modality and conversion of propositions and Elenchs: but this breeds no defect in the art, for these three appertaine to the exposition of the precepts of this Art: they are no essentiall precepts thereof. 1. The modalitie of propositions doth explicate the subject or predicate of the proposition wherein it is. 2. The Conversion of a proposition is no more, but the right placing of things not rightly placed in a proposition. And 3. Elenchs are the detections of falshood in the forme of syllogismes.

5. Our Mother Tongue doth not disgrace

*To the Reader.*

disgrace this Art of *Logicke* to the *English*, no more then *Greeke* did to the *Grecians*, or the *Latine* to the *Romans*: for if it had, then would not *Aristotle* haue written his *Logicke* in *Greeke*, nor *Tully* his in *Latine*. We haue the holy Scriptures in our mother tongue, without disgrace thervnto, why then should it be disgracefull to *Logicke*? Besides, some men vnderstand not *Latin*, & yet haue they neede of *Logicke*, because they need the helps to the vse of reason.

Thus ( I hope ) full satisfaction is given to every doubt that might hinder thy profit by this art now offered vnto thee: so as nothing more seemes needfull, or worthy thy labour and mine: therefore here I will end all that I haue to say for this thing.

*London the 24. of Iune.*

1628.

THO: SPENCER.



# THE ART OF LOGICK

## CHAP. I.

### *The Definition of Logick.*



LOGICK is an  
Art of discoursing  
well.

*In this sence, it is  
called Dialectick.*

*Ramus.*

This sentence defineth, or setteth out the whole nature of *Logick*. *Aristotle* hath the same for substance. *Top: lib. 1. Cap. 2.* In these words;

I.

Dialectick is } Congresse,  
profitable vnto } Exccercitation,  
Philosophicall science.

*Ramus* confesseth in his Schooles

B

vpon

upon this place alledged; that, this sentence comprehendeth (well neere) *all the notable things of Logick*: and therefore, (in his Iudgement,) it is a definition of it. The thing it selfe doth say no lesse: for, the three words attributed by him to *Logick* or *Dialectick*, doe signifie, discoursing well. *Ramus* makes discoursing the end of *Logick*: *Aristotle* doth the same, by the word *profitable*, for, as we learne by *Thom*: 1<sup>a</sup>. 2<sup>a</sup>. q. 7. art. 2. *incor.* q. 8. art. 3. Sed. con. Every good, ordained to some end, is sayd to be profitable: That which tendeth to some end is called profitable.

2.

Logick is  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Naturall.} \\ \text{Artificiall.} \end{array} \right.$

Naturall *Logick* is either the understanding it selfe, in that respect, that of its proper, and specificall difference, it hath a power of discoursing; or rather, the certaine knowledge of the manner, or wayes of discoursing, which the reason it selfe, bringeth forth, without the helpe of any order, or method. Thus farre



farre the *Iesuites* ( in their preface before the *Organon Colleg: Conimbr:q. 6, art. 2. col 62.* *Logick* is here taken for artificiall, not naturall: so the same *Iesuites* tell vs in that preface: *col: 67.* *Aristotle* implies this distinction, in the first chapter, and first booke of his *Rhetoricke: A man* ( sayth he ) *is a Logician by nature, or art.*

[*Logick Dialectick.*] Both these names are vsed indifferently, to set out the thing defined: and, we haue the frequent vse of learned men to avow it: The *Iesuites* doe expressly teach it, in their *Commentary vpon Aristotles Organon, Col: 26.* neere to the end, in these words, *The whole art of discoursing, is set out, by, either the word Logick, or the word Dialectick.* And, they doe not barely avouch it; but, they confirme it with plentie of proofes, as the Reader may finde, if he please to consult the place assigned.

Both the words doe signifie no more, but, a thing appertaining vnto the vse of reason; therefore, the *Iesuites*

ites in the same Preface, *q. 4. art. 4. Col: 40.* doe conceiue, that, *Logick* ( in an *vniverfall apprehension* ) is no more, but, a director of the art of reason. And, *Suarez* hath the same thing, in his *Metaphysicks disp. 39. D.*

4. [ *Is:* ] This word, is the band, to tye both parts of the definition together. By it, the later part is affirmed of the former, and, it signifies an essentiall attribution ( that is ) that, the latter part of the definition doth giue being vnto the former ; so as, the first doth consist in the second.

5. [ *An art:* ] The word *art*, doth set out the generall nature of *Logick*: ( that is ) it doth signifie, that nature which *Logick* hath in common with diuers other things: as, *Grammar*, and *Rhetorick* &c. It is called an *art*, in the most common vse of men; sometime it is called also a science, and, that we find in the *Iesuites* Preface *q. 4. art. 3.* *Aristotle* doth vse both the words indifferently, as signifying the same thing, in his Preface to the *Metaphysicks* and first Chapter.

The word *art* signifies, a multitude of Precepts, orderly digested and approved by use. And, thus the *Iesuites* teach in their Preface, q. 6. art. 2. and *Aristotle* hath the same thing in his Preface to the *Metaphysicks* and first Chapter. Where, wee haue these words; *Art is gotten by experience, experience makes art. Art is made, when as one universall thing, is framed out of many experimentalls: so as, to doe by experience, differs nothing from art.* He brings the same thing, and the reason of it, *Poster lib 2. cap. 19.*

The word [ *Art* ] is vsed to shew, that *Logick* is one intire art, that cannot be divided, nor is subordinate to any other art, as *Geometry*, and many other arts be. *Logick* is usually called, the art of arts, the mistress and director of all other: and, there is good cause why, for, *Logick* disputeth of all things, and is common vnto every being, as *Aristotle* hath taught vs in the fourth booke of his *Metaphysicks*, cap. 2. text 4. Experience sheweth, that *Aristotle* sayd true, for, there is no art, but by

6.



face thereto, Col. 27. 55. So, likewise saith Gillius, lib. 1. Tra. 1. cap. 6. n<sup>o</sup>. 4. The art of Logick delivereth wayes, and rules of discoursing.

[To discourse] (As it is here used) is to declare one thing that is lesse knowne, by another thing that is more knowne. This we haue in the Iesuites Preface col. 27. and 62. As for example, He that knowes not what a man is, is made to know it by saying a man is a reasonable Creature: the addition of rationalitie vnto man, shewes what man is. So likewise, when wee say, God is a spirit, infinite in all perfection; we informe him that is ignorant, and knowes not what God is. In this very thing, this art of Logick doth differ from all other arts whatsoever: for Logick ends in speculation, and proceedeth no further than to judge whether one thing be truly affirmed of another: all other arts, be practi- call: they concerne mans outward or transient actions, as their next end: as, Grammar, and Rhetoricke tendeth vnto mans speech, Geometry vnto

8.

measuring, *Arithmetick* vnto numbering, &c. *That art* (saith *Okam*) is *practicall*, which directeth vs vnto the doing of a thing to be wrought, In 3. dist. q. 11. lit. V. Yea, in this, mans knowledge differs from the knowledge that is in God and the Angels: in that they behold the things in themselves, as they are in themselves, distinct each from other: they doe not know one thing little knowne, by the light and reflection of another thing, that is better knowne: wherefore their knowledge, is called intellection, ours is called rationalitie.

9.

[*Well*] This word, seemes (vnto some) to be superfluous; and, a man would thinke, that the *Iesuites* were of that opinion, because they define *Logick*, to be no more, but an art of discoursing, coll. 27. so *Gillius*, lib. 1. Tra. 1. cap. 6. n<sup>o</sup>. 4. yet, indeed, in other places, they haue as much as this word comes to: for, thus they write in their *Preface the last question*, col. 70. He is a good *Logician*, which doth exercise himselfe in each thing well,



well, and diligently: and, Suarez doth joine with them, in his *Metaphysicks* disp. 39. D. Logick (saith he) is an art, directing the operation of the understanding, to exercise it selfe artificially, and according to reason. And, all these Authors doe adde, that word, to very good purpose; for, thereby Logick is distinguished from *Sophistry*, which is onely a deceiving science: A Sophister seems to know, but in deede, knowes not, in the truth of the thing, as we learne from *Aristotle*, in his *Metaphysicks*, lib. 4. cap. 2. text. 4. And thus much shall suffice, for the opening of the severall parts of the definition of *Logick*.

That wee may put a finall end, to the matter in hand, wee must remember, that the word *discoursing*, implyeth arguments, wherefore wee must now see what an argument is.

An argument is that, which hath a force to argue.

*Alisfidorensis* saith in his Preface, lit. F. an argument, is a reason, that giveth vs knowledge of a thing that is doubt-

IO.

Ramus.

II.

doubtfull: *Aristotle* saith, that, arguments are such, as whereby saith ( Logically ) may be made, of the thing that is spoken of. *Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 22. Logicè igitur &c.*

II.

[ *That* ] This word importeth, the generall nature of an argument ( that is ) the thing which is common to arguments of every kinde: and signifieth a notion, which our vnderstanding doth apprehend, a resultancy or reflection, proceeding from a being, objected to our vnderstanding.

[ *Which hath a force to argue* ] That is, hath of its nature a power, aptitude, or fitness, to bring the thing, objected unto our understanding, into the knowledge, and intuition thereof. I omit to giue instance of these things, because, that will better be done in setting out the nature of particular Arguments: Wherefore, now, wee haue fully done, with the first precept of *Logick*; I will proceede to the second.



CHAP. II.

The Distribution of Logick.

LOGICK hath } Finding out of ar-  
two parts, the } guments.  
                          } Disposing of ar-  
                          } guments.

Ramus.

This precept must haue the second place: for, the nature of the things themselves doth require it: because by this, we come to know, what particulars are wrapped vp in the former precept, and, *Aristotle in the 6. Booke of his Topicks, and latter end of the first Chapter*, requires, that, the thing defined, be distributed into parts: *Ramus* tooke this precept out of the second Chapter of *Aristotles Categories*, where wee haue these words: *Those things, which are contained in Logick,*

I.

bee { without complexion.  
      { with complexion.

I sayd, *Ramus* followed *Aristotle* in this partition, and, the thing it selfe shewes it; for, they both di-  
vide

2.

vide *Logick*, into two parts ; The first part in *Logick* ( according to *Aristotle* ) are things *without complexi- on*: so are they, according to *Ramus*, as his owne words doe witnesse, when he termes them, *Seuerall respects of things, considered alone, and by themselves*. *Aristotle* giues, his *incomplex- ed things* no name: but, thereby he meanes *arguments*, as they are vndis- posed, as, his next precept doth shew, and, *Ramus* giues them that name ex- pressly.

*Ramus* call the first part of *Logick* invention: and, so doth *Aristotle* too, as wee may gather from the 32. chap- ter, of the first booke of his *Priorum*: Where, a little after the beginning, he requires, a *facultie of inuenting, in him, that makes a Syllogisme*: but, more plainly, and fully: we finde the same thing, in the first Chapter of the eight booke of his *Topicks*; To finde out (saith he) the place, from whence a man may argue, appertaines to *Logick*: therefore, vnto the first part of *Lo- gick*, for it can haue no other place.


*Ramus*

*Ramus* calls, the second part of *Logick*, *disposition*. So doth *Aristotle* also, in the place last alleadged, where he requires of a *Logician*, to *dispose singular things, by themselves*: and, he saith, that, *this disposition is proper to a Logician*; and, therefore, belongs to *Logick*; and, consequently, it is a second part thereof: for, it cannot be the first: yea, that *Aristotle* meant thus, doth vndoubtedly appeare; because, he appoints his *Logician*, first, to finde out the places, from whence to argue; and then, in the second place, to dispose them, being so found out.

[ *Two parts* ] That is, the precepts of *Logick*, tend vnto two things, or ends: and, they be called parts, because, all those precepts be shared, or parted betwene those two ends: some of them appertaine to the one, and the rest vnto the other.

[ *Finding out* ] To finde out, sometime signifies, to discover a thing that is secret; but, here it is not so taken, but, the meaning is, that, the precepts of *Logick*, doe assigne the seates, and places.

places of arguments, and describe, and set forth the nature of them: and so much for the generall Distribution of *Logick*.



### CHAP. III.

#### *Of the seates of Arguments in generall.*

I.

**A**ristotle assigneth ten places, or seates of arguments, in the fourth Chapter of his *Categories*: in these words:

*Those things, which we finde in Logick, without all coniunction, doe signifie:*

- 1 *Substance; as, a man, a beast, &c.*
- 2 *Quantitie; as, two or three cubits.*
- 3 *Qualitie; as, white, &c.*
- 4 *Relation; as, double, halfe, &c.*
- 5 *Where; as, in the field, &c.*
- 6 *When; as, yesterday, the yeere past.*
- 7 *The place; as, he sitteth, &c.*
- 8 *To inioy; as, to be armed, &c.*
- 9 *Todoe; as, to cut, &c.*

10 *To*

10 To suffer; as, to be cut, &c.

He repeates the same doctrine in the ninth Chapter of his first booke of the Topicks; and in both places, he doth explicate them by certaine properties, that be common to them all ioyntly; viz. 1. They neither affirme, nor deny. 2. They be neither false, nor true. 3. A coniunction being added to them, they containe negation, or affirmation, truth, or falsehood. 4. All propositions are framed from them.

In the fift Chapter of his Categories, and in his Prior. lib. 1. cap. 27. Eorum igitur. Post. lib. I. cap. 22. he doth divide them thus.

2.

These ten, be { Either, subiected onely.  
Predicated onely.  
Or, subiected, and predicated, also.

This distribution, is fitly set out by Athysodore, in his Preface A. and B. Where, he hath these words:

An Argument, { proveth:  
is that, which { or is proved.

This

This is all, that I finde, touching arguments in generall.

3.

*Aristotle* delivers the doctrine of *Substance* (which is the first seat of arguments) in the fifth Chapter alledged, which containeth these foure things:

1. *A substance, is every thing, of which we may say, that, it is.*

We finde the same thing in *Thomas*, *Whatsoever* (saith he) *is essentiall to a thing, appertaineth unto substance,* 1. p. q. 77. art. 1. ad 1<sup>m</sup>.

2. *Substance is*
  - First: as every singular & individuall thing.
  - Second: as Genus and species.

3. *Genus, and species, signifie substances, by a figurative speech, not properly, they signifie, rather, the manner, according to which, a thing is.*

4. *A singular thing, is most properly, a substance; because, all other things, be attributed thereunto, and that, attributed unto none.*

Thus,

Thus, haue I set downe, all that I finde in *Aristotle*, touching the nature of those arguments, which are contained in the first place, or seat of arguments: (for this time we must omit the consideration, of the second substance; for, that hath the last place in this first part of *Logick*). The first substance comes now to be handled: *Thomas* doth wholly subscribe vnto *Aristotle*, for this distinction, and explication of substance, reported out of *Aristotle*, and, he shewes the same, in this short sentence: viz. *In the name of first substance, is intended the nature of uniuersall and parts. 1. p. q. 29. art. 3. ad 2<sup>m</sup>.* And, for further explication, he saith, *1. p. q. 75. art. 2. ad 2<sup>m</sup>.* A first, or individvall substance, may be taken two wayes: one way, for every thing that hath a substance; another way, for a compleat subsistency, in the nature of any species: from whence, a mans hand may be called a first substance, or an individvall thing, after the first sort: but not after the second: so also, a mans soule, may be called a first

C

sub-

4.



*substance, or a singular thing in the first sort: because, it is (as it were) a thing, that subsisteth: but, that which is compounded of soule, and bodie, is called, a first substance, or an individuall being, in the second sense.*

Vnto this place, must be referred, every individuall effect, as it consisteth by force of all the causes, and, every individuall subject, that receiveth any outward change, whether it be by the subtracting of something injoyed, or the receiving of something that is added,

The nature of these effects, and subjects, is delivered by *Aristotle*, in his tenth place, or seat of arguments, viz. of *suffering*. I say, they are contained there; for, in the judgement of *Thomas*. 1. p. q. 79. art. *To suffer*, is no more, but, to lose things injoyed, whether appertaining to nature, or not appertaining thereto, or, to be brought from power to act: and therefore, *Aristotles* tenth seat, of suffering, importeth the whole nature, of every individuall effect, and subject, as it is an effect,



effect, and subiect. Now, I conceiue, that, this is wholly agreeable vnto *Aristotles* meaning ; because, in his doctrine of predicated arguments, hee speakes not a word, of effects, and subiects.

This Doctrine is peculiar to *Aristotle*: *Ramus* doth not acknowledge it ; for, he hath not a word of it : It may bee, he conceived, that, 1. To set downe all the seats of arguments in one place together, would breed a needles repetition. 2. These single termes did not appertaine to *Logick*. 3. The first substance, or thing subiected, in every sentence, hath not the nature of an argument. It is very likely, that, he thought thus ; because, this doctrine of *Aristotle* hath beene anciently receiued ; therefore, hee would not depart from it vnles hee had some reason for it: and I conceiue, he had no reason, but these 3. I answer, these three arguments bee insufficient : The first, because *Aristotle* doth neuer repeat ; or handle these ten seats of arguments twise :

but, instead of them sometime hee brings in the doctrine of a definition, Propertie, Genus, Accident, as the things, which are contained, in those ten seates of arguments: and, this wee finde in the 8. and 9. chapters of the first booke of his *Topicks*. Some other time, he sets out, the nature of other arguments: but, they are such, as are either, contained in these 4. or arise from them; and, (at most) hee doth but explicate at large, the same things, that he had set downe summarily, in the 10. places afore said.

6.

Neither, is the second reason good: for, those 10. things, are propounded, not as meere and simple beings: but, in respect of that reflection, or relation which ariseth out of them, vnto our vnderstanding; for, he doth intend them, as they may bee fit to argue, and serue vnto the framing of disputations, either in single propositions, or in syllogismes, as himselfe expressly sheweth, in the 8. and 9. chapters alledged: and, this is also evident, by the properties which he assigneth  
vnto

vnto them: viz, *They containe truth, or falshood, affirmation, or negation, when one of them is attributed to the other.*

The third also is insufficient, for the first substance, or subiect part of every sentence, hath truly, and properly, the nature of an argument, for, it hath a relation, or emanation vnto many things, that may be added, or attributed to it: so as, we conceiue it to be, a receptiue thing, 1. of the causes whereof it is compounded, and constituted. 2. of the properties flowing from it, 3. and of outward additions, whereby it is beautified and made to differ, and dissent from other, and whereby it is made equall, or vnequall, like or vnlike vnto others: as we shall playnly see, when we come to the particulars; and, it is plaine, that *Aristotle* vnderstood that argument, which he calls the first substance, after this sort: for, in the sayd 5. chapter of his *Categories*, he sayth, it is proper vnto the first substance to receiue contraries, as sicknes, and health, blacknes, and whyness, and


7.

*thereby to be changed, from well to ill,  
from white to blacke.*

The onely doubt is, whether an individuall effect, and subiect bee some wayes predicated or not. *Ramus* sayth yea; and brings them as predicated arguments. *Aristotle* doth not so, and no doubt, he hath the truth. No indiuiduall effect, is predicated. I haue three reasons for it: first, we neuer find any such predication, in the formall writings in the schooles, 2. No man can say, this indiuiduall thing consisting of soule, and bodie, is this man: for, the predicate is lesse knowne then the subiect; The subiect engendreth distinct and certaine knowledge: because, it comprehendeth all the causes, but no man will say so, of the predicate, nor so much, 3. The authority of the schools is against it. I will alleadge *Thomas* for them all. An integrall whole (sayth he) 1. p. q. 77. art. 1. ad 1<sup>m</sup>. is not predicated of all the parts together, vnles improperly as when we say, these walls, this foundation, and rooffe, is this house.

house. For the subiect; the matter is yet more cleere, we cannot say, this learning, is this man. *Thomas* sayth truly 1. p. q. 29. art. 3. ad 3<sup>m</sup> *Accidents doe manifest the subiect*: but hee neuer sayd, nor any man else, that, the subiect doth manifest the accident; and no maruaile why: for, if the subiect be predicated of the accident, then we must conceiue, that, the accident is without, and before the subiect: but no man will say so: therefore, we may conclude, the individuall effect, and subiect, are fitly comprehended. vnder the name of a first substance. Thus, I haue set downe, and explicated, the generall nature of arguments; and, the speciall nature of that argument, which is alwayes subiected or argued. In the next place, I come to those arguments, which be alway predicated.

## C H A P. IIII.

*The distribution of predicated Arguments.*

I.

A positive argument, is that which is attributed simply, and absolutely considered in it self: not compared with others.

A consenting argument is that, which is predicated of the subject affirmatively.

2.

I Finde this doctrine of positive arguments, deliuered by Aristotle also, and I will shew it in his doctrine of consenting arguments; in the second chapter of his *Catēgories*, hee sayth, some arguments be of the subject, and other some, in the subject: those I say be

in



in the subiect, which are no parts of it, nor can be without that thing in which they are. The same thing is taught by Thomas, yet more plainly, 1. p. q. 25. art. 6. In. cor. Some arguments (saith he) be of the essence, and other some, without the essence of the subiect, of which they are predicated. I say, this of Thomas, and that of Aristotle are the same, with the last two branches, of Ramus his division: or (at least) it is comprehended in them: for, those that be of the essence, doe absolutely agree with the subiect, of whose essence they be. They that be in the subiect, but without the essence thereof doe agree to the subiect after a sort, seeing therefore, they agree in those two last branches, they must agree also in the former branches of the division: seeing, every argument that agrees absolutely, doth consent positively with the subiect, of which they be predicated; and consequently, it is enough to the vnderstanding of the whole, if we doe explicate, and prosecute, those two last branches: and, because I suppose,

pose, that the terms of *Aristotle*, and *Thomas*, be more significant, and fit, I thinke it best to follow them.

3.

[*Of the essence*] By these words, are set out such arguments as be essentiall vnto the thing, of which they are predicated: now, all the causes be of this kinde, for as much, as the effect is constituted by all the causes, as *Thomas* hath taught vs in 2. dist. 27. q. 1. art. 2. ad. 9<sup>m</sup>. he saith the effect is constituted by all the causes, (that is) each one in its kind, and manner of working; for, all of them, doe concur, and bestow their force, vnto the procuring of the thing to be. These arguments be all comprehended in the 9. place of arguments viz. To doe.



C H A P. V.

The Definition of a Cause.

*A Cause is that, by force whereof, a thing is.*

*Ramus.*


**T**HIS argument, which we call a Cause, is sometimes taken for every thing whereupon another follows: and so saith *Okam*, 1. dist. 1. q. 3. lit. N. wherefore (as the same *Okam* sayth) 1. dist. 41. lit. F. *A Cause is taken two wayes: Sometimes, for every thing that hath another thing, as an effect thereof; and, sometime also, for a proposition, whereof another doth follow; thus farre Okam.*

I.

A Cause in this place, is taken, not so largely, as in *Okam* first and third senses: but, in the second. *A Cause in this notion, is also taken for the thing it selfe which doth cause; and sometimes also, for the nature of Causing, or, for the thing, as it doth exercise Causallitie in act, or, for the relation of*  
Causing:

*Causing: A Cause, is taken in the second sense, in this definition; wherefore, A Cause is that, of which the effect, even by it selfe dependeth. Thus farre the Iesuites in their Preface unto Porphyrie.*

By this it is manifest, that, *Ramus*, and *Aristotle*, doe fully agree in the defining of a Cause, and in the explication of that definition: therefore, we need not say more for the opening thereof; a few examples wil make it easily vnderstood; but, we may not doe that in this place, least we be forced to repeate the same thing againe, when we come to the particulars.



## C H A P. VI.

### *The Distribution of a Cause.*

*Ramus.* There be foure } Efficient, and Matter,  
Causes: the } Forme, and End.

I.

There is an vniverfall agreement in this precept also. *Aristotle* makes

makes them thide foure, as wee may finde, in the 11. chapter of the second booke of his *Posteriorum*; his words be these:

- There be 4 Causes {
1. That which sheweth what a thing is.
  2. That which must be when the thing is.
  3. That which moueth first.
  4. That for which a thing is.

He hath the same thing in the fift booke of his *Metaphysicks* and 23. chapter. Thomas doth follow him, and doth teach the same things in 1<sup>a</sup>. 2<sup>a</sup>. 9. 72. art. 3. in cor. and no man thinks otherwise: therefore, I will descend, to vnfold the nature of the particulars.

## C H A P. VII.

*Of the Efficient Cause.*

*Ramus.* *The Efficient Cause is that, from which, the thing is.*

1. [ *Efficient* ] This word imports no more; but, to doe, or to bring to passe: and, therefore, it signifieth, the office of all the Causes, and consequently, it seemes not fit to be given vnto any one Cause distinctly: yet notwithstanding, we must know, that there is good reason thus to call it; else, the learned of all ages would not haue giuen it that name; yea, the very nature of it deserues we should call it so: as we shall see in the next passage.

2. [ *From which* ] These words doe set out the nature, or office of that Cause, which is called Efficient: and signifie the originall, or fountaine, from whence the effect doth receiue its being. I say the effect, and I meane the

the whole effect : for, this Cause doth ioyne together all the other Causes, whereof the effect is compounded : as namely, it bestoweth the forme vpon the matter, and doth destinate the matter formed vnto the producing of something that is good : and therefore, it deserues well to be called Efficient. The forme doth make the effect to be of this, or that kinde : the matter formed, doth make the effect to be this, or that individuall thing : the end makes it fit for this or that good : but, the motion and efficacy of the efficient Cause onely, doth giue being vnto the effect in the event. Wee haue many examples of this Cause, and the operation thereof; we finde one in the second of *Genesis*, the leauenth verse, where it is sayd,

*God formed man, of the dust of the ground, and breathed into him the breath of life, and he became a liuing soule.*

In this example, the making of man is attributed vnto God: therefore God is sayd to be the Efficient Cause of  
man :

man: the office of this efficiency, is placed in ioyning the forme vnto the matter; he framed him of the dust, there is the matter, and breathed life into him, and thereby the forme is impoted on the matter, and then, God did destinate him to an end, *viz.* The actions of life, thereby he made him a living soule.

We haue another the like example in the 11. of *Genesis*, the 3. and 4. ver. where it is reported; that,

*The men of the earth, did build a high tower of bricke, and slime; for a memoriall of their name.*

The men of the earth, are made the builders of the tower, and thereby they became the efficient cause of the whole worke: they take bricke, and frame it into a tower; therefore, they ioyne the matter and forme together: they destinate the same vnto an end; *viz.* the continuance of their name on earth. And, thus much shall suffice, to set out the nature of the efficient cause. Wee should now divide an efficient cause into the severall kindes, but,

but, that we cannot: for ( as *Ramus* truly sayes ) they are unknowne unto vs, therefore we will set downe, the diuers, and various manner, wherein the efficient cause doth worke: for that is well knowne, and doth helpe vs much, in the vnderstanding of the office of this Cause.

The efficient cause } By it selfe.  
doth worke, } By accident.

A Cause doth then worke by it selfe, when it worketh by force of, and according vnto the inbred fynesse thereof.

*Ramus.*

We finde this distinction, and the explication thereof, in the Schooles of all ages. The efficient cause ( sayth *Thomas* ) workes, by it selfe, or by accident; the first is, when it moveth by its owne proper vertue: The second, when something is remoued therefrom, or that which remaines, is hindered from working, 1<sup>a</sup>. 2<sup>a</sup>. q. 76. art. 1. in cor. If wee ioyne *Okam* vnto *Thomas*, wee shall finde this matter fully opened; A Cause by accident ( sayth *Okam*. 1. dist. 2. q. 10. lit. B. H. ) is that, which

3.

D

worketh



*worketh by a thing different from it selfe, and a cause, which workes by it selfe is that, which causeth the effect according to its proper nature, and not according to some other thing, which outwardly doth befall it.*

The efficient doth worke by it selfe, in naturall things, when it moues according vnto the instinct, and inbred disposition of nature : as when the living Creature seeth, eateth, sleepeth, avoydeth knowne danger. The plants grow vpright, bring forth leaues, and fruit, in due season; So doth it worke by it selfe in the intellectuall creature, when man moues himselfe vnto doing, by the direction of true reason, and the vnrestrained, and free choyse of the will.

Naturall things doe worke by accident, when the instinct of nature is suppressed, or diverted. The intellectuall creature workes by accident, when the iudgement of reason is erroneous, and the choyse of the will, carried by a preuiall over-ruling power, and all these doe fall out, in case,  
where

where nature meets with defection. The vnderstanding is possessed with ignorance, or the will haled by the naughtinellse of corruption, and violence of temptation. Lastly, *the secret providence of God (which the Heathen called fortune) makes the creature work by accident* : in all Cases when he workes against meanes, as he did, when he brought the people through the red Sea, *Exodus the 14.* and, as he doth in all miracles; or when man intendeth one thing, but another thing comes to passe: of this, we haue an example in the *45. of Genesis, and 5. vers. & 37. & 27. verse.* In this place, they are sayd to sell *Ioseph*, because they would be rid of him; and, in that, *Ioseph* sayth, *God sent him into Egypt, to preserue their lines.* They were the efficient Cause of their owne preseruing, when they sold *Ioseph*; but, yet by accident, through Gods secret providence, that wrought contrary to their intent. The *Iewes*, likewise, were the Cause of Christs glory, and mans salvation,

when they delivered him to death; but, yet by accident, because God himselfe did create light out of darknesse, and made their evill intention, serue vnto that good. There be many examples, wherein wee finde, that, the efficient cause doth worke on this manner: but these are enough, for this present.

4.

The efficient  
doth worke

{ Physically,  
{ Morrally.

This distinction, is received in all the *Logick* schooles, and, is of frequent vse, in the question touching sanctification, and the actuall motion of grace, in mans conversion: the Reader may find it in *Suarez opus. c. I. lib. 3. cap. 10. no. 1.* and in many other places. A Physicall operation, is a reall influence into the effect, we haue an example of this in mans creation: He formed him, and that of the dust, and poured life into him, all these be reall influences: of this kinde,  
are

are the builders of the Tower of *Babel*, they made bricke, and reard a building with bricke, and stone: Of this sort, be all workemen that labour with their hands, and tooles, the strength of nature, doth immediatly flow into the thing that is wrought, making a reall and sensible change in the matter where on they worke.

A morall worke, is a motion offered to the vnderstanding, and serues to allure, and draw it on with reasons, and perswasion. Of this kinde, bee be all such things, as be obiected to the vnderstanding, as namely, the testimonie of God, and man, by commanding, forbidding, promising, threatening, perswading, therefore, so often as wee finde, any of these attributed to God, or man, wee are to know, that then they are efficient causes, that worke morally.

*Ramus* doth call Testimonies, Exhortations, Commandements, &c. in artificiall arguments, because, they argue, not of their owne force, but, by the authoritie of him that doth testifie:

but, this is altogether vnfitly spoken, for inartificiall, and argument, implies a contradiction, it inartificiall, then no argument; if an argument then artificiall, for an argument is a member of Art. 2. These things themselves are no arguments, vnlesse they be referred vnto the Testator, but then they argue as properties or adjuncts, and otherwayes they are never attributed to any subject. In this place affirmation, perswasion, &c. are not brought as morall causes in themselves: but the causalitie is referred to him that affirmeth, perswadeth &c. which makes it very plaine, that, they belong to this place or seat of arguments. God, and his servants, are the morall causes of mans holiness, when they command good, and forbid ill, when they promise good, and threaten ill, when they perswade vnto obedience, and dissuade from sinne, thus our Saviour Christ is the morall cause of all supernaturall things, when by his obedience, he deserved, that God should bestow  
them

them vpon vs, he by meriting (I say) is the morall cause of Gods gifts, because by his merits hee moveth God to bestow them : and so much shall suffice for this distinction.

*A Physicall efficient is*

{	Principall	{ first,
	Instrumentall.	{ second,

5.

This distinction is very ancient in the schooles; and of great vse, when we desire to know, how mans will is wrought vpon, and worketh with the actuall motion of Gods grace; *Alvarez* received it from *Thomas*, and makes vse of it. *disp. 68. no. 5. &c.* where, hee doth thus describe each member of it.

*A principall efficient is that, which worketh out of its owne power, or forme, as Thomas sayth, 1. p. q. 18. art. 3. in cor. A first principall efficient, is that which worketh onely, out of its owne power. Thus God only work-*



eth, of whom it is sayd, *hee sitteth in Heaven, and doth what he will.*

He is the vniverfall cause: for *in him we live, and move, and haue our being.*

*A second principall efficient is that, which is so moved by another, that it moveth it selfe, by a power of its owne. Of this sort is mans mind, which is moved by God, yet neverthelesse it worketh out of an actiue beginning, remaining in it selfe, Of this sort, be all those sayings in the Scripture, which attribute mans good workes, as his conversion, and the like, sometimes, vnto God alone, and other sometimes, vnto man alone.*

6.


*An instrument (properly taken, and so we speake of it here) is that, which worketh onely out of a power received from the principall efficient, of this kinde are all instruments without life, as namely the tooles of a Carpenter, or Smith, &c: Thus hot water, heateth another thing that is cold, by the heate received from the fire.*

To conclude, the point touching  
the



the efficient cause, wee are to know, that, *the efficient, alwayes worketh after one of these waies, whether it works alone, or with others, whether it begins the worke, or preserues it, being already made.*

Ramus.



C H A P. VIII.

*The matter, is a Cause of which a thing is.*

Ramus.

[ *Matter.* ] This word is often times vsed to set out every bodily substance: but it is not so taken in this place, for ( as *Thomas* sayth, *1. p. q. 7. art. 1. in cor.* ) The matter ( as it is a matter ) remaineth onely in power, or capacitie to receiue many formes: and therefore, according to it selfe hath no being, nor can be objected to our vnderstanding: *1. p. q. 15. art. 3. ad 3<sup>m</sup>.* In this place it signifies a bodily substance informed, or some intellectuall thing answerable vnto that,

I.

[ A

[ *A cause* ] These words doe attribute an actiue power, and actual efficacy vnto the matter, wherby the effect is produced.

[ *Of which* ] These words shew the nature of that efficacy, and the maner how the matter doth concurre vnto the effect: and importeth the thing that so receiues the forme, that it resteth and remaineth in it. This we see in an house, wherin the timber, stone &c. are framed, and fashioned together, and made fit for habitation: so doth a peece of timber receiue the picture made vpon it by a carver.

[ *A thing is* ] By [ *thing* ] is meant the effect produced: by [ *Is* ] is meant essentially, so as, the matter is a part of the essence viz. in a second degree, or notion. Wee conceiue the timber &c. Of a house to be a part of it: but we know, that there is another part therof more principall before that: namely, the forme & fashion thereof. A thing, signifies an individuall effect, so as, the office of the matter is to bring the effect vnto a singu-

gular, or individuall being: thus all Philosophers doe conceiue of it. *The matter is the principium of individuation*, saith *Thomas*. 1. p. q. 86. art. 3. in cor. And againe, *the essence is restrained vnto one individuall thing by the matter*. 1. p. q. 7. art. 3. in cor.

We haue an instance of this, in every singular creature. *Peter*, is a singular man by his body, every plant, is singular by the stem that groweth vp; for they inioy all other things in common with the rest of their kinds. The soule of *Peter* hath the samerationalitie with all other mens soules: no singular tree differs from other trees in vegitie. Sanctitie makes men christians: *Peters* sanctitie makes *Peter* a christian, because the holy Ghost dwels in his mortall body.

This argument brings the subiect to which it is attributed, vnto our cleere vnderstanding, and it is of singular vse, to make vs know the nature and distinction of particular beings.

Yea, of absolute necessitie: for (that I may vse the words, and reason of *Aristotle*

*Aristotle. Meta. Lib. 2. Cap. 1 text. 11*)

It is not possible to know vntill wee come vnto indiuidualls. It is impossible to know vntill we ataine vnto those things which doe not admit diuision: for things that are infinite cannot possibly be comprehended by our vnderstandings. We haue a pregnant example of it in the 1. *Cor.* 15. 39 &c. Where, the Apostle doth describe, and destinguish diuers kinds of singular bodies, and saith, some be celestially, as the Sunne, Moone, and stars. Other some be terrestrially, and those be spirituall, as mans body that is raysed: other some be naturall, viz the flesh of men, beasts and birds: and from hence he deliuers the nature and difference of glory that these particular beings doe inioy. Likewise, the holy Ghost *Reuel.* 21 18. &c. Makes vs know, what the new *Ierusalem* is, by the matter thereof. The examples of this kinde are very frequent, and well knowne to every man; therefore, I take this to be sufficient for the explication of the materiall cause.

CHAP.

C H A P. IX.

Of the formall Cause.

*A forme, is a Cause, by which a thing  
is that, which it is.*

Ramus.

I.

[*Forme.*] As I sayd of the matter,  
so must I say of the forme: If it be  
considered in it selfe, abstracted from  
all matter, and individualitie, it is a  
*certaine thing common unto many*: so  
Thomas truly sayth, 1. p. q. 7. art. 1. in  
cor. 2. Vnder the name forme, some-  
times is comprehended a figure, which  
consisteth in the termination of a quan-  
titie. This also I haue from Thomas.  
1. p. q. 7. art. 1. ad 2<sup>m</sup>. But wee take  
not this word, at this time, in either of  
these senses. By forme then wee here  
vnderstand, the *intrinsicall part of the  
compoundd effect*: so sayth Suarez,  
*meta. disp. 10. sect. 1. n<sup>o</sup>. 7.* that is,  
*Received of the matter, informing the  
same*: Thus saith Thomas. 1. p. q. 7. art.  
1. in cor.

*A forme*





[ *A thing is* ] By these words, the essence of every individuall effect, is attributed to the formall cause : *every thing that doth actually exist* (saith Thomas, 1. p. q. 7. art. 2. in cor.) hath *some forme* ; and againe, *every being is caused by the forme thereof*. 1. p. q. 51. art. 4. in cor.

5.

[ *That which.* ] These words doe attribute the whole effect vnto the forme : and this is agreed vpon by the learned in all ages. *Each thing is that which it is, by its forme* : thus Thomas thinketh, 1. p. q. 5. art. 5. & ad 3<sup>m</sup>. in cor. The whole compound is the effect of the forme ; in the iudgement of Ockam. 1. dist. 32. q. 1. & 2. lit. C. And this sentence agrees well with the nature of the thing : for, *the matter doth finite, and contract the amplitude of the forme, and thereby it becomes the determinate forme of this, or that individuall effect*. The forme, on the other side, doth perfit and determine the matter, and bring it, from power, to act, by giving an essence thereunto : in so much, that, by the forme the essence is terminated

6.

ned vnto some speciall kinde. And thus much wee receiue from *Thomas. 1. p. 9. 7. art. 1. et 3. in cor. q. 14. art. 2. ad 1<sup>m</sup>.*

7.

This argument is of necellary vse, to instruct our vnderstandings in the knowledge of the subiect, to which it is attributed: for, how can we know a thing more cleerely, and certainly, then when wee finde the intrinsicall, primary, and proper nature, and being thereof. *It is all one saith Aristotle 2. post. cap. 8. to know the nature of a thing, and to know the cause of its nature.* Wee haue examples of this kinde of Cause, in the word of God, and the nature of the Creature: when God would shew vs what sinne is, he doth set it out by the forme thereof. *Sinne* (sayth the Apostle *Iohn 1. Epist. chap. 3. v. 4.*) *Is a varying from the Law:* The Apostle *Paul*, when he would set out, what *the righteousness of faith is*, he doth describe it (in his Epistle to the *Romans ch. 4. v. 6. 7. 8.*) *by forgiveness of sinnes.* The holy Ghost doth yeeld vs many of these examples, but these shall suffice,


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In man we haue a full representation of every part of this Argument. Wee say, rationalitie is the formall cause of man. Now, 1. Rationalitie is the intrinsecall part of man, all other of his parts, are more overt, and better knowne. 2. Rationalitie hath a force to bestow a being vpon man : for, when God had drawne together the dust of the earth, man had not (as then) his being; but, he receiued that, when God breathed the breath of life into it: at that time ( I say ) and not before, man became a liuing soule. 3. Rationalitie bestowes vpon man a being, that is actuall, and determined vnto one, and actiue ; whereby he is fit to doe the actions of life. 4. There is nothing essentiall vnto man ; but his rationalitie bestowes it on him : The body ( indeed ) doth make him a singular man, by retaining, and contracting the soule vnto one : but, in what respect he is a man, that he receiues wholly from his soule, and from hence, *the forme is truly sayd to be the beginning of difference, that is be-*

E

*tweene*

tweene one and another, and not the difference it selfe. Thom. 1. dist. 25. q. 1. art. 1. ad 2<sup>m</sup>. I say, the difference of things doth flow from the forme: for, as *unitie in substance doth make two things to be the same*, as *Okam* doth truly teach, 1. dist. 19. q. 1. lit. B. opinio 1<sup>a</sup>. and *Aristotle*, meta. lib. 5. cap. 15. text. 20. so difference in substance makes two things to differ. The forme is not the difference it selfe: for, a forme is a subsistence in an unitie: but, a difference is a dissenting betweene the essence of two: and thus much for the explication of the formall Cause.



## C H A P. X.

*Of the finall Cause.*

Ramus.

*The end is a cause for which the thing is.*

• I

[End] By *end* is meant the last notion which wee haue of the effect:  
and

and importeth that wherunto the thing tendeth. So Aristotle telleth vs, *meta. lib. 2. cap. 1. text. 9.*

An end is { Externall.  
Inter- { The intent of the doer.  
nall, in { The thing { naturally  
          { it selfe { Imposed.

2.

An externall end, is the actuall vse of the thing, to which the effect is fitted. Thus the beatificall vision is mans end, to which he tends. An end in the intent of the doer, is no more but either the fines (it selfe) of the effect thought vpon, and purposed by the efficient; (this is the condition of every workman, that deviseth and resolueth vpon the fashion, and forme of the thing to be wrought) Or the commoditie of the workman, and others, sought thereby.

Wee haue example of an end, thus vnderstood, in those words of *Iohn 3. 16. God so loued the world &c.* Where the giving of Christ is an effect, wrought by God, wherein he intended the glory of himselfe, and his

sonne, and the salvation of the predestinate. Thus the workman that makes an axe intends, that himselfe shall get reputation, and maintenance thereby.

An end of a thing imposed vpon it is, when the efficient inioyned that vie of it, which the thing it selfe doth not yeeld, and this end we finde in lawes, and mony; the one is appointed to be a rule of obedience, the other to set a price of wares. I say appointed by him that hath power to doe it, the things themselues doe not yeeld it; as all men doe know by experience. But the word *end* in this place doth not signifie either of these foure things.

3.

The *end* (as it is in the intent and will of the doer) is a cause indeed metaphorically, not properly, and must be rednced vnto the efficient not the finall: for, in that sort it doth but moue, and induce the principall efficient vnto working: and consequently, it is an efficient that workes morally.

4.

That end vnto which the effectt tendeth naturally, is here understood, and defined.



defined. I haue receiued all these things from Thomas 2. dist. q. 1. art. 1. 2. & 3. 1. p. q. 26. art. 3. ad 2<sup>m</sup>. Suarez de predest. lib. 2. cap. 3. n<sup>o</sup>: 2. Vega in Concil. Trident lib. 7. cap. 2.

[ A cause ] Therefore the end hath an active, and an exercised act, in the producing of the effect: for, that is the proper tie of every cause, as hath beene shewed.

[ For which a thing is ] These words set out the nature of that force: and they signifie, a tendency, aptitude, and fitness which the effect hath naturally, vnto something without it selfe. It is of the nature of a finall cause ( sayth Okam ) actually to intend: and whatsoever doth not so, is not truly, and properly a finall cause in Prologo. 1. sent. q. 1. 1. st. F. G. In the same sort writes Aristotle meta. lib. 2. cap. 1. text, 8. An end ( sayth he ) is that for which a thing is made, that is, whose essence is not so for another, that it followes that other: but, the essence of another followes that.

If any inquire how tendency &c. can haue an actuall exercise vnto do-

5.

6.

7.

ing. First I answer it can, because that tendency flowes from the forme, in as much as the forme doth determine the effect vnto an end, according to its owne proportion: as the forme of Steele is such, as best fitteth with cutting. Thomas. 1<sup>a</sup>. 2e. q. 95 art. 3. in cor. Secondly, the end importeth some good so saith Thomas. 1. p. q. 19. art. 1. ad. 1 and all men grant it: therefore it hath an exercised force to constitute, but herein it differs from the form that doth constitute good & no more: his doth both constitute, and diffuse good: It doth constitute, in as much as, it is the perfection of the effect. I say the perfection of it, because, when the effect hath attained thi her it wanteth nothing requisite to a thing of that kind. It is diffusiue good, in as much as, it is fit, and apt to bestow good vpon others.

Wee haue many examples that shew vs the nature of this argument, Fitnes to rule the day and night is attributed to the Sunne, and Moone *Genesys*. 1. 14. As a thing that followed their nature by creation: thus also, fitnes to accom-

company and help *Adam* is affirmed of *Evah* *Genesis*. 2. 18. 21. as the end of her creation. Man is apt, and fit to loue the knowne good, and that is his end; this findes floweth from his reasonable soule or formall being, whose properie it is to judge truly, and choose freely. Now this findes hath a maine stroake in the constituting of man, not by the way of motion, for that belongs to the efficient, nor by the way of reception, and retention: for, that belongs to the matter: but, by the way of settled position as the forme doth from whence it floweth. 2. By this findes a man is made a perfect, and compleat humane creature: for, when he attaines vnto that, he wants nothing requisite vnto his being. Vntill he be so fitted, we cannot conceiue him a humane creature: for, he would differ nothing from brut beasts.


The vse of this argument is of exceeding worth, to informe our vnderstandings in the knowledge of the subject: for, by it we know the for-

8.

mall cause, and consequently the nature of the thing.

To conclude the doctrine of all the causes ioyntly ; we must not forget, that, from this place, or seat of arguments is deriued knowledge, simply so called. *We are then thought to know a thing, when we understand the causes therof,* thus saith *Ramus*. And to the same effect speaks *Aristotle*, knowledge simply so called (saith he) *poster. lib. 1. cap. 4.* is necessary, that is, when the thing cannot be otherwise then as we know it : and we haue that knowledge, *when we understand the causes* : so saith the same *Aristotle. Poster. lib. 2. cap. 11.* *Thomas* also hath the same thing : knowledge (saith he) *opusc. de demonst. cap. 1.* is to understand of certainty, and we doe so when we understand the causes of the thing, and that, both as it is a cause, and also as it is a cause in act, of that thing : and he giues a reason hereof, *Opusc. 48. de Syllog. cap. 1. viz.* Then our reason doth resolue the thing caused into its causes : from whence knowledge doth flow. And thus much  
for

for the finall cause, and all those arguments which are predicated of the essence of the subiect, and which consequently doe absolutely agree therewith.



C H A P. X I.

*Of Properties.*

**V**WE must now prosecute those arguments which import things without the subiect, and consequently consent with it, after some sort: of this kinde, be all adiuncts, as some doe call them.

*An adiunct is that to which something is subiected, and whatsoever doth externally belong, or happen to any subiect.*

*Ramus.*

An adiunct is  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Proper.} \\ \text{Common.} \end{array} \right.$

*A proper adiunct is that which belongs vnto all, & alone, & alwaies.*

*A*

*A common adiunct is that which is not proper in that sort.*

I.

*Aristotle dissents from Ramus in these precepts: Thomas sayth, 1. p. 9. 77. art. 1. ad 5<sup>m</sup>. Not every thing that is without the essence, may be called an accident: Aristotle hath not the termes of proper and common adiunct; nor the thing comprehended vnder them; but the contrary; he sayth Top. lib. 1. Cap. 5. An accident cannot be proper, otherwise then by relation; as when one sitteth and others stand, then sitting is proper to him. Lastly, Aristotle and others with him doe make a thing proper and an accident to differ formally, as we shal presently finde.*

2.

*Aristotle teacheth, Top. lib. 1. cap. 5. that, Arguments which are without the subject, be properties and accidents. That is sayd to be proper, that is reciprocal with the thing, but yet doth not declare the essence, nor come into the definition thereof. And of these he sayth also Top. lib. 5. cap. 1. They are properties by themselves alwayes, and doe separate, and distinguish from all other things.*



things. Porphyrie also doth distinguish and describe these arguments as Aristotle doth. A propriety (saith he cap. 4.) is that which doth concurre vnto all onely, and alwayes. And againe, cap. 9. A property is that which is in the whole kinde to which it is proper, and onely, and alwayes, so as, if that speciall kinde be taken away, presently the propriety thereof is taken away also. And Thomas doth so set out the nature of this argument, that he giues a reason of all this alledged out of Aristotle, and Porphyrie. A thing proper, sayth he. 1 p. q. 77. art. 1. ad 5<sup>m</sup>. is not of the essence, but is caused by the essentiall principles of the species.

Aristotle, and Porphyrie giues instance of properties, in this sentence.

He that is apt vnto laughing is a man.

He that is apt to learne Grammar is a man.

In this proposition, aptnes vnto laughing, and Grammar-learning, is predicated of man: This aptnes floweth from his reasonable soule, and that is the principall thing in his nature.

I say

I say it floweth therefrom, not as a Contingent motion, but as a naturall emanation: therefore, this aptnes agrees vnto all men, onely, and alwayes. No man wants it, none but man hath it, and all men haue it alwayes, and consequently it is proper vnto man, and proper by it selfe, and the nature thereof, and not made proper by any outward efficient, so as in necellary consecution it is convertible with man: we may truly argue thus,  
 If man, then apt vnto Grammar skill.  
 If apt vnto Grammar skill, then man.

4.

An accident sayth *Aristotle*, *Top. lib. 1. cap. 5.* is neither definition, Genus, nor a propertie, and is in the thing: but so as it may be, and may not be, in one and the same thing. And *Porphyrus* recites the same in his fift Chapter; *Thomas* also in the place last alledged, doth so set out the nature of an accident, that he giues also a reason of *Aristotles* Doctrin: An accident (sayth he) is onely that, which is without the subject, and not caused by the essentiall principles.

*principles thereof.* Now, this doctrine of *Aristotle* is certainly true: therefore we ought to leaue *Ramus* and follow him. I say it is certainly true, that there be some things proper, that be not accidents: namely, all naturall actions, as the act of seeing, is proper to all living creatures: the act of discoursing to man: The bearing of leaues, and fruit to plants: and the outward workes of holinesse, vnto him that hath the habit of holinesse. These are proper, because they are necessary emanations, from nature in the one, and grace in the other: so as, when all requisite circumstances be present, man cannot but see, and worke, the plants cannot but bring forth fruit, and leaues: wherefore, the holy Ghost doth thus reason;

*He that doth righteousness is righteous. 1. Iohn. 3. 7.*

Where the holy Ghost doth necessarily ioyne righteous actions, vnto a man that is habituated with righteousness, as proper vnto him.

Properties

5. Properties be not adjuncts: for, *adjuncts doe outwardly befall the subiect*: and so much the word importeth, and *Ramus* expressly affirmeth. Properties doe not outwardly befall the subiect: but, they are necessary emanations from the principles of nature: Heat, and light doe not outwardly befall the Sunne, and fire: neither doth swimming of timber in the water, outwardly befall the same: & such is the condition of properties.

6. To this seat or place of arguments, the other seven, set downe by *Aristotle*, must be referred: viz. *Quantitie*, *Qualitie*, *Relation*, *Where*, *When*, *The place*, *To enjoy*. For, all of them doe outwardly befall the subiect, and are not caused by the principles of nature; as a little labour will shew; for, *Quantitie* imports no more, but Geometricall measure, or Arithmetical number. *Qualitie* signifies the manner, how a thing existeth, or worketh. *Relation* is no more, but the reference, or respect of one thing to another. *Where* importeth the generall

rall place, wherein the subiect is, as in this, or that Country. *When* expresseth the time, and duration, as this yeare, this moneth, &c. *The place* signifies the particular place, as this stoole, this chayre, &c. *To inioy* signifies all indowments, as Honour, Riches, Clothes, &c

Some man (perhaps) will require me to set out the nature of quantitie, and the rest : and alledge *Aristotles* authoritie for it. I answer, that ought not to be done in this place ; for, that belongs to other Arts, as to Geometry, Arithmeticke, naturall and morall Philosophy. This place requires no more, but that I shew, what force there is in them, to bring the knowledge of the subiect, that receiues them, into our vnderstanding ; and that I haue done partly alreadie, and will make it more plaine, and full by that which followes.

*Porphyrie, cap. 5* { *separable, as sleepe to*  
doth divide an { *a man.*  
*accident into* { *inseparable, as black-*  
{ *nesse to a Crow.*

And *Ramus* followes him. A-

7.

8.

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ness to a Crow.

And *Ramus* followes him. A-

7.

8.



*Aristotle* hath not this division; yet it may be allowed, because, it is true, and vsfull. Blacknes to a Crow is an accident: for, a white Crow, is no lesse a Crow then a blacke one, it is inseparable by Gods appointment. Wee may truly say, this division is vsfull: for, the holy Ghost doth vse it; from vnseparable accidents he doth argue thus. *Ier. 13. 23. The Ethiopian cannot change his skin, nor the Leopard his spots, no more can he leaue his sinne, that is accustomed to doe euill.*

9.

Separable accidents are alway of singular vse, and doe abundantly serue, to lead our vnderstandings into the knowledg of the subiects, vnto which they are attributed. If we take them as they are in themselues, and in that coniunction which is between them and the subiect, then they are but light, and of small force to set out the thing we know not: but because many of them doe meet together in one subiect, therfore their number together makes amends for their weaknes severally:

severally : yet, none of them are so weake severally, but that they doe certainly leade vs to know the outward qualitie, and condition of their subiect, for learning, Riches, beautie, &c. doe vndoubtedly argue their subiects to be learned, rich, and beautiful, and therby we know the condition, which the subiect that receiveth them doth inioy, and how they differ from others, that want riches, learning, or beauty: therefore, the holy Ghost doth so often vse this kinde of argument, and then most chiefly, when he would set out his most beloved obiect. By this argument the spouse is described: *Can. 5. 10. 11. 12* My loue is white, ruddie &c. By this argument also, Goliath is set out *1. Sam. 17. 4. 5. 6. &c.* Then came a man named Goliath of Gath. &c. To conclude, such force is in this argument, that we doe certainly and distinctly know therby, one man from another, and what reuerence, honor, and respect ought to be given to this rather then to that: and thus *Aristo-*

it doth vrge it *Top. lib. 1. cap. 5 ad-  
iungantur autem.*

10.

*Ramus.*

Thus are we come to an end of all the positive consenting arguments: and that we may conclude them all ioyntly, we are to know, that *hitherto is to be referred all kinde of unitie or identitie*: I shall not neede to bestow much labour to shew it: for the thing it selfe is evident, there is nothing wherein one man can be the same with another, vnles it be in things essentiall, or without the essence. It is a ruled case in the Schooles, *Two things are the same Generally, Specially, Numerically, Top. lib. 1. cap. 7.* but this differs nothing from that, and both of them containe an vndoubted truth: Two men are the same generally, because both of them haue a living soule, two men are the same specially, because they haue a reasonable soule, both of them are one numerically, because each of them haue a bodie, flesh, and bones. Two men are the same in riches, health, &c. because they are both rich, and in health.

In

In the next place we come to dissenting arguments.

CHAP. XII.

Of Diverſities

A dissenting argument is that which dissenteth from the thing it argueth.

Ramus.

RAMUS hath this sentence out of Aristotle, to Differ (sayth Porphyrie) in a common sense, is no more, but by a varietie to be distant some wayes or other: so as, a thing is sayd to differ after this sort from it selfe, or from another: and we finde the substance hereof delivered by Aristotle. Top. lib. 1. Cap. 16.

I.

[Dissenting] This word importeth, the name of those arguments which belong to this place, and they may very fitly be so called, because the nature of them doth agree thervn to.

2.

[ *Dissenteth* ] This word comprehends the generall nature of all the arguments which belong to this place, (I say) the generall nature, because arguments doe dissent more waies then one: and it signifieth a *distancy*, arising from a *varietie* as *Prophyrie* hath fitly exprell'd it: for, we say those things are distant each from other, that are severed by a space, or some bodily substance that is betweene them: and this space is the *varietie*, or *varioufnes* that is betweene severall, and distinct arguments: As riches is a barre, that comes betweene a rich man and pouertie: by reason whereof pouertie dissenteth from him that hath riches.

4.

[ *From the thing it argueth* ] This sheweth the terms of this variation, namely, the subiect and the predicate the argument arguing and the argument argued, as for example: Health is an argument arguing, and this dissenteth from a man that is sicke, by reason of that distance, or variation, which ariseth from sicknes: Sicknes doth

doth make such a difference in a sick man from him that hath health, that, that health can no wayes be affirmed of him, therefore saith *Porphyrie*. chap.

3. *Every difference makes a thing various, when it is ioyned therewith.*

These kindes of arguments serue to refell error, and the vse, is very needfull. To know what a thing is, hath the first place, and to know what a thing is not, ought to haue the second: for, by the one our knowledge is begun, and by the other our knowledge is confirmed; we are sure our knowledge is true, when we vnderstand that the thing is no other then as we know it, from whence also it folloves that these arguments belong to *Logick*, seeing we may be truly said to know what we knew not, when wee are confirmed in our knowledge.

To conclude, when wee say these arguments doe leade vs to the knowledge of the subiect, we meane, the qualitie not the essence thereof; They shew what manner of thing it is: not of what nature it is: so sayth *Aristotle*



*Top. lib. 6. cap. 6. Every difference (sayth he) declares after what manner a thing is. We shall see the truth hereof in the particulars following; and thus much shall suffice, touching dissenting arguments in generall.*

*Ramus.* Dissenting arguments are  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{divers.} \\ \text{opposits.} \end{array} \right.$

6.

This precept divideth dissenting arguments, into their severall kindes. *Ramus* did not invent it; *Porphyrus*, *cap. 3.* hath it plainly: *Difference* (saith he) is by accident, or by it selfe: and *Aristotle* hath the same thing plaine enough, *Top. lib. 6. cap. 6. Considerare, &c.* But more plainly, *Top. lib. 1. cap. 16.* where he makes the distancy of arguments to be some great, some small. Wee shall shew the sence hereof, when we come to the particulars.

*Ramus.*

*Arguments that be divers, are such as disagree in some respect onely.*

7.

We have this precept (also) in *Aristotle*; a difference by accident (sayth *Porphyrus*)



Porphyrie) cap. 3. Is that which is not essentiall, nor makes the things that differ, to be another: but divers. And Aristotle implies the same in both the places last alledged. In *Top. 6. cap. 6.* (he saith) a difference by accident is in, and is not in, the thing from which it differs: therefore (according to him) their difference standeth in some respect onely. In *Top. lib. 1. cap. 16.* he sheweth that difference which he saith is small, in the example of sense and science. Now all men know that the difference betweene these two, is respectiue onely, not simply, and really.

Aristotle giues instance of these arguments in Iustice and Fortitude, prudence and temperance, *Top. lib. 1. cap. 16.* Now, these doe differ, because we conceiue this man that hath the one, differs from him that hath not that, but another: they differ from the subiect which they argue, but in some respect onely, namely, through the present condition thereof, because the subiect inioyeth one of them: but not the rest.

8.

I make it manifest by this sentence:  
*Socrates is temperate, but not iust,  
 nor prudent.*

Here, Iustice and prudence dissent from *Socrates*, onely, in respect of his present condition, and because he hath them not: this disagreement that is betweene the subiect, and the predicate, viz. Man, and prudence, makes a diversitie betweene them, and no more. For, a iust man may also be prudent, and a prudent man is not another man, from him that is Iust.

We haue examples of these arguments very often, we say in our *English* Proverbe, *This man is at ods with his wits*; and we meane by it, his wit, and he differs, onely, because he wants it.

In the same sort it is sayd,

*Vlysses was sayre, but not eloquent.*

Where, eloquence differs from *Vlysses*, onely, in respect, that he had it not: for, otherwise it agreed with him no lesse then beautie; he might haue beene the one, as well as the other,  
 not-

notwithstanding the nature of himselfe, and that qualitie.

The vse of this kinde of argument is very behoofefull: for, hereby a man is shewed his error, that thinkes he hath much, when indeed he hath but little: Thus the holy Ghost argueth against the Church of *Pergamus*, *Revel. 2. 12. 13. 14. and 15.*

*Although thou holdest fast my Name in the time of persecution, yet thou hast many faults; for thou entertainest the doctrine of Balaam, and the Nicolaitans.*

So he argueth the Church of *Thyatira*, in the 19. 20. and 21. Verses. And thus much shall suffice touching argumētts that differ from the subiect, of which they are predicated, after the manner of diversitie, and in some respect onely.

## C H A P. XIII.

## Of Opposites.

*Ramus.**Opposites are dissenting arguments,  
which wholly disagree.*

I.

**W**E have this sentence in *Aristotle*, *Top. lib. 1. Cap. 16.* The difference (sayth he) which is in those arguments that be farre distant, or different is very conspicuous. This of *Aristotle*, and that of *Ramus* are the same: for, by farre distant, *Aristotle* can meane no other but opposition, and by conspicuous in difference, he can vnderstand no lesse, then an opposition that is made wholly, and every way: for that opposition is indeed conspicuous: we may finde it with little labour, and iudge of it with great certaintie.

[*Opposites*] This word signifies such things, as are set against each other.

[*Wholly disagree*] That is, both *respectively*, because the subiect doth want

want the thing that dissenteth: and really, because the subiect cannot receiue the thing that dissenteth: When the subiect, and the thing dissenting, doth abhorre each other, and are ( as we say ) incompatible, then there is a totall opposition betweene them: we haue examples hereof in such sayings as these be:

*He that is rich, is not poore.*

*He that is in health, is not sicke.*


I say the nature of opposites is found in these, not in those wherein man barely, and simply is subiected: for dissent is in the qualitie not the quidditie, or being of the subiect: as hath been shewed. 2. Povertie and sicknes agrees to man barely, and simply taken, and so they doe not oppose him at all: the reason why povertie, and sicknesse are opposite vnto a man that is rich, and in health, is because riches, and povertie are of that nature that they cannot befall the same subiect, in the same respect, part, and time: therefore, whensoever one of them is affirmed, the other is thereby denied.

denied. Thus much of opposites in generall; in the next place, I must set downe the speciall kindes of them.




### CHAP. XIII.

Of the distribution of Opposites.



I.

**A**ristotle doth divide Opposites, *Categor. cap. 10.* In the same manner that *Ramus* doth; in these words;



*Thomas*



Thomas doth divide opposites,  
*De veritate, q. 28. art. 6. in cov.*  
 agreeable vnto them both : in these  
 words, *Opposits import a positive na-*  
*ture* { *in both.*

{ *in one, onely, as* { *Contradictories.*  
 { *Privatives.*

That they all agree in the nature of  
 the thing, the explication of the par-  
 ticulars will shew : their difference in  
 manner of speaking, doth helpe (well)  
 vnto the vnderstanding of the whole.


[ *Opposites are* ] In this division,  
 opposition is placed betweene argu-  
 ments that be predicated : but that  
 seemes to be disagreeable vnto the  
 definition of dissenting arguments in  
 generall, *cap. 12.* I answer, opposition  
 is so placed indeed : yet this division  
 disagrees not from that definition: for,  
 they may be vnderstood two wayes,  
 and agreeable to that definition in  
 both. If they speake of the predicates,  
 in case where the one is affirmed, and  
 the other denied of the same subiect,  
 in the same respect, part, and time,  
 then,

2.



then they agree wholly with that definition ; for, then that predicate which is denied, doth oppose the thing argued: and I thinke that these authors meant thus: for, they know that the predicates themselves containe neither truth, nor fallhood, and therefore no opposition. If they speake of the predicates themselves, not attributed to some subiect, then they giue them the foundation of opposition, and not formall, and actuall opposition: and therefore, they agree fully with that definition, and truth: with that definition: for, it doth suppose, that the foundation of formall, and actuall opposition is in the predicates themselves: and they agree with truth: for, it is most certaine, that the predicates themselves are the foundation of formall, and actuall opposition: by reason they are of that nature, that if one be attributed, the rest cannot, as is truly delivered by *Ramus* in this point of opposites: And *Alacio*, in 1. sent. q. 2. lit. H. even as the dore when it is shut, debarrs all entrance:

entrance : and an armour of prooffe  
repells the bullet. Now, I haue cleer-  
ed this doubt, I proceed to set out the  
nature of the particulars.



CH A P. X V.

Of Disparats.

[ *Disparats* ] This word importeth  
inequalitie, and therefore it may  
seeme vnfit for this place : yet it is  
duely placed, for thereby we vnder-  
stand an inequality, not in the quan-  
tity, or force of opposition, as if these  
opposites did oppose, some more,  
and some lesse : but of number, and  
therefore, those opposites which beare  
this tide, are thus defined.

*Disparates* are opposites, one of which  
is alike opposed, to many.

*Aristotle* calls these opposites by the  
name of *Contraries*, and doth set them  
out by these properties: 1. They may  
be, and not be, in the subject. 2. A  
third

*Ramus.*

1.

third thing comes in the means, or middle betweene them. 3. This third, either partakes of both the opposites, or is of it selfe, and partakes of neither. Now it is playne both *Aristotle*, and *Ramus* doe speake of one kind of opposites: for, both of them doe instance the opposites they speake of in one and the same example: viz, *black and white*. If we apply that instance vnto them both, we shall see that they disagree not 1. These colours are opposite 2. They may be, and not be, in the same subiect. 3. They haue a third thing that comes betweene them: as *greene, red, and all other colours*. 4. These middle colours doe partake of *black, and white*. 5. each one of them is alike, or equally opposed to the rest: a man may truly say, he that is blacke, is not red, nor greene &c: and so of the rest. 6. many doe oppose one: for, he that is any one of them is denied to be all the rest.

2.

*Aristotle* doth also instance these opposites in *good, and bad*: and thereby their nature is fitly resembled: for, experience

experience tels vs, that betweene good, and bad actions there be some, which be both good, and bad: and therefore, they partake of both the opposites. There is also, a cessation or omission of action, and that comes betweene them both, and partakes of neither. *Thomas* giues these opposites a seventh, proprietie, viz: *They import a positive nature, sometimes in both, and sometimes but in one*, and doth instance the first in blacke, and white; and we might instance the second, in good, and euill.

Thus we see these authors conspire in one, every one of them brings a part, and all of them together doe make a full, and compleat exposition of the thing in hand.

The vse of this argument is very needfull, and comes often, we finde it in the word of God: The holy Ghost doth argue the Church of *Laodicea*, *Revel. 3. 17.* with this argument, *thou art (sayth hee) wretched, miserable, poore, blinde, and naked: therefore, thou art not rich, nor increa-*

sed with goods, nor needest nothing, as shon vainely braggest. Where, all the things denyed, are opposed vnto the wretched *Laodiceans*, in the next place wee come to Relatiues.

## C H A P. XVI.

### Of Relatiues.

*Ramus.*

*Relatiues are affirming Contraries, the one whereof consists by the mutual relation to the other.*

I.

**W**Ee finde this precept deli-  
vered by *Aristotle* in the  
10. Chap. of his *Categories*: Those ar-  
guments (sayth he) which are opposed  
as Relatiues, the one opposite is refer-  
red to the other mutually: and *Thomas*  
deliuers the same thing, when (sayth  
he 1 p. q. 28. art. 2. in cor.) Things are  
spoken relatively, then a certaine relati-  
on, or reference of one opposite, to ano-  
ther is signified.

[ *Relatiues* ] This word importeth  
things that are referred the one to the  
other

other. *Relatiues* (sayth *Thomas* 1. p. q. 28. art. 1. in cor.) doe signifie according to their proper nature, onely, a respect of one thing to another.

[ *Affirming* ] This word is brought to let out vnto vs, that both termes opposed, doe comprehend positiue beings: *Aristotle* agrees with *Ramus* in it, in the place alledged, when hee sayth, *That, Relatiues (even) in the thing that they are, be referred:* so also, hee giues instance of relative opposition in knowledge, and the thing to be knowne: and both of them doe signifie positiue beings. And *Thomas* doth teach the same thing, as I haue shewed in the 14. Chapter.

The onely doubt is, what the terms in relative opposition doe affirme, *Thomas* doth resolue this doubt, 1. p. q. 28. on this maner:

In Relatiues } Foundation.  
there is their } Relation.

*Relatiues are founded vpon either*  
G 2 *quantitie,*



*quantitie, or action, and passion: art. 1 in cor.* In this sence, Relation doth import an accidentall being in the subiect *art. 2. in cor:* or things assisting outwardly affixed *art. 2. in cor.* The proper nature of relation, consisteth in a respect of one thing to another, *art. 1. ad 1<sup>m</sup>.* which respect doth after a sort befall the thing related, in that it tendeth from it selfe into another *art. 2. in cor.*

3. [Contraries] That is, one single terme, doth oppose another single terme. *Aristotle* teacheth the same thing, when hee putteth knowledge, and the thing to be knowne, as an instance of Relatiue opposition.

4. [The one &c.] In these words, the proper nature of Relatiue opposition is set out: and they import such an opposition, as wherein the terms opposed doe mutually constitute each other. *Aristotle* teacheth the same, when he affirmeth, that the terms opposed be mutually referred each to other: and denies, that mutuall reference to all other kinde of opposites.

Thomas



Thomas also hath the same thing: *Relatiues* (saith he 1.p.q.42.ar.3.ad 2<sup>m</sup>.) are together in nature, and our understanding; in as much as, the one is comprehended in the definition of the other, wherfore *Ramus* concludeth truly in these words.

*Because of this mutuall relation, Relatiues are sayd to bee together in nature, so that, he which perfectly knowes the one, knoweth the other also.*

*Ramus.*

To conclude this point of Relatiue opposition, it may bee demanded, whether all Relatiues be opposites? I answer first; The foundation of Relatiues bee Adjuncts, or Causes, and effects: therefore, in that respect, no relatiues are opposites. Secondly, the proper nature of relation consisteth onely in a respect, that one thing hath vnto another without it selfe, and so also no relatiues are opposites: for which cause, *Aristotle* makes Relatiues to be consenting arguments, as

5.

I haue shewed Chap. 3. foregoing. Thirdly, The things comprehended in the termes related, or referred, be such, that, they agree not vnto the same subiect, in the same respect, part, and time: and thus all relatives be opposites. Fourthly, The opposition that is betweene the termes related, is made relatively, that is, each terme opposed hath a respect, and relation, the one to the other: so as, we conceiue the one is against the other, and the one doth constitute the other; neither of them can be in themselves, nor knowne to vs, but by the one, and the other: yet when they are, they oppose one another; And thus, all relatives be opposites. This I gather from *Tho. 1. p. q. 28. Relatives* (saith he) *signifie a certaine Relation of one terme vnto its opposite, art. 2. in cor.* The nature of relation is a respect of one to another, according to which, one thing is opposed vnto another relatively, *art. 3. in cor.* Thus (I hope) this doubt is fully cleared.

6.

We finde the nature of these arguments

mētfully layd open in this sentence.

*He that is Father to Socrates, is not sonne to Socrates in the same respect, and time.*

Here, 1. Father and Sonne are terms referred the one to the other, as things that respect one another. 2. This respect goeth out of the one to the other, the Father is a respect that tendeth vnto the Sonne, and the Sonne a respect that extendeth to the Father. 3. The termes related doe mutually constitute one another, in their owne being, and our knowledge; the Father is, and is knowne to be, by the Sonne, and the Sonne is, & is knowne to be, by the Father. 4. The foundation of this relation is Paternity, and Filialitie: now, Paternitie being referred vnto Filialitie, we finde cause, and effect: but Paternitie being referred vnto the Father, is an adjunct: and Filialitie is an adjunct to the Sonne. Thus farre they both consent with the subiect which they argue. 5. The things comprehended vnder these two termes cannot agree to the same subiect, in

the same respect, and time: so as, now we finde them opposites: no man can be Father, and Sonne in the same respect, and at the same time. 6. Wee finde these termes of Father, and Son opposed relatively, (that is) in what sort the one doth respect the other, in that sort it is referred, as vnto its opposite: but so as, one terme makes the other to be in it selfe, and our knowledge. 7. These termes of Father and Sonne be contraries: for, as *Thomas* sayth, *Contrarietie is a difference according to the forme. 1<sup>a</sup>. 2<sup>a</sup>. q. 35. art. 3. & 4. in cor.* And such a difference there is betweene Father, and Sonne, Paternitie is formally one thing, and Filialitie is formally another. The same things are to be found in many other examples, as in *Prince*, and *subiect*: *Priest*, and *people*: *Master*, and *servant*: *Seller*, and *buyer*, &c. But this shall suffice, as sufficient to open the nature of relative opposition. In the next place we must come to aduersatiues.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Adversatiues.

*Adversatiues are affirming Contraries, which are alwayes directly opposite each to other.*

Ramus.

**A**ristotle teacheth the same thing touching the nature of these opposits, (though his words seeme different) he sayth of them thus; *Those arguments which be so contrarie, that one of them must of necessitie be in the subiect that can receiue them, they neither are referred the one to the other, nor haue any third to come betweene them.*

I.

[Contraries] Adversatiues be contraries, because one alone opposeth vnto one alone: this opposition is taught by Aristotle, when he sayth, *One of these opposites is in the subiect that is fit to receiue the same, and doth instance them in health, and sickness.*

2.

[Alwayes]

3.

[ *Alwayes* ] This word and the rest which follow, doe set out the speciall nature of these opposits: and by them we vnderstand what these opposites be, and how they differ from all others. This word signifies the continuance, and perpetuities of opposition that is betweene these opposites, namely, that it ceaseth not at any time: because (as *Aristotle* sayth) *no subiect that is capable hereof can possibly be without one of them*: now, in this they differ from Disparates, and relatives: for, every subiect that can be blacke, and white, may at some time be neither of them; so also, a man may be neither Father, nor Sonne. No Father, when he hath no childe, and no childe when he hath no Father.

4.

[ *Directly* ] This word importeth an opposition that is without mixture, interposition, or diversion, like vnto a straight line that extendeth betweene two points, and this no doubt was intended by *Aristotle*, when he sayd, *These opposites be without relation, or a third thing to come betweene them.*  
 Herein




Herein these opposites differ from Disparats, and relatives, the one receiues the interpoling of a third: and the other admits a mixture of consenting, and thereby a diversion from oppoling: by that relation, and respect that the one hath to the other. Wee haue all these particulars layd open to vs, in that one instance which wee finde in *Aristotle*: namely,

*He that is in health, is not sicke.*

In this example we finde, 1. one side set against another. 2. one positive being is set against another; for, so we conceiue of sicknes. 3. One of these is true of a man alwayes: he cannot be but sicke, or well; because, the temper of his bodie requires it, and therefore this opposition is in man alwayes, because when he is sicke, he is not well: and when he is well, he is not sicke. 4. There is no third thing to come betweene sicknes, and health. 5. Sicknes is never mixed with health, nor health with sicknes.

sicknes. 6. This opposition is direct : he that falls from health becomes presently sicke: when sicknes is expelled, then health is presently recovered: the one devours the other, and contrariwise, the one overcomes the other: like vnto two armies in the field, the last motion in fighting on the one side, is the first motion in pursuite on the other side: this may suffice for all those opposites which doe containe positive being in both terms.



## C H A P. XVIII.

### *Of Privatives.*

**I**N this Chapter and that which folowes, wee must handle negative contraries.

*Ramus.*

*Privatives are negative Contraries, the one whereof denies in that subject (onely) wherein the affirmative is by nature.*

*That which is affirmed is called the habit:*

*habit : that which is denyed the privation, or privative.*

**A**RISTOTLE teacheth the same things in the tenth Chapter of his Categories, Privation and habit universally taken (saith he) is sayd concerning one, and the same thing namely, that wherein nature requires that the habit should be. In this we conceive the habit, and the privation ; To have the habit, and to be deprived thereof, and these two are not the same : for, both of them cannot be attributed to the same thing. To be deprived, and to have the habit are opposed as privation, and habit : for, after what sort there is opposition betweene the privation, and habit, in the same sort to have the habit, and to be deprived of the habit are opposed.

[Privatives] This is the name of these opposites: but it seemes not very fitly given : for, it belongs vnto one member onely ; Aristotle (as we see) calls this opposition a privation, and habit ; and Thomas, an opposition according to privation, and habit: de veritate q. 28. art. 6. in cor. [Nega-

1.

2.

3. [ *Negative contraries* ] These opposites be vnfitly called negative, because onely one of them is negative. *Thomas* ( in the place alleadged ) doth expresse the same thing more fitly: *Some opposites* ( sayth he ) *are such as one onely imports a certaine nature, and the rest no more but the removing, or negation of that nature affirmed.* Contraries they may bee called: because one is opposed to one, but not properly, for the negation of a forme hath no forme.
4. [ *The one whereof, &c.* ] These words and the rest doe set out the nature of these opposites, and placeth the same in these properties: 1. The one denies, the other affirms, ( that is ) the one hath a positive being, called a habit, the other the absence of that habit, called a privation, or priuative. 2. This habit, and privation is opposed, not the one against the other, abstracted from their subject: but as the one is received by the subject, so the other is substracted therfrom. 3. This subject whereabouts they are exercised,

fed, is one and the same : even that subiect, and no other is deprived that hath received the habit. 4. That subiect whereabout these opposites are exercised, is not every one vniversally ; but onely that wherein the habit ought to be according to the course of nature.

The reason why these opposites must be exercised about such a subiect is ; because nothing can truly be sayd to be deprived, vnlesse the thing which is remoued, be due thereto by nature. The reason why, to haue the habit, and to be deprived thereof, are opposed, is because the habit and priuation thereof, cannot befall the same subiect, in the same respect, part, and time.

All these particulars are declared in that one instance which *Aristotle* giues, viz.

*He that seeth, is not blind, or deprived of sight.*

In this sentence we finde, 1. Two terms,

terms, viz. sight, and blindnesse.  
2. The one imports a positive being, the other the absence of that being.  
3. The one is affirmed, the other denied, therefore one is opposed to one.  
4. The things themselves abstracted from the subject are not opposed, but their opposition is exercised about one subject. 5. One of the terms is due unto the subject wherein they oppose, viz. sight is due to mans nature: for God made him a seeing creature. 6. The foundation of that opposition is in sight, and blindnesse, in themselves abstracted from their subject: we deny blindnesse unto the same man that hath sight: because mans bodie is not capable of them both together, in the same respect, part, and time. And here I put an end, to the opposition of habit and privation.



C H A P. XIX.

Of Contradictories.

*Contradictories, are negative Contraries, the one whereof denieth every where, or generally.*

*Ramus.*

**A** Contradiction (saith Aliaco 1. sent. q. 5. lit. M.) is the most manifest repugnancy that is, the affirmation of one, and negation of the same: and this is double, the one is of propositions, the other of terms: when as a fixite terme is opposed vnto an infinite terme. This place speaks of the last not of the first. Some opposites (sayth Thomas) de verit. q. 28. art. 6. in cor. doe affirme a certayne nature in one part, the other is a negation of the same, and these are opposites according to affirmation, and negation.

I.

Aristotle doth teach the same things most fully: A Contradiction (sayth he) is an opposition which by it selfe wanteth a meane, or middle betweene  
H them:

*them: Poster. lib. 1. cap. 2. Principium autem &c.* And he doth explicate this thing further; *Categor. cap. 10. Id quoque.* That opposition (sayth he) that falleth vnder affirmation, and negation, is not affirmation, and negation belonging to this place: but the things which fall vnder affirmation, and negation, and these doe oppose the one the other, as affirmation, and negation; for, there is the same manner of opposition in these, as in them, even as affirmation, and negation are opposed, when we say, *he sitteth, he sitteth not.* So also the things subiected in both those sentences are opposed, namely, *to sit, not to sit.*

2.

[ *Contradictories* ] This word is the name of this kinde of opposition, and signifies properly two sentences wch pronounce against each other, but in this place it is vsed to set out things which are subiected vnto such sentences, or doe fall vnder affirmation, and negation, and they may be so applied; because, such things doe oppose each other no lesse naturally, and vniuersally then sentences doe: and there-  
by

by they are the foundation of the affirmation, and negation in sentences.

[*Negative Contraries*] One part of the Contradiction is negative : they may be called Contraries, because one doth oppose vnto one.

3.

[*The one denieth every where.*] These words doe place the nature of Contradictories in these properties: 1. They containe a deniall, that is, the absence of a positive nature, affirmed in the one, is implied, or virtually avouched in the other. 2. This deniall is made by one onely; the other alwaies containing a positive nature. 3. This deniall is made vniversally : for all times, and respects, and every where ; and in all subjects, so as, these oppositions containe alwayes a truth in them, whether *Socrates* be, or be not, one of them is alwayes true, and the other false: wherefore it is proper to the opposition of this kinde, that one of them is true, or false : as *Aristotle* hath truly observed in the tenth chapter of his *Categories*, And the reason of it is good, all things that haue any

4.

being, must either continue, or discontinue in that being: from whence it is, that, *Aristotle* sayth, that *this opposition is made by it selfe, and wants the intermission of a third*: for no power can put a third thing betweene being, and not being, nor cause that thing not to be which is in the same respect and time, when and as it is, nor make that to be which is not in that respect, and during that time wherein it is not.

*Aristotle* and *Abaco* giue vs two examples in the places alledged, that doe fully represent the nature of these opposites.

*He that sitteth, doth not, not sit.*

*He that is a man, is not, a not man.*

Wee haue in these two sentences, two terms, *viz.* *To sit, not to sit. A man, a not man.* The first of these terms comprehends a positiue, and finite nature: in the second, a negation, or absence of that positiue nature, (by a terme infinite, and vnlimited) is implied,

plied. The first is affirmed of a man, the second is denied of the same man. 3. This deniall extends to all times, and respects, wherein that affirmation may be conceiued. 4. This deniall is not voluntary, nor imposed: but, ariseth simply, and absolutely from the nature of the things themselues: no power can make him that is a man, not to be a man, during the time while he is a man. Neither can any power make that a man which is not a man, during the time wherein he is not a man. 5. It is alwayes true, or false of this, or that singular man, that either he is, or that he is not, there can be no third moment assigned, wherein he neither is, nor is not. So as with this I may put an end to Contradictory opposition, and the explication of all positiuē arguments, both Consenting, and Dissenting.

## C H A P. X X.

*Of Comparison in generall.*

**N**OW we must come to comparative Arguments.

*Ramus.*

*Comparative arguments, are those arguments that are compared together.*

• I

*Aristotle* delivers the doctrine of these arguments, fully, and plainly enough, as we shall see anon.

[ *Comparative* ] These Arguments are opposed vnto positive, and therefore, they haue a sense opposite to them.

[ *Compared together* ] These words doe set out the speciall nature of these arguments: they are called Comparative, because they are compared with other things; and this nature consisteth in two things: First, they are compared. Secondly, they are arguments, by meanes of that comparing Thing,



Things are compared together when the one is measured, waighed, or deciphered by the other; Thus timber is compared with the rule; wares are compared with the waights, and the picture with the thing pictured: and thus we vnderstand the word *Compared* in this place. A single terme becomes a compared argument; when it hath such a force to argue, or set out the subiect, as is receiued from another thing, that it is compared withall: and herein, these arguments haue an opposite nature vnto positue: for, they borrow no force to argue from the qualitie, or quantitie of any other arguments.

These arguments haue these foure properties. 1. *They are equally knowne* } (that is) the two things compared, haue in themselues no prioritie, or antecedency, to argue, and be argued: as we finde in the effect, and causes thereof: In the subiect, and the properties, and accidents annexed thereunto. 2. *[Some men doe know the one better then the other.]* That is, in the

2.

event, by reason they are acquainted with the one, and not with the other.


3. [*They are taken sometimes, from things feigned.*] And so, they may well be; for, such things haue a being in our vnderstanding, and that is enough to make them *rationall beings*; as wee learne from *Thomas, 1 part. q. 16. art.*

3. *ad 2<sup>m</sup>*. That is enough also, to giue them a place in *Logick*: for every being, as well rationall, as reall is obiected thereunto. 4. [*Comparisons taken from feigned things doe argue, and set out the subject.*] Because, the force that all comparisons haue to argue, ariseth from the apprehension of our vnderstanding; and not from any reall relation, or consent that the one hath to the other.

3.


Now, because the Reader might know, how to finde a Comparison in a Discourse, wee must vnderstand, that, *sometimes they are set out by certaine words, which are proper to them: and sometimes they lie open in sentences that are fit to expresse them: In this case the first sentence is called the proposition:*

sition: the second the reddition: therefore, when he findes them, he needs no other direction; Sometimes also, they are set downe without notes, or markes; and the parts are inverted, or contracted: then the matter it selfe must direct him. These are all, that belong to comparisons in common,



C H A P. XXI.


Of the Distribution of comparison.



Aristotle hath every branch of this division; In his *Categories* in the sixth Chapter, he placeth Comparison, In quantitie, as proper thereto: and divides it into equall, and unequall. In the 8. Chapter, he placeth Comparison

I.

parison in qualitie, and doth *divide it into like, and unlike*, and makes this kinde of Comparison, to be found onely in qualitie. Lastly, *cap. 6. At horum &c.* and *cap. 7. Omnia vero*, he divides *unequall into greater and lesse*: and the things themselves, that these two Authors bring, are received in the Schooles of all ages; therefore, I will proceed to the particulars.



## C H A P. XXII.

## Of Equalitie.

*Ramus.* Quantitie is that by which things compared are sayd to be so great, or so little.

I.

**A**ristotle doth teach the same thing: *Top. lib. 1. cap. 9. Ex his, &c.* Quantitie, sayth he, importeth magnitude.

[Quantitie] In the first place, we ought to vnderstand what quantitie is,

is, elle we shall not vnderstand, what is meant by a Comparison in quantitie.

[ *That which &c* ] These words set out the nature of quantitie, and place it in a magnitude ; for, according to magnitude, things are sayd to be greater, or lesser : now, magnitude is not taken here Geometrically, nor Arithmetically : but, in a larger sense: even, for every magnitude, by which a thing may be sayd to be thus, or so much: whether it be spoken of bodies, number, or vertues : of things reall, or intellectuall: for, this *Logick* requires; because it hath to doe with all things, wherein our vnderstanding hath any thing to doe.

*Those things are equall, that haue the same quantitie.*

*Ramus.*

One in quantitie makes equall ; so sayth *Okam* 1. dist. 19. q. 1. *lit. B. opinio. 1<sup>a</sup>*. I doe not finde this sentence in *Aristotle* expressly : yet he implies thus much, as wee shall see when we come

2.

come to the Comparison of likenes, chap. 25. And no man thinks otherwise, therefore we must esteeme this sentence to be a precept of Art.

3.

[*Those things are equal*] That is, two things layd together, be of equall quantitie, or magnitude.

[*Which haue the same quantitie.*] That is, which are adæquate in magnitude: as when two lines be of the same length, the one is neither longer nor shorter then the other: when neither end of the scale waighes downe the other: when two numbers agree together, as, two and two; foure and foure; for, thus every magnitude is one in quantitie. Now, we haue the nature of Equals defined, and set our vnto vs, we must know how to finde and vse them.

Ramus.

*The markes, and signes of equalitie are these 5 viz. One. Equal, As much, As and So, denyall of inequalitie.*

4.

As and So, be signes of this comparison; but not proper to them: for,  
many



many times they are found in comparison of likenes. I doe not finde that *Aristotle*, or other Schooles, doe thus punctually shew vs how to finde out these comparisons, onely, I finde that *Thomas* sayth 1. p. q. 42. art. 1. in cor. Then a thing is sayd to be equall, when it is denyed, to be vnequall, that is more or lesse: and I finde the same thing in *Aristotle Meta. lib. 10. text 15. 16.* from whence we may inferre their agreement with *Okam*, that placeth the equallitie of things, in being one in quantitie.

We haue examples wherein comparisons of equallitie are set out by these marks, or signes, namely;

5.

1. Both the Cherubes were of one measure: 1 Kings. 6. 25.

2. Thou hast made them equall to vs: Mat. 20. 12.

3. Sinners lend to sinners, to receiue as much againe; Luke 6. 34.

4. The length of the Citie is as large as the breadth: Revel. 21. 16.

5. I cannot doe lesse, or more then Gods word commands: Numb. 21. 18.

6. Ye

6. *You are not inferior to other Churches: 2. Cor. 12. 13.*

6. Sometime the Proposition and Redditiō are distinctly set downe.

7. *As his part is, that goeth to the battle, so shall his part bee, that carrieth by the tūffe: 1. Sam. 30. 34.*

8. *How much shee hath glorified her selfe, and lived deliciously, so much torment, and sorrow giue her: Revel. 18. 7.*

In these examples, wee finde two Cherubes to bee one in dimension. Two Labourers, one in wages. A lender, and a borrower one in quantitie of money. The length and breadth of the Citie one in measure. The Corinthians and other Churches one in grace, &c. They that went to warre, and they that guarded the stuffe, one in the quantitie of prey. The Whore of Babylons delights, and sorrowes one in extent. By this we see how to finde out such comparisons, as are marked out vnto vs.

7. I will also set downe some comparisons that want those signes, or markes, viz. *What*

*What force vertue hath to happi-  
nes, that force vice hath to cursednes.*

*The Iewes answered, wee can not  
tell, Christ answered neither tell I you.  
Mat. 21. 23.*


In the first, Vice and vertue, are  
one in efficacie. In the second, Christ  
and the Iewes, are one in silence. By  
this we may know how to finde out  
these comparisons.

Now I will shew how we should  
vse them, for, hitherto we finde them  
comparisons, but no arguments, be-  
cause thus farre they are wholly desti-  
tute of relation to any subiect, in this  
quantitie, the one sets out the other,  
and no more: but every argument  
leads vs to know some subiect, which  
we knew not. I will shew their vse,  
by one of the examples, (and I thinke  
that will suffice) on this maner.

*The Whore of Babylon hath sor-  
rowes.*

In this sentence, the word *sorrow*  
doth leade vs to vnderstand what the  
Whore of Babylon is: *viz:* in her e-  
state or condition. Now, because some  
man

man doth not know the quantitie of this sorrow: but doth know the quantitie of her delight: therefore, her sorrow is layd to her delight, and thereby hee comes to know what is the quantitie of her sorrow, in as much, as, shee is one in the quantitie of both. By this I hope the Reader will finde the way how to make vse of all comparatiue arguments, so as, I shall not neede to doe the like in any of the rest which follow.



## C H A P. XXIII.

### *Of Vnequales.*

*Ramus.* Unequall things are those which have not the same quantitie.

I.

**T**O the same effect speaks Thomas 1. p. q. 42. art. 1. in cor. Unequals (sayth he) cannot be one in numericall quantitie: and thus much Aristotle and Okam speake: because, they make those

those things equall, which be one in quantitie.

This definition hath nothing in it to be expounded: for, that is done already in the definition of quantitie.

2.

Cap. 22.

*The greater is that, the quantitie whereof doth exceede.*

Ramus.

The termes of this definition, may be vnderstood by that which is past, in the last Chapter.

The proper markes of this Comparison, are such as these:

2.

*Not onely, but also. Rather this, then that: More then: Much more.*

Examples of these Comparisons, are these which follow.

*I am ready, not to be bound onely: but also, to dye for the name of the Lord Iesus. Act 21. 13.*

*I had rather be a doore-keeper in Gods house, then dwell in the tents of wickednes. Psal. 84. 10.*

*The Lord loneth the gates of Sion, more then all the dwellings of Iacob. Psal. 82. 2.*

*If, when wee were enemies, wee were*

*reconciled to God, by the death of his sonne: much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life. Rom. 5. 6. 7.*

In these examples, we haue these Comparisons. *To be bound, and to dye*, doe differ in the quantitie of bitterness, & this is esteemed to exceed that. *To keepe a dove, and to dwell in the tents &c.* are layd together, and this preferred before that, in mans judgement, as exceeding in the quantitie of excellency. *The gates of Sion*, are compared with the other *dwellings of Israel*, in the quantitie of glory, and louelines, and these preferred before that. *The reconciling of an enemy*, and the *saving of a friend*, are compared in the quantitie of difficultie, and that is judged to excell this.

3.

In these Comparisons, the greater is brought to set out the lesser, to the end, that the lesse may set out and declare the subiect, or thing argued: and the holy Ghost himselfe hath shewed vs how to doe it, for in the last of the examples, he doth reason thus;

*If*



*If Christs death reconciled an enemy,  
then his life will save the reconciled.*

The reason of this consequence is this, viz. (In the judgement of man) the first is more difficult then the second. It is a hard thing to reconcile an enemy; for, then the whole worke is to doe: But not so hard to save a friend; for, such a one is next dore to salvation. In the same sort, *David argues: If I love to dwell in Gods house, rather then in mans tents; then my affection is exceeding fervent thereto: for, mans tents (in the judgement of man) exceed Gods house for outward pleasure, and profit: and after this sort we may argue from the rest.*

## C H A P. XXIIII.

## Of the Lesse.

*Ramus.**The lesse, is that, the quantitie  
whereof is exceeded.*

**I** Shall not need to explicate, and avow this definition: for, that is done enough already, in the two former Chapters: therefore, I proceed to set downe examples of it.

*A stone is heavie, and the sand waigh-  
tie, but a fooles wrath more heavie  
then them both. Pro. 27. 3.*

*I laboured more abundantly then they  
all. 1 Cor. 15. 10.*

*It is easier for a Camell to goe through  
the eye of a needle, then for a rich  
man to enter into the kingdome of  
God. Luk. 18. 25.*

*The Oxe knoweth his owner, and the  
Ass his Masters crib: But Israell  
doth not know, &c. Isa. 1. 3.*

In these Instances, the Comparison  
we seeke for, is very apparent: A  
stone

*stone and a fooles wrath is Compared,* in the quantitie of waight: and that is sayd to be lesse then this. *Paul and others* are layd together in the quantitie of labour, and he exceeds them. *The passing of a Camell through a needles eye,* and *a rich mans going to heaven,* are compared together in the quantitie of difficultie: and that is inferior to this. *The Oxe, and I(raell)* are set together, in the quantitie of ignorance: and these are more blamed then they.

These Comparisons doe argue the greater, by the lesse, and they must be framed thus: A fooles wrath abounds in waight: for, the stones and sand are not so heauie as it. If *I(raell)* be ignorant of me, then their ignorance is excessiue: for, the Oxe in his kinde is not so ignorant: because, he knowes who owes him, and feedes him, so doe not they. And thus much for Comparison in quantitie.

## C H A P. XXV.

## Of Likenesse.

*Ramus.* Now followeth Comparison in qualitie, whereby things are sayd to be such or such.

I. **I** Call a qualitie (sayth Aristotle, *Categor. Cap. 8.*) that, of which, things are sayd to be of this or that manner: and a qualitie must be reckoned amongst them which are sayd to be manifold, or of many sorts.

*Ramus.* Those things are like which haue the same qualitie.

2. Those are like (sayth Aristotle, *meta. lib. 5. cap. 15. text. 20.*) whose qualitie is one. One in qualitie makes things to be like, so sayth *Okam. 1. dist. 19. q. 1. lit. B. opinio 1.* I will end with *Gallius, A likenes* (sayth he) *is an agreement in qualitie. lib. 2. tract. 5. cap. 1. n<sup>o</sup>. 1.*  
From hence wee may conclude, that (in the judgement of Aristotle) those things be equall, which are one  
in

in quantitie: because, he makes them to be like, which be one in qualitie: and consequently, he placeth comparison in qualitie in the same thing that *Okam* doth, whose judgement is alledged. Chap. 22.

*Aristotle* doth explicate the nature of these Comparisons: *Top. lib. 1. cap. 17. Similitudes* (sayth he) must be considered either in things which are of divers kinds; Or in those which are of the same kinde. The first is after this manner: as one thing is to one, so another is to another: as for example, as knowledge is to the thing knowne, so sense is to the thing sensible. Again, as one is in one, so another is in another: as for example, as sight is in the eye, so the mind is in the soule: as, calme is in the Sea, so cleernes is in the ayre: and both of them are quietnesse. Wee haue examples of the second kinde, when the same qualitie is in many: as smelling, seeing, &c. in a man, a horse, a dog: for, how farre forth the same thing is in them, so farre forth they are alike.

3.

4.

I will content my selfe with the bare allegation of *Aristotles* words: I shall not need to compare them with *Ramus*, nor seeke for their sence: because, all that *Ramus* brings in this Comparison, is but an explication, and Comment of the words alledged: what *Aristotle* delivers in brieft, *Ramus* opens at large; therefore, I will set downe what he sayth.

*Ramus.*

*The markes of likenes be these, viz.*

*As, like, After the manner.*

5.

I will shew examples of this Comparison, where the markes are observed: as followeth,

*Let them that love him, be as the Sunne, Iudg. 5. 21.*

*They saw his face as it had beene the face of an Angell. Act. 6. 15.*

*The forme of the fourth is like the sonne of God. Dan. 3. 25.*

*Except yee be circumcised after the manner of Moses: Act. 15. 1.*

*Ramus.*

*Sometime the marke is left out.*

As in this example,

*My sister is a garden inclosed, my sprinse a spring shut up, a fountaine sealed, Cant. 4. 12.*

Of



Of this kinde are all metaphors, or borrowed words, they ( I say ) containe similitudes, as when Christ is called *a rocke, a shepheard, a vine*; and God the Father an *husbandman*. For in them, Christ, and God the Father, are likened vnto those things which be vsually signified in those words.

*The parts of a similitude are sometime layd out at large : either severed, or ioyned ; as when there are foure termes distinctly set downe.*

*Ramus.*

Foure termes, are then found in a full Comparison, when there be two in the Proposition, and two other in the Reddition. These examples will shew it.

6.

*As the waxe melteth at the fire, so let the vngodly perish, at the presence of God. Psal. 68. 2.*

The termes in the Proposition are *Waxe, Fire* : in the Reddition *ungodly, Gods presence*.

*As*

*As the Hart brayeth after the Rivers  
of Water, so panteth my soule after  
thee, O God, Psal. 42. 1.*

The terms in this full Comparifon,  
are thefe foure: The *Hart, River,  
Soule, God.*

*Ramus.*

*Sometime one of the markes is left  
out, and the parts displaced.*

And this we finde in this example:

*Husbands loue your wines, even as  
Christ loued the Church. Ephes. 5.  
29.*

7.

The terms in this Comparifon are,  
*Christ, Church; Husbands, Wines.*  
The Reddition is fet firft, the Propo-  
fition laft. If we place it orderly, this  
is the frame of it: As Christ loued the  
Church, fo must men loue their  
wiues.

*Ramus.*

*Sometime both markes are left out.*  
And this instance shewes it.

*Silver, drosse, over-layd vpon a pot-  
sheard: burning lips, and an euill  
heart. Pro. 26. 23.*

8.

The Comparifon lies thus; as is a  
potheard, and drosse couered with  
silver; so are burning lips, and a wic-  
ked

ked heart : fayre without, and foule within. The foure terms are distinct: *Drosse, Silver ; burning lips, a wicked heart.*

*A Continued similitude, is when the second terme, is to the third, as the first is to the second.*

Ramus.

This example will make it familiar.

*As the Father hath loved me, so have I loved you. Iohn 15. 9.*

In this similitude, there are but three terms: viz. *Father, Christ, Disciples*; *Christ*, the second terme, is referred to the third terme, *Disciples*; so the first terme *Father*, is referred to the second terme *Christ*.

9.

*Here also one marke sometimes is omitted.*

Ramus.

The words of our Saviour will manifest this sentence.

*Oughtest not thou so have had pittie on thy fellow servant, as I had pittie on thee. Mat. 18. 33.*

The three terms in this similitude are these, *Lord, Servant, Fellow* : and it

10.

it ought to haue this forme : As the Lord had pittie on thee : so thou shouldest haue had pittie on thy fellow.

*Ramus.*

*Fained similitudes are of as much force to argue as true.*

II.

And so much we finde in Scripture : for, Christ spake much in parables, and all parables be similitudes taken from fained things. I should now (according to my former course) apply the examples vnto their severall rules ; but I will spare that labour : for, the similitudes doe lye so plaine in them, that much labour will not make them plainer. I may not shew how these similitudes doe argue the subiect, and ingender truth : for, that is not their office, but Comparisons in qualitie, doe onely make our knowledge more easie, and familiar.

This example will shew it.

*The wicked are destroyed.*

In this sentence, destruction is attrib-

buted to wicked men : and thereby we vnderstand what condition befalls them. To make this knowledge more easie, and sensible, the holy Ghost doth compare them to the *melting of Waxe*, and thereby we finde, that, this condition befalls them secretly, certainly, vnrecoverably : for, such is the qualitie of melting waxe, that cannot be discerned how it melteth, nor prevented from melting, nor recovered againe when it is melted.

*Aristotle* seems to differ from *Ramus*, because he maketh *similitudes* usefull


12.

so the framing of  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Reasons.} \\ \text{Syllogismes.} \\ \text{Definitions.} \end{array} \right.$

To the first, because by the induction of many particular likenesses, wee conclude the universall. To the second, because we take as confessed, as it is in such and such, so it is in the thing in question. To the third, because in *Similitudes*, the termes are compared together in one thing, that is, common vnto them: such a thing is a Genus, and a Genus is required to a definition. *Top. lib. 1. cap. 18.*

I answer,

I answer, I must not (now) decide this doubt, because the point it selfe doth not fit this place: for, the first branch speakes of things Compared. The third, of the qualitie wherein they are compared; and both of them belong to the matter of a Comparison, not to the formall nature thereof. The second is a Comparison of equalitie (if any at all) no Comparison of likenesse: and this I take as certaine, therefore here I will end Comparisons of likenesse.



## C H A P. XXVI.

*Of Vnlike.**Ramus.*

*Vnlike things, are those, which haue a diuerse qualittie.*

I.

**W**Ee haue little to say touching this comparison: for, the explication of comparison in likenes, doth sufficiently set out, the nature of



a comparison of vnlikenes. I will therefore adde examples of it, and that shall suffice; and in that also I will content my selfe with these which follow.

*The fourth beast, was unlike to all the beasts before it: Dan. 7. 19.*

*There is one glory of the Sunne, another of the Moone, and another of the Starres, for one Starre differeth from another in glory: 1. Cor. 15. 41.*

*There is none like mee in all the earth: Exod. 9. 14.*

*But not as the offence, so is the gift: Rom. 5. 15.*

*The Sunne doth set, and rise, Man dies, and liues no more.*

The things compared, and the qualitie wherein they are vnlike: are so easie to bee found in these examples, that, I should seeme to lose my labour, if I should attempt to shew them. The last is the most difficult, because it wanteth the signes of this comparison, yet every man may see, that, the *Sunne* and *Man*, are compared together, in the qualitie of dying:

ing: the *Sunne* dyes by setting, and revives by rising, man dyes, but revives no more.

2.

The vse of these dissimilitudes, is also found in this last instance, where every singular man is set out by his subiection to death; as a qualitie of his being: now, although this predication be truly made in the iudgement of all men: (for none will deny that man is subiect to death) yet our knowledge hereof is furthered when the truth is unfolded, and made more easie: for that end, these comparisons of likenes, and vnlikenes are brought: we doe then more readily conceiue what death is to man, when wee see it is vnlike the death of the sunne, that revives, so doth not man. This that I haue sayd (I hope) is sufficient to shew the nature, and vse of similitudes, and dissimilitudes: and therefore here I will end the matter of comparatiue arguments; and all thole which be predicated onely.

CHAP. XXVII.

*Of the Genus and Species.*

**I**N this place wee must set downe, those arguments which bee sometimes predicated, and sometimes subiected: for, that is the last thing contained in this part of *Logick*; as I have shewed in the third Chapter foregoing.

I.

The arguments of this kinde, are called the *second substance*: consisting in the *Genus* and *Species*: as is also declared in the place alleadged. In the handling hereof, wee must first set downe their nature. Secondly, how they be predicated, and how subiected. Thirdly, we must shew that they be a second substance.

*The Genus is that whole, that is essentiall to the parts.*

*Ramus.*

And thus sayth *Aristotle* too. The *Genus* (sayth *Porphyrie*, *Cap. 2.*)

K

Is

Is a certaine whole : yea ( as Okam sayth 1. dist. 8. q. 4. lit. D. & E. ) The Genus importeth the whole thing : not, because it doth partake of all the specificall differences : for then ; one and the same thing should partake of contraries ; which may not be granted, in the iudgement of Aristotle. *Meta. lib. 2. Cap. 12. text. 42.* But because it is an essence common unto many : as the same Aristotle teacheth ; *Top. lib. 1. Cap. 18. ad definitiones, Cap. 5. Proprium verò & Porphyrie, Cap. 2. Quod etiam.* And a whole not designed as Thomas thinketh : 1. dist. 25. q. 1. art. 1. ad. 2<sup>m</sup>.

*Ramus.*

*The Species is a part of the Genus.*

2.

Porphyrie, and Aristotle doe speake to the same purpose ; A Species (sayth Porphyrie) is placed under the Genus, as a thing that is essentiall thereto. cap. 2. *Explicam igitur.* And yet more plainly, in the same Chapter. *Continetur igitur.* The Species is both a whole, and a part : a part unto another (that is)

unto

unto the Genus, sayth Aristotle, *meta.*  
lib. 5. cap. 24. text. 30. A whole not  
unto another, but in others: because it  
is a whole in the parts.

The generall is either *supream*, or in-  
ferior. The speciall is either middle-  
most, or lowest.

Ramus.

The *supream* Genus, is that which  
hath no Genus above it.

The inferior Genus, is that which is  
inferior to one, and superior to ano-  
ther.

The lowest species, is that which can-  
not be divided into other specialls.

Wee have all this in *Porphyria*, and  
thus he writeth in the second Chap-  
ter alleaged. In every Category there  
be some things that be most generall,  
and others that are most speciall; and  
betweene these, there be some that are  
both generall, and speciall. That is most  
generall, unto which there can be no su-  
perior Genus. That is most speciall, un-  
to which there can be no other Species  
inferior. Betweene the most generall;

Arboris  
Porphyrus  
ante de  
scriptio:

and the most speciall ; There be others, which the selfe same thing, is both Genus and Species, being referred some while to one thing, and otherwhile to another : as for example ; a Substance is a Genus, and vnder that, there is a bodie : and vnder a bodie, an animated bodie : and vnder an animated bodie, a living Creature : and vnder a living Creature, a rationall living Creature : vnder that a singular man. Of all these, a substance is most generall, because it is a Genus onely. A man is the most speciall, because it is a Species onely : but a bodie, is a Species of substance, and a Genus vnto an animated body. An animated body, is a Species of a body : Again, a living Creature, is a Species vnto an animated body : and Genus vnto a reasonable living Creature : but a reasonable living Creature, is the Genus of a man. And so much for the nature of the Genus and Species.

3.

Wee must now shew, how the Genus, and Species, is subiected, and predicated : for, that is the second thing we vndertooke. Aristotle doth that,



that, partly in the fourth booke of his *Topickes*, the first and second Chapters: and partly, but more fully, in the fifth Chapter of his *Categories*, where he proceedeth thus: *The Genus is attributed unto all, and every the Species, that are contained under the same. The Species is subiected to the Genus, the Genus is predicated both of the Species, and the individuall: the Species is predicated of the individuall.* Thus farre Aristotle. Wee may make this familiar to our vnderstanding, by these examples:

*A man is a living Creature.*

*Peter is a man.*

In the first, *living Creature* is a Genus, viz. of reasonable, and vnreasonable Creatures. A *man*, is a species: because it is one kinde of living Creature. *Living Creature*, is attributed to man: the Genus to the Species. In the second, *Peter* is an individuall: *Man* is a species, and thereby we see that the species is predicated of the in-

Arboris  
Porphyr  
ante de  
Scriptio:

and the most speciall ; There be others, which the selfe same thing, is both Genus and Species, being referred some while to one thing, and otherwhile to another : as for example ; a Substance is a Genus, and under that, there is a bodie : and under a bodie, an animated bodie : and under an animated bodie, a living Creature : and under a living Creature, a rationall living Creature : under that a singular man. Of all these, a substance is most generall, because it is a Genus onely. A man is the most speciall, because it is a Species onely : but a bodie, is a Species of substance, and a Genus unto an animated body. An animated body, is a Species of a body : Again, a living Creature, is a Species unto an animated body : and Genus unto a reasonable living Creature : but a reasonable living Creature, is the Genus of a man. And so much for the nature of the Genus and Species.

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dividuall; and consequently, the Genus is predicated of the individuall also: for, *the Genus hath no being but in some species*, as Thomas hath truly observed. 1. p. 9. 15. art. 3. ad 4<sup>m</sup>. And the things themselves do say no lesse. If a man, then a living Creature: seeing every man is a living Creature. By this (I hope) it is plaine, that the species is subiected, and both species, and Genus are predicated.

4.

Some man may doubt, whether the Genus be not alwayes predicated, and consequently belongs to those arguments, that are alwayes predicated. I answer, the Genus (as it is a Genus) is alwayes predicated, and so must be, vnlesse we will divert nature: but that Genus that is sometimes a species, is subiected: and may be so, when it is a species, and that is enough to bring the Genus vnto this place; for, it makes it sometime predicated, sometime subiected. This example will shew that I answer truly.

*A living Creature, is a living body,  
able to moue it selfe.*

A

*A living Creature*, is a Genus of a man: but a species of a *living bodie*, and it is subiected in the fore sayd proposition. A living body, is a Genus to a living Creature: for, vnder that is comprehended, the growing plants, that increase: but cannot moue themselves: as a living Creature that can both waxe bigger, and moue themselves also: now, this Genus is predicated of a living Creature: therefore, wee may rest assured, that a Genus is sometimes predicated, and other some time subiected.

The third thing that we seeke for is, whether the Genus, and Species be a second substance. *Aristotle Categor. cap. 5.* proues that they are: on this manner: *They are a substance, because*  
 1. *We may truely say they be something.*  
 2. *They appertaine to the essence of every particular being.* 3. *They are subiected vnto others, and others are predicated of them: which is proper vnto a substance.* *They are a second substance: because.* 1. *They are Communicated to many.* 2. *They are predicated sometimes,*

5.

and consequently, they haue not the proper nature of a substance: for, that is alwayes subiected, in so much, as nothing could exist, but by reason of substance properly so called.

6.

The species comes neerer to a first substance then the Genus: because,  
 1. The species is in nature, and predication neerer to the individuall, then the Genus; as a man is neerer vnto *Peter*, then a living Creature. 2. The Genus, is Communicated to more then the species. 3. The species, as it is a species, is subiected alwaies to the Genus: and it selfe never predicated; but of the individuall. These things are evident in themselves: therefore, I need not adde any proofes to confirme them, they are easie, and open to our vnderstanding: therefore, I will not stand to vnfold them. If any require me to shew, how the Genus, and species doe argue, and set out the first substance, I answer, that, that request is not in vaine: because (as *Aristotle* truly sayth, in the fifth Chapter of his *Categories*.) *All other things*  
 are



are predicated of the first substance: therefore, if the first substance were not, none of the rest could be. Yet notwithstanding, this place doth not require me to shew it: because the instances given already, haue done that in part, and the precepts of a definition will shew it yet more, but they belong to the second part of *Logicke*, and may not be brought hither, without inu-  
u-  
rie to nature, and our vnderstanding.

I will satisfie the demand so farre as this place permits, and this one sentence will doe it.


*Peter is a man.*

Here, *man* is a species, because it is but one kinde of thing, comprehended vnder the name of living Creature. The lowest species, because no Creatures that haue different formall beings, are contained vnder it. *Peter*, signifies a first substance, because it importeth a thing that cannot be divided, otherwisethen into matter, and forme; viz. his soule and body: and they be in *Peter*, as in a whole, not as in a subiect; as we learne by *Aristotle*,  
Categor.

*Categor. cap. 5. Porro ne nos &c. Man* is attributed vnto this first substance, and thereby every superiour Genus is attributed to it also : for, if a man then 1. a living Creature. 2. A liuely body. 3. A body. 4. A substance, and consequently, when wee attribute man vnto *Peter*, that goes not alone, all the rest goe with it.

8. I haue now (I hope) satisfied the demand, and shewed the force that these arguments haue to argue the first substance; and therefore, I am come to an end, of all that belongs vnto those arguments, which be sometimes predicated, and sometimes subiected: and therewithall, I haue finished all that belongs, to the first part of *Logicke*, in the judgement of *Aristotle*, and the nature of the things themselves. *Ramus* doth extend this first part of *Logicke* further then thus: but vndoubtedly, he followes his own apprehension, against the authoritie of all *Logicke* Schooles before him; and the nature of the things themselves. In the next Chapter, I will set downe,

downe, what he sayth, and why I dissent from him, and thereby giue a full Conclusion to this part of *Logicke*.



C H A P. XXVIII.

*Of Coniungates, &c.*

<i>Arguments that arise of the first, are</i>	{	<i>Coniungates.</i>	<i>Ramus.</i>
		<i>Notation.</i>	
		<i>Distribution.</i>	
		<i>Definition.</i>	

*These arguments haue the same force to argue, that the primittives haue, from which they are derived.*

**T**His precept, sets out foure other seats of arguments, more then *Aristotle* hath, and giueth them place in the first part of *Logicke*. They belong to *Logicke*, and so farre this precept is true; but not to this place, and so farre it is false. I say, not to this place; for, even in the judgement of

I.

*Ramus*

*Ramus* himselfe, they belong to other seats of arguments, namely, to them that he calls by the name of privative Arguments; for, (according to him) they haue the same force to argue that the primitiues haue, from which they are deriued; therefore, they are the same with them, seeing the nature of every argument ariseth from its force to argue: but the precepts of them are already dispatched, and ought not to be repeated againe.

2.

If any say, the force that these haue to argue ariseth not first, and originally out of themselues: but by reflection, (as the Moone is conceived to haue her light) and that therefore they ought to haue their owne proper seats in this Art. I answer first, they doe not argue by reflection, or any force received from others, as the particulars will shew. Secondly, although they did so, yet can they challenge no new places: for, if wee should multiplie the seats of arguments, according to the varietie that our vnderstanding doth apprehend  
to

to be in them, then wee must haue an endles (at least) a fruites number: seeing it is in vaine to set ten men to doe the labour of one.

The foresayd seates of arguments, belong not to this place ( in the iudgment of *Aristotle*) therefore common vse hath not given it them, and consequently, they ought not to haue it; because Art is approved by vse: and so much for them all ioyntly.

3.

*Coniugates are names diversly derived from the same beginning.*

*Ramus.*

*Aristotle* doth giue the name of *Coniugates* vnto some arguments; namely, vnto all those that are of the same roote, Case, Coniugation, or ranke: as, *Iustice, Iust, Iustly, Strength, Strong, Strongly, Top. lib. 2. cap. 9.* therefore, there is no difference touching the name. In their nature they are no more, but either formall qualities, accidents, or properties.

4.

*Iustice* in the abstract, is nothing; if we referre it to man, it is an accident: because

because

because he may haue it, and be without it, or a formall qualitie, being denominated, and constituted iust by it. *Iustly*, importeth an action done according to law; and therefore, what Iustice is to man, that Iustly is to an action: Conforming to Law may be, and not be in an action, and being there it doth denominate, and constitute the action iust. *Aristotle* (in the place last alledged) calls them *Cummings*: because when one of them is proved good, and laudable, all the rest are so too: therefore, he never meant to make them a seat of arguments distinct from his ten.

*Ramus.*

*Notation is the interpretation of a name.*

5.

*Aristotle* doth acknowledge, that some words doe interpret the nature of things, and denominate the things themselves: for, thus he writeth; Those are called denominates, which haue the appellation of a name from some other: but so, as, they differ in case, as from *Grammar*, man is called a *Grammari- an*: from strength he is called *Strong*.  
*Categor.*



*Categor. Cap. 1.* These are the same arguments with the former ; for Grammarian, imports the skill of Grammar, and is an accident, because it may be, and not be in man : It is a formall qualitie, seeing it doth constitute, and denominate a man a Grammarian: Grammar is an abstract, and signifies nothing Logically, being no more but a comprehension of precepts. If we referre it to man, it is the same with Grammarian: namely, the same precepts literally, and habitually.

*Distribution is when the whole is divided into parts.*

*Ramus.*

*Distribution is called, the dividing of the whole. The gathering of the parts together, to make up the whole, is called Induction.*

When we say, a man hath two parts, soule and bodie : Living Creatures are reasonable, and vnreasonable, then we make a distribution : and *Aristotle* doth acknowledge these distributions. *Top. lib. 6. Cap. 1.* but in a different sence.

6.

Although

Although it is very probable, that a distribution doth formally consist in an axiome, and therefore it belongs to the second part of *Logicke*: yet I will not now insist thereupon: because the arguments predicated in a distribution, are meerely the Causes themselves; and we cannot finde a compounded effect more cleerly resolved into its Causes, then in a distribution. In the first example of distribution before going, we find the matter informed, arguing the whole effect constituted by that matter. In the second, we have the specificall forme, informing each severall kinde, and arguing that whole effect, which comprehendeth both kinds. The Reader shall finde this answer fully explicated, and proved, *Chap. 38. &c.* in the matter of a distribution.

7.

*Aristotle* doth acknowledge a division belongs to *Logicke*: *Prior. cap. 31.* but he makes it a *Syllogisme*; because something is alway concluded therefrom: though a weake one; because it presumes what it ought to prove. He doth

ac-

acknowledge induction also. *Top. lib. 8. cap. 2. lib. 1. cap. 12. Prior lib. 2. cap. 23.* and by an induction bee vnderstands, a collection of all the singulars, to make the totall: therefore he doth acknowledge it in the present sence: but (according to him) it is one species, kinde, or forme of disputing, little differing from a Syllogisme: for thus he sayth of it: *A Syllogisme, is for Logicians, an Induction for the multitude: Top. lib. 8. cap. 2.* Secondly, It is an instrument more apt to perswade, more open, better knowne to sence: and is common amongst the multitude: but a Syllogisme hath greater force to urge, and is more effectuall against them that are apt to gaine-say: *Top. lib. 1. cap. 12.*

Therefore (according to him) division, and induction belong to the second part of *Logicke*; not to the first: and consequently, a distribution must be referred thither also: for both division and induction are comprehended, or implyed, in a distribution, according to *Ramus*.

L

A definition

*Ramus.*

*A definition is, when wee declare what a thing is.*

*Therefore a perfect definition, is nothing else, but a generall marke, or badge of the causes, which make the essence, or nature of the thing.*

8.

I haue a little to say touching this fourth seate; for, I haue done enough in the last, to satisfie this: for, what appertaines to that, may be applyed to this. *Aristotle* doth acknowledge definitions, and that in the present sence too: but giues them a place in the second part, as wee shall see, cap. 35. &c. The arguments disposed in a definition, belong to the first part of *Logicke*: because as *Thomas* sayth 1. dist. 25. q. 1. art. 1. ad. 2<sup>m</sup>. a definition, according to the intent thereof, doth lead to the knowledge of the thing defined: and this is the case with all axiomes whatsoever. The predicate in a definition belongs to the seat of causes, even in the iudgement of *Ramus* himselfe? for the predicate doth set out what the subiect,

or

or thing defined is, and nothing can doe that, but the causes: therefore a definition deserues no other place in *Logicke*, but the seat of the causes.

Vpon these premises, we may wel conclude; theiſe foure ſeats of arguments in question are ſuperfluous; becauſe Art hath given them place alreadie in the precepts fore-going, therefore wee muſt not ſeeke it here. The ſecond part of *Logicke* comes in the next ranke:

L 2

THE







THE  
SECOND  
PART.

CHAP. XXIX.

*Of disposition, or iudgment.*

*Hitherto wee have handled the first part of Logicke; called Invention. Wee come now to the second, termed Iudgement: Iudgement is a part of Logicke, teaching the maner of disposing arguments, that we may iudge well: for every thing is to be iudged according to certaine rules of disposition. Hence this part of Logicke, is called, both Iudgement, and disposition: the same thing being signified by both termes.*

*Ramus.*

2.



THE  
SECOND  
PART.

C H A P. XXIX.

*Of disposition, or iudgment.*

*Hitherto wee haue handled the first part of Logicke; called Invention. Wee come now to the second, termed Iudgement: Iudgement is a part of Logicke, teaching the manner of disposing arguments, that we may iudge well: for every thing is to be iudged according to certaine rules of disposition. Hence this part of Logicke, is called, both Iudgement, and disposition: the same thing being signified by both termes.*

*Ramus.*

I.



THE substance of all this matter, is already set down in the second chapter, and repeated heere, for the benefit of the Reader. There is no great difficultie in the parts, nor difference in the whole, from *Aristotle*: I haue shewed the consent of both Authors in the place aledged, and I will now giue my opinion of the sence, of every thing that seemes not cleere enough,

2.

[ *Iudgement Disposition* ] These words are vsed for the same thing, and that fitly; for they are the same thing variously considered, the second intends the first, and the first proceeds from the second. The second is the fountaine: the first is the streame: and they make one continued thing. The first is the supreme, the second the subordinate end, and meanes vnto the supreme, in that respect they vary; and not otherwise.

[ *A part* ]

[ *A part* ] *Logicke* hath parts, even by it selfe : for the precepts thereof are of distinct natures, as members in the whole, and therefore we must so conceive of them. The precepts that are contained vnder this name, make a second part: for, the disposing of things doth suppose, that, the things themselves haue a being already.

[ *Disposing* ] These words, and the rest that follow, doe containe the whole shot, or generall summe that ariseth from all the precepts, belonging to this part of *Logicke*: and it signifieth, a ioyning together of distinct things in an orderly frame.

[ *Arguments* ] viz. Those single, or incomplexed termes whereof wee spake in the former part.

[ *Iudge* ] Iudgement, is an act of the vnderstanding, whereby we determine in our selues, that this or that is true, or false. This word sets out the end of those precepts which belong to this part of *Logicke*; namely, the thing they are fit for; and the profit we receiue by them.

[*Well*] That is, not doubtfully : but even as the things are in themselves: and this is the perfection of Iudgement.

This first and vniversall precept, may fitly be exprest in these terms.

1. Some precepts of *Logicke*, doe teach vs to dispose arguments fitly, that thereby wee might iudge of truth, and falsehood cleerely, and certainly.
2. These precepts make vp a second part of *Logicke*.

Now wee vnderstand the grosse summe, wee shall the better know the particulars,

## C H A P. XXX.

### *Of the Division of Disposition.*

**I**N this Chapter wee must divide asunder, what we found together in the former; and so proceede, till we haue veiwed every severall precept.

*Iudgement*



Judgement is  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Axiomaticall.} \\ \text{Dianoeticall.} \end{array} \right.$

Ramus.

By this sentence the precepts belonging to this part, are devided into their severall kindes: and it is as much as to say: These precepts teach vs to frame arguments in an Axiom, & in a discourse, that thereby wee may iudge of truth, and falshood contained in them both. These (I say) are severall kindes, because they be distinct manners of disposing. The first branch supposeth, that some speech may be called an Axiome, and that is true. In this place, the word Axiome signifieth no more, but a declarative, or pronouncing sentence. This kinde of speech deserues that name, because it is (in the nature thereof) more excellent then any other speech of Man. An Axiome is thus defined.

I.

*An Enunciative speeck, is that, that containeth truth or falshood.*

Ramus.

Wee

2.

Wee haue this precept from *Aristotle, de interpre. cap. 4.* He assignes it the first place, and well worthy, for truth and fallshood is the first obiekt of our iudgement, and belongs to all Axiomes whatsoever, and nothing but an Axiome contains truth and fallshood.

[ *Speech* ] This word contains the essence or nature belonging to all Axiomes, and other speeches which are not Axiomes. In this place it signifies, the inward sentence of the minde, and the written sentence, as well as the sentence pronounced in words.

[ *Enunciative.* ] This word, importeth a species, or one kinde of speech: & restraines that word which is common to many, vnto that one kinde which belongs to this place. Enunciating, or Pronouncing implyeth, that speech is the Herald, and proclaimer of mans minde, and so it is indeede, by institution, not of it selfe. *The signification of words, followes the intent of the speaker, and not otherwise: so saith Aristotle*

*Aristotle* in the fourth Chapter alled-  
ged.

[ *Truth and falshood* ] These words,  
containe the proper, and formall be-  
ing of every Axiome in common.  
*Ramus* makes *truth and falshood* a pro-  
pertie belonging to every axiome: but  
*Aristotle* doth more, he placeth the  
primary nature of an axiome therein;  
and so he may well doe; for thereby  
all axiomes are made to differ from  
all other kindes of speech: If there be  
any other thing, that giues being to  
an axiome, from whence this pro-  
pertie doth flow: either wee are not  
able to apprehend it, or want words  
to expresse it. I say, truth, or falshood  
doth make axiomes to differ from all  
other kindes of speech: for single  
termes, as *Man, Peter, to run, to sit,*  
&c. and all commanding, and intrea-  
ting speeches, containe neither truth,  
nor falshood: as *Aristotle* hath well  
observed, *De interpre. Cap. 2. 3. 4.*

Truth ( in the iudgement of all  
Philosophers ) signifies, the adequa-  
tion of the thing, and our vnderstan-  
ding.

ding. Wherefore truth, is radically in the thing, and formally in the vnderstanding, and declaratiuely in a proposition. Wee must conceiue of truth according hercvnto.

*Ramus.*

*A proposition is then true, when it pronounceth of a thing, as the thing is indeed.*

3.

*Aristotle sayth thus too ; Speeches are then true, when they pronounce as a thing is in it selfe: De interpre. Cap. 9. Quare cum orationes & meta lib. 4. cap. 7. sect 27. Cum enim convenit, &c. Thus Tho. 1. p. q. 21. art. 2. in cor. 1. dist. 46. q. 1. art. 2. ad 1<sup>m</sup>. And so all Philosophers speake ; I will giue you the words of *Albertinus* ( a learned Schooleman ) in stead of them all. That proposition ( sayth he ) is true, which is conformable to the thing pronounced of, and false if it be inconformable. fol. 265. col. 1.*

*Ramus.*

*A true axiome is*

*Contingent.*

*Necessary.*

*Contingent,*

*Contingent, when it is in such sort true, that it may also at sometime be false. This is called opinion.*

*A necessary axiome, is when it is alwayes true, and cannot be false. An axiome necessarily false, is called impossible.*

*Ramus.*

*Aristotle speakes wholly after this sort; Every proposition (sayth he) doth signifie something to be, either necessarily, or contingently. Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 1. And further, he sayth Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 33. That is necessary, that cannot be otherwise. Some things are true, and are, but may be otherwise. Opinion is concerning that, that is true, or false, but may be otherwise.*

4.

*For the full explication of this point, we must first vnderstand, that axiomes are necessary, and contingent, by reason that the things whereof they pronounce are necessary, and contingent. Now, that is sayd to be necessary, that is so, and cannot be otherwise. This is simply, and after a sort. Simply, when the being of a thing is of, and by it selfe, and the causes thereof, so necessary, that the*

ding. Wherefore truth, is radically in the thing, and formally in the vnderstanding, and declaratiuely in a proposition. Wee must conceiue of falshood according herevnto.

*Ramus.*

*A proposition is then true, when it pronounceth of a thing, as the thing is indeed.*

3.

*Aristotle sayth thus too ; Speeches are then true, when they pronounce as a thing is in it selfe: De interpre. Cap. 9. Quare cum orationes & meta lib. 4. cap. 7. text 27. Cum enim convenit, &c. Thus Tho. 1. p. q. 21. art. 2. in cor. 1. dist. 46. q. 1. art. 2. ad 1<sup>m</sup>. And so all Philosophers speake ; I will giue you the words of *Albertinus* ( a learned Schooleman ) in stead of them all. That proposition ( sayth he ) is true, which is conformable to the thing pronounced of, and false if it be inconformable. fol. 265. col. 1.*

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Ramus.


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*For the full explication of this point, we must first vnderstand, that axiomes are necessary, and contingent, by reason that the things whereof they pronounce are necessary, and contingent. Now, that is sayd to be necessary, that is so, and cannot be otherwise. This is simply, and after a sort. Simply, when the being of a thing is of, and by it selfe, and the causes thereof, so necessary, that the*



the thing that is, hath its being wholly without relation to any other thing without it selfe. A thing is necessary by supposition, and after a sort, when it is by force of another, the first, is called necessary, simply, and properly: because it is wholly impossible it should be otherwise then it is, thus farre Aristotle *meta. lib. 5. cap. 8.* In the first sence, all Axiomes that pronounce of God, are necessary, either in their truth, or falshood. In the second sence, some propositions that pronounce of the creature be necessary, and some contingent in their truth, and falshood, I will shew you how or when.



And a proposition, when it pronounceth of created effects, is true, or false according hereunto; as wee shall more plainly see when wee come to shew the severall natures of Axiomes:

*Every thing (sayth Aristotle) is necessarie when it is; and every thing necessarily is not, when it is not: but this necessitie, is not a necessitie simply. de interpre. cap. 9. Ergo. Quod.*

I shall shew the truth, and vse of these precepts when I come to the speciall kinde of Axiomes in the next Chapter: therefore I forbear it in this place, least I should hale in something before the time, or repeat what I haue sayd sufficiently already: therefore here I will end those things which belong to all Axiomes in common,

## C H A P. XXXI.

## Of a simple Axiome.

Ramus.

An Axiome is  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Simple.} \\ \text{Compound.} \end{array} \right.$

*A simple Axiome is that, the band whereof is a Verbo.*

I.

**A**ristotle speakes wholly after this sort: *An enuntiative speech is either simple, or compounded of those that be simple. A simple Enunciation, is a voyce that signifieth that something is, or is not, according to the diversitie of times: and he calleth these Axiomes one speech, because one thing onely is predicated of another. de interpre. Cap. 5. & 10.*

Now wee haue the definition of a simple axiome, wee must vnfold it: It containeth three things. 1. The termes of it. 2. The extension of one terme to another. 3. The framing of those

those termes together. I call that a terme (sayth *Aristotle*) *Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 1.* into which the proposition is resolved, and they be three: viz. The predicate, The subiect predicated of, and the Verbe that comes betweene them: now the Verb of it selfe signifies nothing: but serveth to compound those things that cannot be understood, till they be compounded: and therefore it is a perpetuall signe of things predicated, and subiected. Thus *Aristotle* hath taught vs *De interpre. Cap. 3.* The Verbe (in the cōmon language of the Schooles) is called the band, or couple: and that terme agrees well with this doctrine of *Aristotle*: for a band doth compose diuers things together. *Ramus* doth call the subiect, and the predicate, by the name of antecedent, & consequent: but very vnduely: for, the predicate doth not follow vpon the subiect; neither in the thing, nor in our apprehension. Those termes belong to some compound axiomes, as I shall shew in due place.

For further illustration, it is needfull for vs to know: that,

Predication is	{	Naturall,	{	Identicall.	
				Direct.	
		{	Not naturall	{	Contrary to nature.
					Besides nature.

*Identicall predication, is that which nature sayes must be: Direct is that which according to nature may be Contrary to nature, is when the subiect, and predicate are incompatible: when they abhorre one another (as we say.) Besides nature, when the predicate is undecent for the subiect: or the subiect undecent for the predicate. Thus the Iesuites haue taught vs in their Preface to Porphyrie. q. 1. art. 4. and that to very good purpose. Now predication, is taken in this place for naturall predication, not for that which is against nature: for predication against nature is a defection, no perfection in art: and consequently, when we meet with it in any discourse, we must reject it, or reforme it by art.*

*By*

By verbe, is meant a voyce or name that signifies a time, either present, past, or to come: whose office it is to compound the predicate, and subiect: or to seuer them, each from other. And this is so necessary, that no speech can be enunciating till that be added: as Aristotle hath duly remembred: *Interpre. Cap. 3. & 5.*

3.

We may make tryall of these precepts in this example:


4.

*Man is reasonable.*

This sentence is an Axiome: because it contains truth or falshood. 2. It is a simple Axiome: because one thing barely, and vncompoundedly, is referred to another. 3. It hath three termes, viz. 1. *Man.* 2. *Reasonable.* 3. *Is.* *Rationalitie* is the predicate: because it is referred vnto man. *Man* is the subiect, because it receiueth rationalitie. *Is.* serues as a band to tye them both together: from whence they receiue signification, and truth, or falshood. 4. This predi-

cation is naturall: because it agrees to both these termes to be thus ioyned together. 5. It is Identicall: because rationalitie belongs to mans essence.

When we say *Socrates* is prudent, we haue the like proposition, and a direct. predication: because prudence sets out *Socrates* directly, even as a straight line that is extended between two points. And so much for the first thing contained in the definition of a simple Axiome.



## C H A P. XXXII.

*Of the severall kindes of  
simple Axiomes.*

*Ramus.*

A simple Axiome is { *Generall.*  
                                  *Speciall.*

*Generall, when the common cōsequent  
is generally attributed to the com-  
mon antecedent.*

*A*



*A speciall Axiome is*  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Particular.} \\ \text{Proper.} \end{array} \right.$

*A proper Axiome, is when the consequent is attributed to a proper antecedent.*

*Particular, when the common consequent is particularly attributed to the antecedent.*

**A**Ll these precepts agree well with Aristotle: for he teacheth vs on this manner. *A proposition is either universall, or particular, and in part. Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 1. 2. interpre. Cap. 7. Top. lib. 2. Cap. 1. lib. 3. cap. 6.* As universall is that, where the predicate is referred vnto all the subiect. A particular, is that wherein the predicate is referred vnto some part, not vnto all that is contained in the subiect. Thus sayth he *Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 1.* but more plainely at the end of that Chapter. Then (sayth he) the Predicate is referred vnto all, or the whole subiect, when as there is nothing in the subiect, vnto which the predicate is not

I.

referred. The same thing is taught by *Altiaco*. 1. *sent.* 9. 5. *lit.* B. Wee doe then affirm *universality*, when there is nothing contained under the subject, of which the predicate is not affirmed. That is an *universal negation*, when as there is nothing comprehended under the subject; from whence the predicate is not remoued.

2.

[Common] This word doth suppose, that, predicated and subiected arguments import things vniversal, and singular, and in that it doth well. *Aristotle* hath the same thing, and that very plainly opened, *de interpre.* Cap. 7. These are his words, *Some things are vniversal, other some singular. I call that vniversal which of the nature thereof is apt to be attributed to many: that is singular which is not so.*

3.

[Generally] A thing is predicated generally, when the totall being thereof is referred vnto all, or the whole subiect; Thus no common predicate can truly be attributed vnto the subiect. Wee cannot truly say all men is all living Creatures, as *Aristotle* hath well

well observed. *De interpre. Cap. 7.*

A common thing is predicated of the subiect generally, when it is referred to all, or the whole subiect, so farre as the subiect can receiue it, and thus a common thing may truly be predicated of the subiect. Now in this case the axiome is generall, when the subiect importeth a thing common. It is singular, when the subiect importeth a thing singular, or particular; therefore in this sense, the definitions of a generall, and speciall Axiome are certainly true, and taught by *Alsaco*.

*1. sent. q. 5. lit. M.* in these words: *When the subiect is sufficiently distributed by this word All, or some other that is equall thereto: then that proposition is sufficiently vniuersall. A proposition is then sufficiently singular, when the subiect is a terme truly singular. I call that a singular terme (in proper speech) which cannot be affirmed of subiects importing reall distinct things.*

That we may fully vnderstand the nature of predications, we must obserue (with *Aristotle de interpre. cap. 7*

4.

& 10.) That, this word *All* when we find it in a proposition, it doth not signifie the universall predication it selfe: but is onely a note of predication: And further, these words *All*, or *None*, doe signifie no more, but an affirmation, and negation universally made. Accordingly hereunto, Thomas sayth, The predication it selfe is no more, but an absolute referring of a thing signified, unto the subject: as when we referre whitenesse to a man. This word *All*, or *None*, doth but goe with the predication, and importeth an order of the predicate unto the subject. 1. p. q. 3 1. art. 3. in cor. In the like manner, he sayth; This word *some*, that makes a proposition to be particular, doth designe an universall, or common terme indeterminately; from whence it doth not determine the same, unto this or that singular thing. *Opusc. 48. De interpre. Cap. 8.* By this (I hope) the nature of every predication is sufficiently cleared, and made easie to our vnderstanding.

5.

It may be doubted, whether *Ramus* and *Aristotle* doe agree in these precepts,

cepts, and that for three reasons.

1. *Aristotle* makes some propositions indefinite. 2. He makes no proposition proper. 3. He doth not require any common terme vnto an vniversall predication. I answere, notwithstanding all this, yet they doe agree. And I doe so answer, because the opening of these three things, doth giue evident light vnto the nature of predications: a thing worthy our knowledge, for predication is the very Center, and life of *Logicke*: all that goes before, descends hither, and all that followes, flowes from hence.

6.

To the first, *Aristotle* doth not conceiue that an indefinite proposition, doth really differ from an vniversall, and particular. I shew it two wayes, first, He names it but once in all his writings (so farre as I can find.) Secondly, Hee makes a proper proposition to be indefinite, onely, because it wants the signes of vniversall, and particular predication. Prior lib. 1. Cap. 1. now the want of them doth  
not

not make a reall difference, as wee haue already heard by his owne words: againe, they may well be referred vnto vniversall, or particular: because the extension of predication, followes the intent of predicating: and it is not hard to shew, where himselfe makes a proposition to be generall, that wanteth the terms of all, & none.

7.

To the second, It is true, he makes no proposition to be proper ( in expresse words ) yet hee doth it in the thing: for, that proposition is contained vnder those, which he calls particular, for a particular proposition ( formally ) hath an vnlimitted subiect: but virtually it hath a singular thing for the subiect: when we say, *some man is learned*, wee assigne no man of certaintie, vntill we descend to a particular, as *Plato*, or *Aristotle* &c. and this is a proper proposition according to *Ramus*: moreover, if he meant not to comprehend a proper proposition, vnder his particular proposition, then hee hath omitted one precept, essentiall to this Art: I say the doctrine

doctrine of a proper proposition, is essentiall to this Art : and I avow it even by the judgement of *Aristotle* himselfe : for he doth vse them often, and must vse them oftner then any other : for, hee makes an individuall thing, a subiect that receiues all other arguments whatsoeuer ; without which they cannot haue being, nor we any certaine knowledge : but we may not thinke, that he hath omitted it : for that is to charge him vndecently : ( seeing he hath deserved so well ) and against reason : because of the allegations already made : to conclude, he doth giue instance of a contradiction in singular, or proper Axiomes  
*de interpre. cap. 10.*

To the third, *Aristotle* doth require a common thing in vniversal predication, and a singular in singular predication, and thinkes it must be so : because the common, and singular nature of things, is the very first ground, and originall reason from whence predication must be vniversal, and singular : as wee finde by his  
owne



not make a reall difference, as wee haue already heard by his owne words: againe, they may well be referred vnto vniverfall, or particular: because the extension of predication, followes the intent of predicating: and it is not hard to shew, where himselfe makes a proposition to be generall, that wanteth the terms of all, & none.

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we any certaine knowledge: but we  
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whence predications must be vniver-  
fall, and singular: as wee finde by his  
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owne words: *de interpre. cap. 7.* Here I will put an end to the second thing contained in the definition of a simple Axiome. *Cap. 31.*



## CHAP. XXXIII.

*Of an affirmed Axiome.*

I.

**I**N this Chapter wee must discusse the maner how arguments are framed in a simple Axiome: and then weeshall haue dispatched all that is contained in the foresayd definition. Now, that point is resolved in these words

*Ramus.*

An Axiome is  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Affirmed.} \\ \text{Denied.} \end{array} \right.$

2.

*Affirmed when the band of it is affirmed. Denied when it is denied.*  
*Aristotle teacheth the same thing*  
 (for

(for substance) *de interpre. cap. 5. & 6. Prior lib 1. cap. 2.* An Enunciative speech, is either affirmation, or negation. It affirmes when the predicate is affirmed of, or ioyned vnto the subiect. It denyeth, when the predicate is denyed of, or removed from the subiect. Wee haue the same thing in *Aliaco. 1. sent. 9. 5. lit. B B.* Every affirmation, and negation, consisteth of a Nounne, and a Verbe: without a verbe there is no affirmation, nor negation: and this I say: because the verbe [*is*] is referred vnto the subiect, as in this example, *Socrates is lust. Socrates is not lust.* Here, the word *is*, and *is not*, is referred in the one, to him that is *lust*: in the other to him that is not *lust*. Thus farre *Aristotle de interpre. cap. 10. Omnis affirmatio &c. — Hoc dico &c.*

*Ramus* applyes this precept to all Axiomes whatsoeuer. *Aristotle* makes affirmation, and negation proper to simple Axiomes: both say true, in the sense they intended, and both those senses doe agree well enough together: but *Aristotles* iudgement is  
more

more accurate, and Logickall, as wee shall see when wee come to compound Axiomes: therefore, for this time we will proceede.

*Ramus.*

*From hence ariseth the contradiction of Axiomes.*

4.

[ *From hence* ] These words, doe referre vs to the ground or reason from whence propositions are contradictory: namely, from their vniuersall, and particular affirmation, and negation. Of them I say, if *Ramus* meant to referre vs to the next, and formall reason of contradiction; then this reference is true: but if they referre vs to the first, and originall ground of contradiction, then it is not true. *Aristotle de interpre. cap. 6.* doth referre vs to the things themselves which are subiected, and predicated, as to the first fountaine, and originall of contradiction, in propositions: Because (saith he) *A thing that is, is pronounced not to be, and that which is not, as if it were, so also, something is affirmed*

affirmed to be after this, or that manner: and is not after that manner. At other times, some things are pronounced to be present, which are not present: therefore some thing that is affirmed, is denied, and some thing that is denied, is affirmed, and thereby affirmation is opposed to negation, and negation to affirmation: which opposition makes contradiction. Thus saith he. If wee take both these Authors together, we shall see the whole reason of Contradiction.

*A Contradiction is when the same Axiome is affirmed, and denied.* Ramus.

Wee haue this sentence in *Aliaco*.  
 I. sent. q. 5. 1st. M. *A Contradiction*  
 (sayth he) is an affirmation of one  
 thing, and the negation of the same:  
 and this is as well of propositions, as of  
 single termes. Aristotle doth fully a-  
 gree with them both, When (sayth he)  
 the affirmation of one thing, and the ne-  
 gation of the same, are opposed, then  
 there is a Contradiction. De interpre.  
 Cap. 6. Atque hoc esto, &c. Now we  
 see



see what a Contradiction is, we must inquire further after the manner how one, and the same proposition is affirmed, and denied.

*Ramus.*

*A Contradiction is*  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Generall.} \\ \text{Speciall.} \end{array} \right.$

*Generall, when a generall negation, is opposed to a generall affirmation.*

*Speciall, when a particular negation is opposed to an universall affirmation, and contrariwise.*

*A proper proposition, is contradicted by a proper proposition.*

6.

*Aristotle teacheth the same things, but in different words. Propositions (according to him) are opposed as contraries, or contradictories. When a generall affirmative, is opposed by a generall negative, then they are opposed as contraries: but when the same predicate, is universally affirmed, in the one: and not universally, in the other, of the same subject, then they are opposed as contradictory.*



tradictories: de interpre. Cap. 7. A singular proposition is contradicted by a singular: as, Socrates is wise. Socrates is not wise, cap. 10. Perspicuum autem est.

A generall contradiction may be false in both parts.

Ramus.

A speciall Contradiction cannot be true and false together, in both parts.

Aristotle hath the same precept, word for word; in the places last alledged.

These examples following, will set out the precepts of an Axiome, contained in this, and the former Chapter.

1. All men are learned. 3. Some man is not learned.
2. No man is learned. 4. Some man is learned.
5. Socrates is learned. 6. Socrates is not learned.


The first, is an vniversall affirmatiue. The third, is a particular negatiue; and the one doth contradict the other. The second, is an vniversall negatiue.

N

gatiue.

gative. The fourth, a particular affirmative: and they are opposed as Contradictories. The fifth, is an affirmative proper. The sixth, is a negative proper; therefore, they also are Contradictories. The first, and second are opposed as Contraries. *Ramus* calls their opposition, a generall Contradiction.

Now I have finished all that is contained in the definition of a simple Axiome, touching the disposing of Arguments. In the next place we must see, how truth is contained in an Axiome.



## C H A P. XXXIIII.

*Of simple Axiomes necessarily true in common.*

I.

**I**N the 30. Chapter before going, all Axiomes are sayd to containe necessary, or contingent truth, or falsehood: and thereby is implied, that  
truth

truth is contained in them variously, even according vnto the different kinde of Axiomes. In the 31. Chapter, we haue divided Axiomes into simple and compound: therefore, we must (now) set downe, after what manner truth is in simple Axiomes; and thereby finish the precepts touching simple Axiomes. I thinke it sufficient to shew how, and in what case, a simple Axiome is necessarily true: for, thereby we shall know, how they containe a contingent truth: and when wee see how they containe truth, we shall be able to judge how they containe fallhood.

- In a necessary Axiome the Cōsequent is attributed to the Antecedent.
- 1. To all of it, and alwayes.
  - 2. By it selfe, and essentially.
  - 3. { Not only to all, alwayes, & essentially  
But also first, of the whole, and interchangeably.

Ramus.

2.

We finde this precept taken out of  
*Aristotle, Poster. lib. 1. cap. 4.* In which  
place he sayth thus.


*In a necessary  
Axiome, the  
predicate is  
attributed to  
the subiect.*

- |                              |   |
|------------------------------|---|
| 1. To all, that is           | { To all of it, not to<br>some onely.<br>At all times, not<br>at some onely.  |
| 2. By it selfe,<br>that is,  | { 1. As essential ther-<br>to.<br>2. the predicate is in<br>the subiect, et contra<br>3. It is not sayd of a-<br>ny other.<br>4. Even for it selfe,<br>not by accident. |
| 3. Universal-<br>ty, that is | { Of all, by it selfe, &<br>as it is in it selfe.<br>It doth de- { first.<br>monstrate { In e-<br>the subiect { very<br>part.   |

3.

Now, we haue the nature of a neces-  
sary simple Axiome fully layd out,  
wee should vnfold such termes as  
seeme doubtfull: but wee cannot doe  
that

that in this place: for, here we speake of them, in an vniverfall notion, abstracted from all speciall kindes of simple Axiomes. Wee shall come to them in the sixe next Chapters; and then, we shall see the meaning, and vse of this generall precept.



## CHAPTER XXXV.

*Of simple Axiomes, necessarily  
true in speciall.*

Necessary simple  
Axiomes, are { Definitions.  
Distributions.

I Doe not finde this precept, either in *Ramus*, or *Aristotle* exprefly, yet I bring it by the authority of them both. According to *Ramus*, every precept of Art, is a neceffary axiome; but (according to him alfo) a Definition, and Distribution, are precepts of art; therefore, he muft confeffe

they bee necessary Axiomes. The principles, and foundation of a demonstration, are necessary axiomes: in the iudgement of *Aristotle. Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 2.* But a Definition is a principle, and foundation of a Demonstration, even in the sentence of the same *Aristotle, Poster. lib. 1. cap. 33. lib. 2. cap. 3.* Therefore, according to him, every Definition is a necessary Axiome. Wee may argue the like from his authority, for a Distribution: for he inioynes him that makes a Definition, to distribute the thing defined into parts. *Top. lib. 6. Cap. 1.* and in framing his art of *Logicke*, he makes Distributions to be precepts, no lesse then Definitions. Lastly, though I had not their authoritie to avow this precept, yet I might bring it: because a Definition, and a Distribution haue the nature of a necessary Axiome, as we shall see when we examine them.

**CHAP.**

CHAP. XXXVI.

Of a Definition.

**I**N this Chapter, we must see what a Definition is.

*A Definition, is a simple Axiome, wherein we declare what a thing is.*

*Ramus.*

A definition is { perfect. This containes the constituting causes onely.  
imperfect. This sets out the thing by other arguments also.

*The first, is a Definition properly, the second, is called a Description.*

**T**HIS precept is avowed by Aristotle. He makes a Definition to be double, in the thing, though not in words. He sets out the nature of a definition, as Ramus doth. A definition (sayth he) is a sentence that signifies

I.



what the thing is. Top. lib. 1. Cap. 5.  
*A notification of the essence, and doth  
 explicate what a thing is. Poster. lib. 2.  
 Cap. 3.*

A Definition thus set out, must needs be a perfect one. In the first booke of his *Topickes*, and 4. Chapter, he hath these words; *There is something that is proper, that signifies what a thing is: and some other, that doth not so signify. The first is called a definition, the other is commonly called a thing proper: when it is attributed to the same subject with the other.* Now, in this latter place he speakes of a Definition that differs from the former. I say it differs. 1. In the name, he sayth, *this name is but commonly given*, he sayes not so of the former. 2. In this definition, the nature of the thing defined is set out, and more too: it is explicated by properties, that doe not declare the essence: and therefore, in all these places together, he makes one kinde of definition, that sets out the nature of the thing onely; and another that doth so, and more too: and

and consequently (according to him) a definition is perfect, and imperfect: and that in the sence and meaning of *Ramus*. *Thomas* teacheth the same thing expressly: *A definition* (sayth he) *is either perfect, or imperfect, that comprehends the totall being of the thing, as it is constituted by all the causes. This expresseth some of these, and divers condicions also: and is called a description. 2. dist. 27 q. 1. art. 2. ad 9<sup>m</sup>.* In this place we speake of a perfect definition; and therefore vnto *Thomas*, I will ioyne. *Aliaco*: in him I finde these words; *A good description may be conuerued with the thing defined: not onely for one difference of time; but for all times whatsoever: so as, the predicate cannot possibly be severed from the thing defined. Quest. de Resumpta. lis. 2. vnto them two, I will ioyne Richardus de Sancto victore: for, he is most full in explicating of a definition: De trinitate. lib. 4. Cap. 21. fol. 108. That a definition may be perfect, it ought to comprehend the totall; and onely essence of the thing defined: for, as*

it borrowes its name from the thing, so it ought to extend it selfe vnto the vntermost limits of the thing defined. Neither must it exceed it, it ought to agree vnto all, and onely vnto the thing defined, and so farre, that it may be converted into it selfe : Thus farre he. I might shew the same out of later Authors ; but I spare that labour, because these, for their iudgement, may goe in stead of all ; such is their learning, and antiquitie. Others say the same, and none doe dissent from them.

2.

By these authorities we finde what a definition is, and thereby wee are resolved, that a definition is a necessary Axiome, in the sence layd downe *Cap. 34.* and consequently, wee see how to finde out a definition from other sentences : and to iudge of the truth of it when wee haue found it ; But because all this doth shew vs the very secrets of nature, ( as I may say ) and they cannot be vnderstood, neither speedily, nor easily : therefore it will be very profitable ; if I set out a definition by other notes, or markes  
that

that are better knowne to vs: that, when wee haue them altogether, the one will lead to the other: and both together will giue vs certaine knowledge of this *roote*, and *originall* of all knowledge: yea of that knowledge, whereby we know single termes in them selues, as *Aristotle* cales it: *Poster lib. 1. cap. 3. Nos vero*: and that knowledg is no lesse then Angelicall.

*Aristotle* hath done so much in the thing we seeke for, that the assistance of any other authors may seem needles, he shewes vs, positiuely how to know a perfect definition: and lest we should forget, he shewes vs also, the naughtines, and faults in a definition, he doth the first in these termes.

1. A definition is constituted of the Genus and the differences: *Top lib. 1. cap. 8. namely the specificall differences whose office it is to make a definition compleat: and to designe that which is more generall vnto one speciall kinde: and this it doth, by reason that they are taken from the proper forme of the things differenced, as the roote, and originall*

ginall from whence they flow: in the judgement of Thomas. 1. p. q. 29 ar. 3. ad 4<sup>m</sup>. 1. dist. 35. q. 1. art. 1. ad 2<sup>m</sup>.

2. In a definition, the end whereto the thing defined is referred, is not to be omitted. Top. lib. 6 cap. 8.

3. A definition must be universall, and affirmative: Poster lib. 2 cap. 3.

4. He that defineth must use words (so farre as he can) that shall be of cleereſt ſence: becauſe, a definition is made for the getting of knowledg. Top. lib. 6. cap. 1.

4.

Hee abounds in ſkorin v<sup>p</sup> the faults of an evill definition: I will bring ſome of them to further our vnderſtanding. I will not bring all, leaſt I be tedious. He referres them vnto two heads: viz. *Obscuritie*, and *Superfluitie*. The *Obscurities* are ſet downe Top. lib. 6 cap. 2. and they are 4 in number. Firſt, when the thing defined (that admits divers ſences) is not diſtinguiſhed. Secondly, when it is expreſſed by a borrowed ſpeech. Thirdly, when any words are uſed that bee rude,

rudd, and unproper. Fourthly, when the definition is so made, that we cannot find: how it differs from another that is contrary to it, or what the thing is, that is defined: for then it is like a picture that cannot be knowne whose it is, unless it be shewed by writing. The superfluities of a d. finition are 6. He sets them downe in the third chapter of the same booke, and these they are. First, when one thing is repeated often. Secondly, when a definition is made of arguments that in nature doe follow, and in our knowledge are lesse knowne then the thing defined. Thirdly, when in the definition the thing defined is brought: cap. 4. Fourthly, if a superior be defined by an inferior. Fifthly, when more is brought in the definition then ought: cap. 1. Sixtly, Every thing is superfluous, that may be taken away, yet the rest that remaine doth make the thing defined to be evident; and declare the essence thereof. I will conclude in Aristotles words; by these things wee may sufficiently know when a definition, is rightly made, and when it is not.

Top.



*Top. lib. 6. cap. 3.* and therefore I shall neede to say no more to set out the nature of a definition: or what maner of truth is contained in it. Perhaps some man will require mee to set forth, when a definition contains vntruth: but, I thinke that request needles: because every definition contains a necessary truth that followes these rules: and that is vntrue, which doth not obserue them: but, commits the faults against them.

5.

Although these things may seeme sufficient to giue vs knowledge of a definition, and the necessary truth thereof: yet, I thinke it very needfull to set downe a definition, and apply it to the rules alledged.

*A man is a living creature indued with reason.*

This is a definition in all mens iudgement. That it agrees to the former rules, is very manifest; for herein first, *Life*, and *Rationalitie* are attributed to all men; and at all times.

Secondly,



Secondly, They are attributed, not by accident, or the application of a third: but, by themselves, in as much as the essence of *Life*, and *Rationalitie* (even of it selfe) hath a relation vnto man: and wee apprehend the one, by apprehending the other. Thirdly, *Life* and *Rationalitie*, are attributed vnto man vniuersally: that is, not onely vnto all men, and at all times: but, adæquately: so as, all that is in *Life*, and *Rationalitie*, is sayd to belong to man: and all that is in man, is denoted, and set out by *life*, and *rationalitie*: the one is as large, and no larger, then the other. Fourthly, They are attributed vnto man first: that is, they haue no reflexion, or relation to any thing before man: neither is man receptiue of any thing before *life*, and *rationalitie*: but, the first act that they doe, is to giue being to man: and the first being that man receiues is from *life*, and *rationalitie*. *g.* *Life*, and *rationalitie*, even such as they are in themselves, such reference they haue vnto man: in so much that man is no more  
but

but an effect compounded of life and reason : and they no more but an effect resolved into all the causes : I say all the causes, for animalitie ioyned to rationalitie, comprehends all the causes in it. Whereupon the thing defined, exceeds not the definition ; nor the definition is larger then the thing defined : but, they are convertible, wee may truly say, If man then a living Creature indued with reason ; If a living Creature indued with reason, then a man ; and both of them containe one, and the same truth.

Thus haue we done with the definition, we must come to a description next.

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CHAP.

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CHAP. XXXVII.

Of a Description.

*A description is a sentence which setteth out a thing, even by other arguments.*

*Ramus.*

**T**His precept is agreed on by all parties, as the Reader may finde in the foregoing Chapter: therefore, we need not make doubt, whether it belongs to this art or no; It is reasonable cleere: therefore, a few words will prevent all doubtfulness in it.

I.

[ *A thing* ] That is, the thing described. Now, the thing described seemes to be of shorter standing, then the thing defined. A singular, or individuall substance may be described: but not defined: for, so we heard from *Aristotle* in the foregoing Chapter: and he made it a law, that every definition must be vniversall, but that proposition where an individuall thing is subiected, is not vniversall.

2.

O

[ *Other*

3.

[*Other Arguments*] These words doe containe the formall nature of an imperfect definition. The word *argument*, importeth an affirmative predication in a description: for dissenting arguments cannot describe, nor define: no not in the most vnperfect manner: for defining, how imperfect so ever it is, must needs import, that the thing is in some sort or other: but, dissenting arguments doe not serue in the least sort to set out what a thing is. They haue force to shew what a thing is not, and no more. The word *as her*, doth signifie, that the arguments wherby a thing is described, are mixed: and are partly essentiall, partly without the essence. Where wee must know, that, the more neere arguments be vnto the essence, the more force they haue to set out the thing described: and the more truely that sentence wherein they are predicated, may be called by the name of a Definition.

4.

Here it may be doubted, whether a Description may be made in any  
part

part by accidents? I answer: No accident (as it is an accident) hath place in a Definition: and I thinke so, because, *Aristotle* doth perpetually forbid accidents to come within the doores of any Definition. An accident (according to *Aristotle*) may in some respects, and at some time become proper: and in that case, they may serve to describe an individuall subject as this, or that singular man may be made knowne to vs, and differenced from all others, by riches, learning, &c. which he inioyes and none other.

Now we see what arguments are disposed in a description: and how they are referred the one to the other, it remaineth, that, I declare what truth there is in it. In a Description there is a necessary truth. I say necessary truth, *not of constitution* (for that is proper to a perfect definition, where the thing defined, and the definition doe constitute each other, and is adequatly the same thing: according to the sentence of *Thomas*, 1. dist. 25. q. 1. art. 1.

ad 2<sup>m</sup>.) But, of emanation, effluence, and consecution in as much as, the arguments describing, are (at least) so proper vnto the thing described, that they come conuerble therewith: and it cannot but be so, for, if the properties doe belong to the species, or the whole kinde, then they are necessary emanations from the principles of nature, belonging to that kind: and therefore, they stand, and fall together. If the properties appertaine to an individuall, then they haue a necessary connexion therewith, thorough a peculiar right, and possession.

6.

I will adde an instance or two, and thereby the nature, and truth of this precept will be made evident, and cleere.

*A man is a living Creature, mortall, and capable of learning.*

In this sentence, man abstracted from individualitie, (that is, not considered as this or that particular man)



is described: all the words that follow the Verbe [*is*] containe the description; Theſe two terms, viz. *mortall*, and *capable of learning*, are ioyned together by that Verbe, and thereby the description is affirmative. The word *living Creature* is essentiall to man: for, it is the whole short, (as I may say) or comprehension of all the parts of his nature in generall. The words *capable of learning*, import a thing proper vnto mankind, that is, as he is formally this kinde of Creature, which we call man: and therefore, that attribute bordreth next of all to mans particular essence. The word *mortall*, importeth an accident, now made proper to man. I say it is an accident, and no more; because, it flowes not from the principles of his nature. Mans reasonable soule, is the chiefe thing in his being: but mortalitie flowes not from that: for, the soule is living, so sayth the Lord: *He breathed in his face the breath of life, and he became a living soule*, Genesis. 2. 7.



Mortalitye is now proper to all men, because they all, are subiected to death; I say, it is proper to them all, not because they doe, and must dye: but because all of them, and none but them must dye after that sort (that is) by accident. All other Creatures are subiect to dissolution by that nature which they had from God by Creation: but man is subiect to death by imposition: he incurred his mortalitye when he sinned. God threatned it before man sinned. *Genesis 2. 17.* and inflicted it when man had sinned, *Rom. 5. 12.* But that had never beene, if the principles of mans nature had inclined, and fitted him to mortalitye. This being so, we may well conclude; mans mortalitye is very little distant from mans nature. And consequently, this proposition is a definition somewhat vnperfect.

7.


There is a necessary truth in this Description: for, the thing defined, and that wherewith it is defined, are convertible: the sentence is equally true,

true, which wayes soever you take it, if it be read as it lyeth, all men will grant it; if we invert the parts, and say thus, *Every living Creature that is mortall, and capable of learning is man:* no man will deny it. But this truth is not constitutive: for, mortalitie and capacitie vnto learning (as they are conceived by themselves, and as they are in themselves) have no share in mans essence; but is a thing flowing therefrom: and were it not for a third thing that comes betweene them, they might, and might not, belong to man any wayes. This truth is necessary by emanation, and consecution: for, take man as he is a man, he must needs be reasonable, as he is reasonable, he cannot but be capable of learning: take him as he is now a man, and he must needs be mortall: for, he sinned, and God imposed mortalitie vpon him.

We have another example of a Description, in the 2. Epistle to the *Thessalonians*, the 2. Chapter, and 3. verse, &c. which fitteth this place well.

8.

*Antichrist* (an individuall) is sayd to be a man of sinne, the sonne of perdition, an outlaw, &c. Now, all these be accidents, yet they become proper vnto him, in that sense wherein the holy Ghost meant them: and that description containes a truth so necessary, that we may certainly know, that he is *Antichrist* who is a man of sinne, &c. in that sense which the holy Ghost intended in that place. This shall suffice to set out the nature of a description: and thus haue we finished the whole matter touching a Definition.



## CHAP. XXXVIII.

### *Of a Distribution.*

**T**He next thing that comes to be handled; is a distribution: that is defined, or set out in this one generall apprehension.

*Ramus.*

*A distribution, is a simple proposition, wherein the whole is divided into parts.*

*The*

*The whole, is that which containeth the parts.*

*A part, is that, which is contained of the whole.*

*Aristotle* and other *Logick* Schools haue left vs these precepts also: as we shall see by the particulars: *Aristotle* requires, that the thing defined, be distributed into parts: *Top. lib. 6. Cap. 1* *Rur/sus utrumque, &c. cap. 2. Idem Contingit, &c.* Therefore (according to him) a distribution is then made, when the whole is divided into parts. He sayth further; a whole is no more but a gathering together of the parts. *Physicor. lib. 1. text. 17. lib. 4 text 43.* And againe, That is sayd to be a whole, that wants no part of that of which it is sayd to be a whole: either by nature, or as a thing containing that which is contained: so as, they all doe make one certaine thing: *meta. lib. 5. Cap. 25. text 31.* According to *Thomas*, that is a whole, which is divided into parts. *1. p. q. 76. art. 8. in cor.* These Authors doe not tell vs, what a part is conceived a-  
part

I.

part or abstracted from specialties : neither need they, for that is done sufficiently already when they tell vs what a whole is ; and the same thing will better appeare, when wee come to the particulars : therefore I proceed.

*A distributi-  
on, is of the* } *Genus into the Species.  
Integrall into the mem-  
bers.*

*Ramus.*

*The integrall, is a whole to which the parts are essentiall.*

*The Genus, is a whole that is essentiall to the parts.*


2.

I finde no dissent betweene any parties touching this precept: that the Genus, and the Integrall, be wholes, (and in that sense which is now given) is confessed on all hands. I will alledge *Aristotle*: *A whole*, sayth he, is twofold, viz. *Universall* ; or a *total* *existence*. *meta lib. 5. Cap. 25. text 31.* And *Thomas* goes along with him: *A whole* (sayth he) is either an *universall*, or an *Integrall*. 1. p. 9. 77. art.

1. ad 1<sup>m</sup>. According to Aristotle, An universall whole, is also Equivocall, or univocall. The first, when the name onely is common, but the things named be divers: so a man himselfe, and a picture is called a living Creature. The second, when the name is common, and the things named are the same. Categor. Cap. 1. We take an vniversall whole in this last sence. Now, Aristotle in the place of his *Metaphysics* last alledged, doth call that such a whole, as is one to every part; as a living creature is to a man and a beast: in the like sort speakes Thomas in the place last alledged; these are his words: *An vniversall whole, is present to every part, according to the whole essence, and power thereof: as a living Creature, is to a man, and a beast; and therefore it is predicated properly of the singular parts: but an Integrall whole is not in each part, neither according to their whole essence, nor vertue, and therefore it is no wayes predicated of the singular parts; no nor of them all together, unless it be very improperly.* Thus saith he: *Aristotle*



*Aristotle* in the place alledged calls this whole, one thing that ariseth of the parts ; and thereby agrees with *Thomas*: By these allegations we haue this precept agreed vpon , and made plaine ; therefore we may proceed to the severall kindes of Distributions.



# C H A P. XXXIX.

*Of the kindes of Distribution, and first of the Generall into the Specialls.*

- I. **I**N handling the severall Distributions, it is not greatly materiall, either to art, or the things themselues ; that we beginne with the one rather then with the other : but in my opinion, the distribution of the Genus into the Species ought to haue the first place ; because it is first in nature, and obiected first to our vnderstanding, being a comprehension of the particular kindes ; therefore, I will begin with that. *The*



*The Genus, is distributed into the species, when the generall nature is divided, into severall kindes.*

Neither of our Authors hath this precept expressly: yet this place, doth require it, and their doctrine, and practise avowes it, therefore, without further labour, I will proceed to the unfolding thereof.

2.

[ *Divided* ] This word is made proper to this distribution, by the common phrase of Logicians. The meaning of it is, The generall is divided into the specials, if wee inquire how it is divided to them? it may be answered; It is divided two wayes. First, In it selfe, being applyed vnto, or ( as I may say ) bestowed vpon, each kinde: ( not in the totall latitude thereof, but so farre, as one can receive it ). Secondly, Each speciall kinde containes no more then is included in the generall, what is explicitly in any one of the kindes, is implicitly in the whole: what is dilated in that, is thrust together in this.

[ *Severall*

3.

[*Seuerall kindes*] The parts divided are called severall : because they be severed by distinct formes. They are called kindes ; because both of these distinct formes are one, and the same thing in the generall, or vniversall, wee shall see the truth, and evidence of this precept ( thus vnderstood ) in this instance,

*A living Creature, is either reasonable, or unreasonable.*

This sentence, is a simple axiome ; because, one thing, is ioyned to another, by a verbe. I say one, for though the branches of the predicate, be two, being referred to themselves, yet they are but one, when they are referred to the subiect.

4.

[*Living Creature.*] Is the whole that is divided. 2. It is an vniversall whole. 3. The parts into which it is divided, are reasonable, & vnreasonable Creatures. 4. This whole, is bestowed vpon both parts, because the reasonable, and vnreasonable Creatures, (each of

of them apart.) are truly sayd to be living Creatures. 5. Neither the vnreasonable, nor reasonable Creatures haue any thing essentiall to them more then is contained in animalitie: for, that word importeth no more, but such a thing, made by God, as hath life, and motion in it selfe. Now, that includeth a corporall substance, and a spiritualitie, called life: This as the forme, informing the matter: That as the matter informed. The reasonable Creature hath no more: thus he hath a bodie made liuely by his soule, and that is the matter informed. He hath a soule, or life, and that is the forme informing. We finde the like in the vnreasonable Creatures, they haue a bodie, wherein their life remains: this corporall substance is the matter informed, and that life is the forme informing. 6. These doe differ in their kindes, (I say) in their kindes, and not numerically, because, they haue different kindes of corporall substances: so the holy Ghost pronounceth of them, 1. Cor. 15. and so

so we finde by experience. The flesh of man and beasts doe differ in their proper being, and Gods destination: for, the one is made to perish finally, the other to rise againe. These Creatures doe differ also in their life or liuelines: the life of beasts is no more, but as breath that doth vanish at their dissolution: Mans life is more: for, his soule is life; being a living, continuing, and spirituall substance: and no doubt, but that spirituall substance, is informed by a liuelihood, differing therefrom (though our vnderstandings cannot but ghesse at it) 1. because wee finde a secret motion of mans vnderstanding, and will in his soule, differing from the spirituall substance thereof. 2. Because mans soule liues when it is parted from the body.

5.

It may be some will obiekt on this sort; If the species contains no more then is in the Genus, then the specificall difference is also contained in the Genus: but this last is not true: therefore, the first is vntrue also.

I an-

I answer: I grant the assumption; vpon *Aristotles* authoritie, and proote alledged before in the poynt of the Genus. But I deny the consequence; because it doth suppose, that the specificall difference, is a reall being, constituting the species: but that is vtterly vntrue. If that were so, then it is a cause different from the matter, forme, and end. But the last is not true: and this I take as granted: therefore, the first is vntrue also; and consequently, the argument is so too, that is founded therevpon. The specificall difference, is a rationall entitie. and no more; namely, our vnderstandings doe apptehend this kinde, to differ from another, when they are both layd together. Now, this apprehension is a veritie, no fiction: for, it hath a foundation in the thing: namely, the specificall forme, our vnderstanding doth thus argue: This hath one kinde offorme, that hath another, therefore this doth specifically differ from that. And thus the specificall difference doth flow from

P

the

the forme, it is not the specifick forme it selfe. Hitherto wee haue shewed what arguments are disposed in this kinde of Distribution: and the manner how they are disposed; now I will declare that it contains a necessary truth: and I may easily doe that, for it fully agrees with the rules of necessary truth, set downe *Chap. 34.* as will appeare by laying them hereunto.

6.

1. The parts doe belong to the whole, even to all of it, and at all times; there is no animalitie more then is comprehended in the Creatures, reasonable, and vnreasonable. We cannot conceiue a time, wherein the Creatures reasonable, and vnreasonable are not liuing Creatures: and therefore the first Rule agrees with this Distribution,

2. The Creatures, reasonable, and vnreasonable, are liuing Creatures, even by themselues, and their owne nature: there is no third thing that comes betweene their nature, and the nature of a liuing creature, that makes the



the one belong to the other: but, they are so living creatures by themselves, that the one is essentiall to the other: therefore, this Distribution agrees with the second Rule.

3. The Creatures, reasonable, and vnreasonable, even in that thing wherein they are, they are living creatures; so also, even in that nature wherein their being doth consist vniversally, they are living Creatures: yea, and this their nature, wherein they are, they are the first thing in living creatures; we cannot conceiue any thing in the essence of the Creatures, reasonable, and vnreasonable, that exceeds the essence of a living Creature. Neither can we imagine, in any signe, or moment of reason, that there is any thing in the essence of a living Creature, which hath the prioritie, or is before the essence of the creature reasonable, and vnreasonable. I say before, either in nature, or time: but in the first moment wherein you conceiue a living Creature to be: you conceiue a creature, either reasonable,

P 2

ble,

ble, or vnreasonable: Wherevpon animalitie and these creatures are conuertible. All living creatures, conceived as making one totall summe, is no larger in number, then the Creatures reasonable, and vnreasonable; and contrariwise. So also we may say; If a Creature reasonable or vnreasonable, then a living Creature: If a living Creature, then reasonable or vnreasonable. And consequently, all the lawes of necessary truth agree vnto this Distribution.

7.

If any desire to know, when a Distribution of this kinde, is false: let him lay it to these rules, and by them he shall know. If it agrees not with these rules, but comes short, in any part; then it is false. And the more it disagrees from them, the lesse truth there is in it. Here I will end the distribution of the Genus, into the species.

CHAP.

CHAP. XL.

*Of the distribution of the whole  
into the members.*

**I**N this Chapter we must see, what  
a Distribution of the Integrall into  
the members, is.

I.

*The integrall is distributed into the  
members, when the comprehensive  
whole, is parted betweene the things  
comprehended therein.*

I must say of this precept, as I did of  
the last; The doctrine, and practice  
of *Aristotle*, and *Ramus* doth patro-  
nize it; therefore, we may take it for  
a precept of art, though they haue it  
not in so many words; the opening  
thereof, will say, it came from them.

In this Distribution: 1. The whole  
is an individuall. 2. That whole is se-  
vered into peeces, as the timber is by  
the saw, or wedges. 3. The parts haue  
different, and individuall natures.

2.

4. The whole is made by their meeting together ; therefore this second kinde of Distribution differs really from the former.

This one example will make the sence plaine, and easie.

*A man hath two parts,*  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Soule.} \\ \text{Bodie.} \end{array} \right.$

This proposition is a simple axiome: for, one thing is attributed to another. I say one ; because, both members, *viz.* soule and body be one in reference to man: though they be distinct in themselves. 1. Man is the whole divided, (to wit) an individuall man, 2. This whole is shared, one peice to the bodie, another to the soule. 3. The body and soule haue distinct individuall natures, the one corporeall, the other spirituall. 4. The meeting of these two parts together, doth make man, as he is an individuall whole : the soule in forming the body, and the body being informed by the soule. This shall suffice to shew, what arguments be in this distribution:

on : and the manner how they are framed together.

This kinde of distribution containes a necessary truth : because the lawes of necessary truth agree to it.

1. Soule and body are affirmed of all men severally, and at all times, without exception. 2. Bodie, and soule are referred vnto a singular man, by themselves, and their owne essence: not by the force of any third. 3. The soule, and body, in what respect they are, and in the very essence, as they are: they are affirmed of a singular man. I say affirmed, both vniuersally according to the totall nature of themselves : and according to the essence of a singular man. So as the essence of a singular man, and the essence of soule, and bodie, are of equall extent: the one is as large, and no lesse large then the other: so also, this their nature, is affirmed of man in the first instant, and moment of his being, and our apprehension. Wherevpon this whole, and parts, are in their nature convertible. Thus wee

may say, If a man, then soule, and bodie. If soule, and bodie, then a man. These things being so, wee may vndoubtedly say, this kinde of distribution containes a necessary truth : and therewithall put an end vnto this precept in hand.

To conclude, I haue this to say ioyntly, of these precepts touching a Definition and Distribution : their vse is not knowne to the negligent, nor esteemed of the ignorant : but, he that knowes them, and hath found the benefit of them, will say, they are worth the having : for, by them a man may know when a Definition, and Distribution containe a necessary truth ; and an artificiall forme: and consequently, he hath a good guide to lead his reason in the right way vnto true knowledge, and the avoyding of error.

CHAP.



CHAP. XLI.

*Of contingent simple Axiomes.*

**T**HAT I may put a finall Conclufion, to all the precepts that belong vnto fimple Axiomes, I muft fhew what arguments are difpofed in them, how they are difpofed, and what truth is contained in fuch fimple Axiomes; as are neither definitions, nor distributions; and touching them we fay,

I.

*In a fimple axiome every argument may be difpofed, except full Comparifons, thofe that consent, are difpofed affirmatively: and they that difsent negatively.*

*Ramus.*

Full Comparifons are iuftly excepted, out of fimple axiomes, becaufe they containe foure termes diftinctly layd, the one to the other, no wayes made one by any Coniunction.

By arguments, is meant fingle arguments,

guments, for all the foure causes together, and essentiall properties, belong not to simple axiomes of this sort; they are proper to definitions and distributions.

2.

We shall finde necessary truth or fallshood in all such axiomes as pronounce of a thing either as it is in present being, or as it is past. I say necessary truth, not simply; but after a sort; because, the *thing that is, or is not, that was, or was not, cannot but be, when it is; nor but not be, when it is not*: as Aristotle hath truly observed, *De interpre. Cap. 9.*

3.

Simple axiomes that pronounce of a thing to come, containe a certaine truth, or fallshood; in respect of God: for, he foreknowes all things possible by his simple intelligence: and all things that shall be, by his intuition or knowledge of vision. In respect of mans knowledge, none of those Axiomes do containe a certaine truth; for vnto man, all future things are contingent, and consequently mans knowledge of them must needs also  
be

be contingent: vnto Man (I say) they are contingent: for as much as, their next causes whervpon they depend, are contingent. All humane actions depend vpon mans will, as their next cause, and mans will is a facultie free, and indetermined vnto one: and therefore contingent. All other things, not humane, are also contingent: because, their next cause may be hindered in their execution. Man is at Gods dispose, and all the other Creatures are at Gods, and mans. These axiomes may containe a contingent truth, in respect of man, and that is all he can haue of them. And here a finall end for simple axiomes.



## CHAP. XLII.

*Of compound Axiomes in generall.*

**C**ompound Axiomes come now to be handled; their generall nature may be exprest in this proposition:

*Ramus.*

*A compound axiome is that, the band whereof is a coniunction.*

I.

So *Ramus*, and thus *Aristotle*. *A speech compounded of simple Axiomes, is made one, by a Coniunction, de interpre.* In which words he doth acknowledge. 1. Some axiomes are compounded axiomes. 2. Such axiomes are compounded of simple Axiomes. 3. They are made one by that composition. 4. Their parts are tyed together by a Coniunction: therefore, he delivers the same precept with *Ramus*, and vnfolds the meaning of it.

Thus farre *Aristotle* went: but never further (for any thing that I can finde:) yet may we not say therefore, that his *Logick* is an imperfect art: because it may be all his writings are not come to our hands; If that be so, then time hath done iniury both to him and vs. I thinke rather, he omitted compound axiomes of purpose. If he did so, he had good reason for it: for, the precepts of simple axiomes giue light enough to shew vs how to  
judge

iudge of these : for these being compounded of them, they must needs be the foundation of these : and consequently, he that can iudge truly of them, cannot be ignorant of these. Neither may we accuse *Ramus* of a superfluitie in art ; for, reason avowes his deed alio ; because, these precepts are convenient, and make the knowledge, and vse of this art more easie.

2. Learned men of all ages haue vsed such axiomes as he calls compound : therefore, he might make the precept, of them to be parcell of this art, seing vse, and experience is the mistress of art. The one did well in omitting ; because, he tyed himselfe to exactnes. The other did well to bring them in, because, he regarded precedent custome, and future ease. We will goe with *Ramus* alone ; because, we cannot haue *Aristotles* company.

[*Axiome*] This word doth put vs in minde, that, these propositions

1. Haue arguments framed in them.

2. They are framed in these, in a fashion differing from simple axiomes,  
from

2.

from whence they are called compound. 3. They containe truth, or fallhood: for such is the condition of all axiomes whatsoever.

3. [ *That* ] This word implyeth, that, a compound axiome, is but one proposition, or enuntiation, as *Aristotle* calls it.

4. [ *Band* ] This word giues vs to vnderstand, that, in compound axiomes we shall find two distinct things tyed together: and in this, they ioyne with simple axiomes.

[ *Coniunction* ] By this word wee know, the band of a connext axiome is, a coniunction: and herein stands a maine, and principall difference between simple, & compound axioms; they had a verbe; these haue a coniunction, to tie their parts together. In a simple axiome, we found a predicate, and subiect: in these, we finde parts tyed together, but no name for them: we must seeke for that in the particular axiomes themselues. This is another reall difference betweene simple, and compound axiomes: thus farre,



farre, for their generall nature. This generall is thus divided.



CHAP. XLIII.

Of a Copulative Axiome.

A compound Axiome is	{	Congre-	{	Copulative.
		gative,	{	Connexive.
		Segregative,	{	discrete.
			{	disjunct.

Ramus.

A Copulative is that, the coniunction whereof, is Copulative.

THIS Definition, doth send vs to seeke an enuntiative sentence, whose parts are tyed together by this word *And*. But a little labour will not finde it, yea, it seemes vnpossible ever to be found: for, this word, is very vnfit so to tye the parts of a sentence

I.

tence together, that thereby one argument should set out another: and truth, or fallshood be pronounced: seeing it doth neither affirme, nor infer, nor any wayes serue for those ends. It may be, his Copulatiue axiomes bee contained in such sentences as these be;

*Christ dyed, and rose againe.*

*Withouts, shall be dogs, and sorcerers,  
and murtherers, and whoremongers,  
and Idolaters, &c.*

Both these propositions be compound, according to *Aristotle*; for, each of them is made one by a Conjunction: they may be called Copulatiue, because that Conjunction is Copulatiue. The forenamed axiomes are compounded of simple axiomes. The first, of two axiomes; the other of fīue. But (according to *Ramus*) both of them be simple, because their band is a verbe. Neither of them a compound; for their Conjunction  
tyes

tyes not the parts of the proposition together; for, it neither affirms, nor interres truth, or fallhood. It tyeth one part of the Axiome together, and makes it one by the knitting together of divers parts, and no more. If we take a veiw of them as they lye, wee shall see all these things plainly.

In the first instance; *Christ* is the subiect, *death*, and *resurrection*, are made the predicate: both of these are ioyned together by the word *And*: and thereby they are made one; that is, not one thing: but one truth together. This one predicate, is referred vnto that subiect, by the verbe that is included in them both, in the truth of the thing, the first containes two axiomes. *Christ dyed*, *Christ did rise from death*, and we finde the same truth in them both, being taken apart, that we doe, when both the predicates are put together into one axiom. The same is the case with the second, when it stands in due forme, thus:

*Whoremongers, Idolaters, Liers, &c.  
haue no right to heauen.*

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2.


In the truth of the thing, this is a simple axiome, as the former was: the predicate *damnation*, is referred to the subiect *Whoremongers*, &c. by a verbe: the subiect consisteth of diuers parts, distinct betweene themselves, *Whoremongers*, *Idolaters*, &c. all those parts are made one by the word *And*. I say one, not in themselves: but in the truth of this proposition, so as, if wee referre damnation to them all ioyntly, it containes a certaine truth. If that predicate be referred vnto *Whoremongers* alone, *Lyers* alone, &c. each one of them doe containe a truth, no lesse certaine, and vndoubted.

A Contradiction is made to this kinde of axiome, by denying the word *And*: for, thereby we say, all the parts vnted together, doe not agree vnto the other part, to which they are referred.

3.

This precept is made evident, by either of the examples alledged. If I say damnation belongs not to *whoremongers*,

mongers, Christ suffered not death; I put an expresse Contradiction to them both, if these be true, those be false. If they be true, these be false: but, this Contradiction is the same with simple axiomes: for, one, and the same predicate, is denied of one, and the same singular subject: therefore we may conclude, these sentences are compound Copulative propositions in their present forme; but simple propositions in the truth of the thing. If you take them, as men doe speake them, then they are compound: if you take them as men ought to speake, then they are simple. And this shall suffice for Copulative axiomes.



CHAP. XLIIII.

*Of connexe Axiomes.*

**A** Connexe axiome comes next: the nature whereof may be thus set out.

Q 3

Ans

*Ramus.*

*An axiome, is then Connex, when a Connexive Coniunction is the band thereof.*

I.

This kinde of Compound axiome, is easie to be found, and fity thus named: It is in frequent vse amongst men, and the nature of it consisteth in composition. There are presidents of it that seeme much to differ, I will propound examples of them both, that the matter may be fully opened,

1. *If in this life we enjoy all our happinesse, then we onely are miserable.*
2. *If righteousness be by the law, then Christ dyed in vaine.*

2.

These propositions are compound ( according to *Aristotle* and *Ramus* too ) for, each of them are made one by a coniuñction, thatso tyés both the parts together, that, they containe such truth, as the parts doe not, when they are taken in sunder, and each one by it selfe. Secondly, They are compounded



pounded of simple Axiomes. In the first, we haue these two: first, All our happines is in this life. Secondly, We onely are miserable. In the second we haue the like. First, Iustice is by the Law. Secondly, Christ dyed in vaine. Lastly, these 2 simple Axiomes are made one proposition, by the coniunction; *If*, and *Then*, I say they are one, not by mixture, but by voyce: that pronounceth the latter certainly to be, where the former is.

These compound axiomes, are called *Conditionall*, in the common phrase of the Schooles; because, the first part is put Conditionally, not absolutely: but (I thinke) the terme of *Connex*, is more fit: because, the latter part is inferred from the former, and therefore it is made to haue a being together with the former: and consequently, it is annexed, and knit vnto the former.

The parts knit together in this kind of axiomes, are named *Antecedent*, and *Consequent*: and they are so in themselves; for, the first in place, is

the first in nature, and our apprehension: else it could haue no force to inferre the second. The second followes the first, and receiues its being therefrom: All arguments may be disposed in this axiome, that haue place in a simple axiome: because, this serueth to conclude all questions, that may be concluded by a simple axiome: so also they may be disposed in the same manner, in this, that they may in a simple, ( that is ) Consenting arguments affirmatiuely, and Dissenting negatiuely.

The truth of this axiome dependeth vpon the Connexion of the parts; so as, if the one doth follow vpon the other, then the axiome is true; otherwise it is false, therefore, if the one doth necessarily inferre the other, then the truth of it is also necessary. If the one doth inferre the other Contingently, then it contains but opinion onely: or a Contingent truth.

The inference, that this rule contains, is most certaine, and vndoubted:

red: The antecedent part of it, is agreed vpon in the Schooles. I will avow it by two Authors of Credir, and they shall be in stead of all. The first of them is *Gregorie de Arim. lib. 1. dist. 42 q. 2. art. 1. in decisio questionis.* Conditionall speekees may be true, and their parts false. These are his words, and they imply, that, the truth of Conditionall speeches, depends vpon their connexion, not their parts. The second is *Alvarez. de Auxilijs, disp. 72. no. 5. ad 3<sup>m</sup>.* There is required vnto the truth of a Conditionall proposition, that the Consequent follow vpon the Antecedent. Whether the Antecedent be the adauquate Cause of the Consequent, or an effect thereof, or a Condition presupposing another Cause. It is enough, if the Consequent followes by vertue of that Condition. Thus farre his words; and they are so plaine, and so full, that, we can require no more authoritie for this question: yet that I may conceale nothing, that may giue light vnto this maine, and important rule, I will proceed a little further.

We must vnderstand: *The Illation or Consequence of a Connexe, or Conditionall proposition, is either formall, or materiall.* The sentences alledged out of Gregory and Alvarez, are vnderstood of formall Illation. Now, in such there is alwayes a necessary truth, and no contingency. A materiall Illation is, when the consequent goes with the Antecedent: yet so as it followes the same, not by force thereof. We finde these propositions in conditionall promises, and in the iudgements that wee giue of future things, that depend vpon the libertie of mans will. These Illations being pronounced by God, haue alwayes a necessary veritie: for, he cannot deny himselfe: therefore he keepes his word Iustly. Mans will is subiected to Gods dominion, therefore he will determine it to one. His power is infinite, therefore he cannot be defeated: but these propositions being pronounced by man, doe containe (at the best) but opinion, contingent, and coniecturall knowledge. Thus much out of Alvarez de Auxilijs disp. 7. n<sup>o</sup>. 7. &c. And Suarez, opusc. 2. lib. 2.

*lib. 2. cap. 5. n<sup>o</sup>. 8. &c.* Where the Reader shall finde these things proued, and vnfolded to the full.

A contradiction is then made to this axiome, when the Illation, or consequence is denyed: and wee doe that, by saying, although the first be true, yet the later is not true: but more plainely, and directly, when we say, the later followes not vpon the former.

This precept is very needfull, for thereby we know how to apply an answer for the refutation, and disproofe of such a proposition. By this also, we know what we must proue, when wee would avow a connex axiome: namely, not the parts themselves; but the following of the later vpon the former. If this opposition to a connex axiome may with reason be called a contradictiō in any sence, then in this art it may goe for a Contradiction indeed: but I doubt whether in reason it may be so called or no: because, the whole band that tyesthe parts of this axiome together,

is

is not denied : and Consequently, there is not an opposition made of one proposition vnto the same proposition : for one thing is not severed from that subiect, vnto which it was ioyned: but onely the same thing is denied to follow, which was once affirmed to follow : and these things may suffice to set out the nature of a connexe axiome.

Before I make a full end of this precept, I must shew what affinities, or rather foundation, a connexe axiome hath with a simple. I may truly say, a simple axiome, and this compound differ nothing but in the manner of pronouncing. Men vsually speake in a connexe forme, because the manner is more familiar in many things: but they should speake in the forme of a simple axiome, in the exactnes of art: therefore, we may resolve these into them: as I will shew by the instances alledged.

The first example of a connexe axiome, viz. *If in this life onely &c.* may be reduced vnto a simple axiome  
in



in every mans iudgement : because, it hath but three termes in it : but in truth, it is somewhat difficult whether it may be so reduced or no : because, it pronounceth of some kinde of men, not vniversally of all : yet it may be done truely, and plainly, if we first know, that the antecedent part ought to be set downe in these words: *They that haue no happinesse but in this life, and here they haue none.* I say, these last words must be added: because, the Connex axiome doth suppose them, and therevpon inferres the Consequent : which otherwise it could not doe. Those words being added, we may bring this Connex axiome, and the Apostles whole disputation therefrom, into this simple forme.

*They that haue no happinesse but in this life, and here, they haue none, they onely are miserable.*

*But we onely are not miserable.*

*Therefore we haue some happinesse which is not in this life.*

The

The other Connex proposition, viz. *If righteousnes be by the &c.* is yet more difficult: yea so difficult, that, if we take it as it lyes, it is not to be reduced vnto a simple forme: for it contains two propositions every way distinct: and therefore, it hath foure termes, viz. 1. *Righteousnes.* 2. *Law.* 3. *Christ.* 4. *Vaine*: but if we take the Apostles whole disputation together, and frame it according to art, it will easily make a simple forme: for thus the Apostle disputeth.

*They that maintaine this sentence, Iustice comes by the Law, they must maintaine this sentence also, Christ dyed in vaine.*


*But no man may say, Christ dyed in vaine.*

*Therefore no man may say, Iustice comes by the Law.*

To conclude this point of Connex axiomes; I hope it doth now appeare, that, they are fundamentally, and indeed no other but simple.

Therefore

Therefore whatsoever belongs vnto them, it is due first vnto simple axiomes, and Consequently, they deriue the same from them. They differ only in manner of pronouncing, and not otherwayes. It is now time that I proceed to a Discrete Axiome.



CHAP. XLV.

*Of a discrete Axiome.*

**T**He nature of a discrete Axiome is opened in these words.

*That Axiome is discrete, that hath a discrete Coniunction for the band thereof.*

The Axiome now defined, is of no lesse frequent vse then the former, nor is it lesse vsfull, in the common converse of man: therefore it is well worth our knowing, and consequently this precept doth well deserue a place

Y.

place in Art. Wee shall vnderstand it the better, if we put an instance or two. There bee different kindes of this also; I will propound one of each, that wee may be the better able to iudge of them, as occasion serues.

1 *Though I walke in the vale of death, yet I will not feare ill. Psal.*

23. 4.

2. *Althoug thou heldest fast my name in the time of persecutiō, yet thou art guiltie of many faults. Revel. 2. 13. 14.*

2.

These are compound Axiomes in the iudgement, both of *Ramus* and *Aristotle*: for in them, two simple Axiomes are ioyned together by a coniunction; and thereby each of them is one intire sentence. I say one sentence, in their voyce of pronouncing, though the coniunction doth thrust the parts one from another; for these propositions doe say, hee that hath the first may bee without the second: and thereby pronounce but one thing.

In

In these Axiomes, dissenting arguments onely are disposed: and dissentingly in the same manner as they are disposed in simple Axiomes: for what can be severed from the subject, but those arguments that dissent from it. The parts of this Axiome can have no name: because, it contains nothing that doth antecede, or follow; vnlesse we will giue it those names which belong to a simple Axiome.

3.

The conjunction which tyes the parts together, is called *discrete*: and in this place it imports no more but a thing that keepe two asunder, for the present, that, at another time may meete together. If we examine these two examples, wee shall easily vnderstand the rule. In the first, *not fearing of ill*; is denied to him that *walkes in the vale of drash*: not simply and absolutely, as if no man could so walke, and *fear ill*; but as a thing which was severed for that time onely; or that did arise vpon that occasion. In the second example, there seemes some difficultie:

4.

difficultie: because it consisteth onely of consenting arguments: for a constant profession of faith, and guiltines of a fault, are attributed to one subiect: The second example, is like the first, if wee frame it exactly according to Art, it will haue these wordes.

*Although thou didst well in these, yet thou didst not well in some other things.*

5.

In this proposition, *ill doing in some things*, is attributed vnto a *well doer* in some other things: but these two differ only in respect of the present time, and those parties, they differ not of their owne nature. For these that did ill in some things, might haue done well in all.

*Ramiss.*

*A discrete Axiome is iudged to be true, if both parts be true, and good, if both parties be diuers.*

6.

[*Good*] That is in respect of the forme. A discrete Axiome is then framed according to Art, when the partes of it doe dissent by diversitie,  
not



not as opposites. This rule must be vnderstood of such Axiomes, as are most agreeable to Art, and in that sence it is most true. If it be vnderstood vniversally, it is not true. If I shall say, *although I am rich yet I am not poore*. I shall frame my discretive Axiome according to Art: for I sever povertie from riches, not simply, and every way: but onely as proceeding from, or bearing company with riches: and that is enough to make it a formall discrete Axiome: because this serues for no other end, but to take away an illation, and to sett a thing falsely inferred, from the thing that did inferre the same. Such an Axiome is ridiculous I grant, but in him that would haue riches, and povertie goe together, not in him that denies their going together.

[ *Both parts true* ] This rule holds in every discretive Axiome whatsoever. The Axiome is false, vnles both parts be true some wayes or other: for in every Axiome of this kinde, the first part is let passe as true. In some

R

Axiomes

7.

Axiomes it is so indeede, and in the thing: but in some other it is so in courtesie onely: not in the thing. The second part must alwaies be true, otherwise it denyes not the inference opposed thereby: and therefore it pronounceth not as the thing is. The examples formerly alledged, will make the matter plaine. In the first, *David* presumes, that, hee did walke through the vale of death; and so hee did indeede: yet he denyes, that thereby he was made to feare ill. If he had feared ill, then hee had pronounced falsely. If neither himselfe, nor any other had presumed, that, he did walke in the vale of death; then (for that also) he had pronounced falsely; for in both these cases, hee had pronounced otherwise then the thing was indeede. The Apostle *Paul* 2. Cor. 11 6. is content to yeeld his accusers, that, he was rude in speech: yet hee denyes that he is so in knowledge. The first is true by concession onely; not in the thing: for his speech was excellent, both for Logicke, and Rhetoricke,

ricke, as his disputation and exhortations doe witnesse. The second is true indeede, otherwise he had made no answer to them that argued him slender in knowledge : because hee was *rude in speech.*

Hitherto I haue opened the nature of discretive Axiomes, it remains that I shew how they be supported by a simple Axiome. Touching that I say, In the thing it is no more but a simple Axiome, as the yce is no more but water: for Art will resolue these Axiomes into simple, as heate, and raine doth dissolve the yce. The first example is no more but as *David* had sayd, *walking through the vale of death, and the feare of ill, doe not alwayes goe together.* In the same sort, *Paul* answers to his accusers: *Rude speech and slender knowledge, are not companions.* Hereupon wee may conclude: discretive Axiomes, are compounded as they are pronounced: but they are simple as they ought to be resolved: therefore whatsoever belongs to a simple Axiome, appertaines to them also.

## C H A P. XLVI.

*Of Disiunct Axiomes.*

**I**N the last place we must come to the precepts of a disjunct axiome: and that may be thus defined.

*Ramus.*

*That axiome is disjunct, whose band is a disjunctive Coniunction.*

I.

These axiomes are seldome in vse, and when we finde them, they are rather disputations by Syllogisme, then single sentences by themselves, pronouncing truth or fallhood: yet notwithstanding, I will vntold their nature, that we may haue a true iudgement of them. We may see that, in this instance;

*Either Saul shall live for ever, or dye by Gods hand, or the enemies sword, or the course of nature. 1. Sam. 26.*

IO.

2.

This sentence is a compound axiome, both

both according to *Ramus*, and *Aristotle*: for divers single propositions are tyed together, and made one by a Coniunction.

This sentence alledged, is a disjunct axiome: for the band that tyes the parts together, is disjunctiue. *Perpetuall life*, and *death at last*, are attributed to *Saul*: one of them certainly, neither of them distinctly, but both disjoynedly.

Opposites onely haue place in this axiome: for none may be disioyned, or thrust the one from the other, but such onely as in their nature cannot agree to the same subiect, in the same respect, part, and time.

The truth of these propositions, is measured according to the opposites disposed in them; if they containe such as one of them must be in the subiect, (and are also) without a third thing to come betweene them, then the proposition is necessary, thorough the opposition of the parts: the example now alledged is of this kinde; *Perpetuall life*, or *death at last*; one of

## C H A P. XLVI.

*Of Disiunct Axiomes.*

**I**N the last place we must come to the precepts of a disjunct axiome: and that may be thus defined.

*Ramus.*

*That axiome is disiunct, whose band is a disiunctive Coniunction.*

**I.**

These axiomes are seldome in vse, and when we finde them, they are rather disputations by Syllogisme, then single sentences by themselves, pronouncing truth or fallshood: yet notwithstanding, I will vntold their nature, that we may haue a true iudgement of them. We may see that, in this instance;

*Either Saul shall liue for ever, or dye by Gods hand, or the enemies sword, or the course of nature. 1. Sam. 26.*

**IO.**

**2.**

This sentence is a compound axiom, both



both according to *Ramus*, and *Aristotle*: for divers single propositions are tyed together, and made one by a Coniunction.

This sentence alledged, is a disjunct axiome: for the band that ties the parts together, is disjunctive. *Perpetuall life*, and *death at last*, are attributed to *Saul*: one of them certainly, neither of them distinctly, but both disjoynedly.

Opposites onely haue place in this axiome: for none may be disioyned, or thrust the one from the other, but such onely as in their nature cannot agree to the same subiect, in the same respect, part, and time.

The truth of these propositions, is measured according to the opposites disposed in them; if they containe such as one of them must be in the subiect, (and are also) without a third thing to come betwene them, then the proposition is necessary, thorough the opposition of the parts: the example now alledged is of this kinde; *Perpetuall life*, or *death at last*; one of

them (I say) must needs befall *Saul*, these two haue no third to come betweene them, therefore it cannot be avoyded: but he must either liue perpetually, or dye at last. If wee will Contradict this proposition, we must say; *Saul* shall neither liue for ever, nor dye once: this is necessarily false: because, the other is necessarily true.

4.

If a disjunctiue proposition containe such opposites, as one whereof must be in the subiect, and the sayd opposites haue a meane betweene them, then the disjunction is necessary; when as all that comes betweene them be sufficiently reckoned vp (as for example) This *action* is either *supernaturally good*, or *supernaturally evil*, or *naturally good*, or *naturally evil*. Here we haue a necessary truth, because every action of man is either good, or evil: and there is no other thing comes betweene supernaturall good, and supernaturall evil, but naturall good, or naturall evil. The Contradiction of this disjunction is made, when we say, there is some other

ther thing that comes betweene supernaturall good, and supernaturall evill: besides naturall good, and naturall evill.

If I make a disiunctive proposition thus: *Socrates, is either, a Father, or a Childe*: then this proposition contains a coniecture, or opinion, no necessary truth: for it might come to passe, that he was no father, because he hath no childe; nor no childe, because he hath no father. Thus (I hope) the nature of disjunct axiomes, is made plaine enough.

These axiomes doe favour no lesse of them that be simple, then all the former compound axiomes haue done. These are compound in the words wherein they are vttered: but they are simple, in the sense wherein they are vnderstood. The examples alledged, may be thus reduced; *He that must once dye, shall not live for ever. That action, that is supernaturally good, is neither naturally good, nor naturally evill, nor supernaturally evill.* Whictevpon wee may conclude,

R 4

what.

5.

6.

whatsoever belongs to a simple Axiome, containing these arguments, the same belongs to disjunct axioms. Now at the last, we are come to an end of all *Logick* precepts, that concerne the making of axioms.



## C H A P. XLVII.

### *Of a Syllogisme.*

**I**N this place we must come to the precepts, which teach vs, to dispose arguments in a Syllogisme, and to iudge of them, when they are disposed:

*Ramus.*

*A Syllogisme is a discourse, wherein the question, is so disposed with the Argument, that if the Antecedent be granted, it must necessarily be concluded.*

I.

This definition is set downe by *Aristotle*, almost word for word : for  
thus

thus sayth he; *A Syllogisme* is a speech, wherein some things being placed, another thing differing from them, doth necessarily follow, from them that are so placed. *Top. lib. 1. cap. 1. Prior lib. 1. cap. 1. Elench. cap. 1.*

[ *A Syllogisme* ] This terme is borrowed, either from accounts, wherein many particular summes are added together, and thereby made one totall, or else, from many sentences being disorderly placed, or brought into one brieft, or breviat; therefore it serueth well for this place: because, the nature of this discourse may truly be resembled vnto either of them.

[ *Discourse* ] This word sets out the generall nature of the thing defined. *Aristotle* calls it a speech: and both of them doe meane the same thing: namely, many axiomes so placed together, that one is drawne out of another. I say *Aristotle* meant thus; because, the rest of his definition sorts with it. And he calls the precepts of a Syllogisme, *Dianosticall Doctrine*. *Post. lib. 1. cap. 1.*

[ *Quæ*

[*Question*] A question (then) is alwayes disposed in a Syllogisme. By *question* is meant, a doubtfull axiome: so as, the office of a Syllogisme is to determine a doubtfull sentence. *Aristotle* doth afford vs the same precept: for (according to him) every proposition ought not to be called into question: but those onely, that may be doubted of. *Top. lib. 1. cap. 11.* yea he accounts them *modi* that take that for a principle, that no man grants, or put that for a question that all men grants: seeing this is without doubt, and that is confessed by none. *Top. lib. 1. cap. 10.*

4.

[*Disposed*] *Aristotle* sayth, placed or put: but both of them meane one thing, namely, ordered, framed, or fitted.

5.

[*Argument*] By argument is meant (here) a third argument: by it wee vnderstand, that, the office of a Syllogisme is, to proue one thing by another: and so much we haue from *Aristotle*. A Syllogisme proues one thing, of another, by a medium. *Post. lib. 3. cap. 4.* There can be no Syllogisme to proue



proue one thing of another, vnlesse some medium be brought, which is referred by a certaine attribution to both extreames. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 23. From whence it followes, that, in every Syllogisme there are three termes, and no more. If there be any other part besides these three, it is called a prosyllogisme. Aristotle teacheth the same thing. It is manifest (in his iudgement) that, every Syllogisme is made by three termes, and no more: if there be more third arguments then one, there are more Syllogismes then one. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 25. Post. lib. 1. cap. 19.

[ Antecedent ] This signifies the two first propositions in a Syllogisme, from whence the third is concluded: so sayth Aristotle also: It is plaine that a Syllogisme consists of two propositions, and not of more: for, the three termes doe make those two propositions. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 25.

The first, is called the proposition, because, it containes at least the predicate, or Consequent part of the question. The second, is called the assumption.

sumption; because, it is taken out of the first. According to *Aristotle*, the first, hath the name of *Maior*, because, it contains the predicate part of the question: the second, the title of *Minor*, because, the subject part of the question is disposed in it. *Prior. lib. 1. cap. 14.* They vary in words, but not in the thing. Onely *Ramus* speaks of all Syllogismes in generall, as well compound, as simple. *Aristotle* of simple onely, but we shall resolve this difficultie, when we come to compound Syllogismes.


7.

[ *Granted* ] The inferring of the conclusion followeth the granting of the antecedent, and *Aristotle* meaneth the same, when he sayth in his definition: *A different thing doth follow from those that are put.* By *put* he can meane no other but *granted*.

[ *Necessarily concluded* ] *Aristotle* sayth, *doth necessarily follow from them that are put* (that is) *there is nothing required more to inferre the Conclusion, then the termes themselves that are disposed.* *Prior. lib. 1. cap. 1.*

Now

Now the definition is vnfolded,  
wee will enter vpon the particular  
things contained vnder it.



C H A P. XLVIII.

Of a simple Syllogisme.

A Syllogisme, is  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Simple.} \\ \text{Compound.} \end{array} \right.$

Ramus.

*Simple, where the consequent part of  
the question, is placed in the propo-  
sition; the antecedent in the as-  
sumption.*

**T**Hus a Syllogisme is divided, and  
the first kinde thereof is defined.  
*Aristotle* doth divide a Syllogisme  
into *Ostensive*, and *Hypotheticall*: and  
therefore he agrees with *Ramus* who-  
ly. *Prior. lib. 1. cap. 23.* I doe not  
finde, that he defines a simple or o-  
stensive Syllogisme in any one sen-  
tence: yet, this definition is wholly ta-  
ken

I.

ken out of him, as we shall see when we vntold the parts of it.

2 [Simple] This word is giuen to a Syllogisme, after the same sort, that it was given to an axiome, even because, the third argument is disposed with the question without coniunction, or composition.

3 [Consequent part, &c.] These words shew wherein a Syllogisme is simple, and how the same ought to be framed. It is *simple*, because one terme of the question, and the third argument makes each proposition: and these two propositions inferre a third, which is a simple axiome also. The predicate part of the question, must be framed with the third argument, in the proposition: and the subiect part with the third argument in the assumption; not so much because, men haue sayd so: but because nature will haue it so: this example will shew it. One sayth, *Socrates is verminous*: another doubts of it: if I would proue it to be true, a third argument must be brought, that shall tye the predicate

cate and subject of that proposition together. Now then, for that end I bring the terme *Iustice*. If this terme be disposed in a Syllogisme, it must be framed after this sort ; *He that is iust, is vertuous : but Socrates is iust. Therefore he is vertuous.* May nature appoints this frame ; because, Iustice is a speciall vertue, therefore where Iustice is, vertue needs must be. Therefore *Aristotle* was a true follower of nature, when he appointed to dispose arguments on this manner. *Prior. lib. 1. cap. 4.* To conclude, from hence it is manifest, that, the Conclusion inferred, by every true simple Syllogisme, must be gathered out of the proposition, and assumption after this manner, *viz.* The antecedent, or subiect part of the conclusion, out of the assumption ; and the consequent, or predicate part, out of the proposition ; and where this is not found, the Syllogisme is false, and concludes nothing.

As we found in a simple axiome, so shall we finde in a simple Syllogisme ;  
affirma-

affirmation, and negation : generalitie, and specialitie.

*Ramus.*

*Affirmative, when all the parts are affirmative. Negative, when either part of the Antecedent, and the Conclusion are negative.*

*General, when the proposition, and assumption are general. Special, when either of them is special. Proper, when both are proper.*

5.

*Every Syllogisme (sayth Aristotle) is either affirmative, or negative, universal, or in part. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 23. Universal is that which consisteth of all universal termes; particular consisteth of termes, as well particular as universal. Wherefore, if the Conclusion be universal, the termes must be universal. But the termes may be universal, and yet the conclusion not universal. In every Syllogisme, either both or one of the propositions must be like the conclusion. Affirmative, or negative, necessary, or Contingent. And thus alwayes the termes in a Syllogisme must be affected: otherwise it is not simply a true one. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 24.*

From



From hence *Aristotle* inferreth further (in the place last alledged) that, In every Syllogisme there must be one terme universall, and one affirmative: because, without a universall it is not a Syllogisme, or belongs not to the thing in hand, or begs the question. Thus far he. We may say the like of that Syllogisme, that consists of all negatives.

It may seeme by this, that *Aristotle* doth not acknowledge any Syllogisme that consisteth of proper propositions. And indeed, it is doubtfull what his iudgement is in the matter: yet, in all likelihood, he doth acknowledge them no lesse then *Ramus*, as shall appeare when I come vnto the particular kindes; where this whole precept will be made more certaine, and cleere to our vnderstanding.

S

CHAP.

## C H A P. XLIX.

*Of Aristotles three figures.*

I.

**A**ristotle delivers the forme of Syllogismes: *Prior. lib. 1. cap. 4. 5. & 6. & cap. 32.* and divides them into three figures, or assigns the making of them three manner of wayes. In the first place alledged, he speakes of them so vniversally, that he comprehends false or vnprofitable Syllogismes, as well as true: but in the latter, he speakes of true Syllogismes precisely, on this manner.

1. *If the last extreame be affirmed of the middle terme, and the middle terme of the first extreame, or the last extreame be denied of the middle terme, and the middle terme affirmed of the first extreame; then it is the first figure.*

2. *If the middle terme be both affirmed, and denied of both the extreames: then it is the second figure.*

3. *If*

3. If the last extreme be affirmed, or  
denied of the middle terme and the  
first extreme be affirmed of the  
middle terme: then, it is the third  
figure.

And after this manner, the middle  
terme ought to be disposed in each  
figure. So farre he. cap. 32.

Every universall affirmative question,  
is proved by the first figure onely: and  
that after one manner of way.


Every negative universall question is  
proved, both by the first, and second fi-  
gure: by the first one way, by the se-  
cond two wayes.

Every particular affirmative question  
is proved, by the first, and third figures:  
one way, by the first, three wayes by the  
third.

A negative particular, is proved in all  
the figures, one way in the first, two  
wayes in the second, and three wayes in  
the third. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 26.

Thus farre Aristotle doth giue vs  
rules for the framing of a Syllogisme,  
and the manner of concluding all

kind of questions by them. I esteemed it the best way to set downe all his precepts together; because they are the easier to be remembred. In the next place, I will set downe what *Ramus* hath delivered, and compare them together, that we may the better see their agreement, and thereby we shall the better vnderstand, then by either of them apart.



## CHAP. L.

*Of Ramus contract Syllogisme.*

I.

*Ramus* doth dispose his precepts, for the framing of Syllogismes, in a different maner from *Aristotle*; I will report them as I finde them in him, and apply *Aristotle* to him. Thus then he beginneth:

*Ramus.*

*A simple Syllogisme hath the parts contracted, or explicated.*

A

A contract Syllogisme, is when the argument, brought as an example, is so applyed to the particular question, that it is the antecedent in both parts: and the assumption affirmed.

This forme of Syllogisme is *Aristotles* third figure, reported in the Chapter going before: and contains nothing more then we finde in him, onely they differ in the name.

[ *Contract* ] This word giues the name vnto this forme. In common speech it signifies a thing crusht together: or drawn into a narrow roome: the reason of the name ariseth from the nature of the thing; namely, the short, & brieve disposing of the third argument with the question, in this figure. Wherein it differs from the rest: and it must bee so contract, because wee finde it so in the common vse of men, and not otherwise vnfolded.

[ *Argument brought &c.* ] By these words, and the rest which follow, the different kind of this forme is set out

by foure properties, whereof this is the first, namely, that the third argument, (or middle terme which is v-  
sed to proue, that the latter part of the question is rightly ioynd vnto, or se-  
uered from the former part) is put for an example, or an instance assign-  
ing the thing wherein the question concluded is true : as wee shall see a-  
non in the Syllogisme it selfe.

4.

In this all the *Logick Schooles* doe agree. First they call this forme an *Expository Syllogisme* onely, because the third argument is as it were an ex-  
position, or commentary to vntold the truth of the question concluded : or else, because the argument doth ex-  
pose the indeterminate subiect part of the question, vnto one certaine, and singular thing : as wee shall see when wee come to giue instance of this precept. Secondly; The Authors of best credit doe expressly teach the same thing with *Ramus*, An *expository Syllogisme* (sayth *Aliaco 1 sent. q. 5. lis. 2.*) is then good, when the mid-  
dle terme importeth one thing, and no  
more.



more. If it comprehend many distinct things, it is naught. According to *Aristotle*, this forme concludes particular questions onely, as hath beene shewed, *cap. 49.* therefore in his iudgment the third argument must bee put for an example, for such questions cannot be proved by any other.

[ *Particular question* ] This is the second proper tie of this forme, no questions are concluded here, but particular : and so sayth *Aristotle* in the chapter going before, and hee adds, that, they are concluded three wayes by it. If therefore any question that is generall, or proper, be concluded in this figure, then the Syllogisme is false, and proves nothing.

[ *Antecedent in both parts* ] This is the third proper tie of this forme, the third argument hath the first place, or is subiected both in the proposition, and assumption. *Aristotle* hath the same thing expressly in the 49. Chapter : *The middle terme* ( say the *Respon- sives*, in their commentary vpon *Aristotle* : *Præf. lib. 1. cap. 6.* ) is subiected

by foure properties, whereof this is the first, namely, that the third argument, (or middle terme which is v-  
sed to proue, that the latter part of the question is rightly ioyned vnto, or se-  
uered from the former part) is put for an example, or an instance assign-  
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[ *Antecedent in both parts* ] This is the third properie of this forme, the third argument hath the first place, or is subjected both in the proposition, and assumption. Aristotle hath the same thing expressly in the 49. Chapter: The middle terme (say the Jesuites, in their commentary vpon Aristotle: Prior, lib. 1. cap. 6.) is subjected

to both parts of the extreame in the  
third figure.

7.

[*Assumption affirmed*] This is the  
last propriety of this figure. Aristotle  
requires the same thing too; namely,  
that, the first extreame be affirmed of  
the middle terme; therefore the as-  
sumption is affirmed; for (according  
to him) the first extreame is alwayes  
disposed in the assumption: and the  
Iesuites in the place last alledged doe  
expressly teach, that, in the third figure  
the *Minor* must alwayes be affirma-  
tive.

We haue an instance of this figure  
in this bricfe Discourse.

*Some confidence is a vertue: as con-  
stancy.*

8

Here we finde a particular question  
concluded. Some confidence, &c.  
This I say is particular; because, ver-  
tue is attributed to confidence, but in  
some part, not to all kinde of confi-  
dence vniuersally. The third argu-  
ment is a singular thing, *viz.* Con-  
stancy,

stancy, and this is put as an example, or singular instance; reducing the indeterminate subject part of the question vnto one determinate thing: and thereby expounding, or vntolding that which was darke, by that which is cleere, and exposing vncertainie to a certaintie. This forme is contracted, because it contains no more expressly but the question, and the third argument: The affirmatiue assumption, and conclusion are both wanting: if they be supplied it will stand in this forme.

*Constancy is a vertue.*

*Constancy is a Confidence.*

*Therefore some Confidence is a vertue.*

By *Aristotles* rule the proposition of this figure may be negatiue, and *Ramus* agrees with him when hee debarres the assumption onely from negation. In a Contract forme wee haue this figure, in this example,

*Some*

*Some confidence is not a vertue : as  
audaciousnesse.*

If we doe explicate this contracted  
forme, we shall haue it stand thus.

*No audaciousnesse is a vertue.*

*All audaciousnesse is confidence.*

*Therefore some confidence is not a  
vertue.*

10.

We learne from *Aristotle, cap. 48.*  
that, the proposition and assumption  
may be vniversall, yet the conclusion  
not vniversall: here we see it avowd.  
More examples are requisite to illu-  
strate this precept, wherefore I will  
adde some others.

*Some man is prudent : as Socrates.*

*Some man is not fortunate : as Elec-  
tor.*

Both these examples may be thus  
vntolded.

*Socrates is prudent.*

*Socrates is a man.*

*Therefore some man is prudent.*

*Hec*



*Heclor is not fortunate.*

*Heclor is a man.*

*Therefore some man is not fortunate.*

Aristotle requires ( as we haue set downe cap. 48. ) that every Syllogisme must haue one proposition vniuersall. It seemes, either that rule holds not alwayes, or else he doth not acknowledge that such Syllogismes as these be, to be true: but (if I may say what I thinke ) I belecue neither of them; for, the nature of the things themselues will avow this kinde of disputing. No conclusion can be inferred, vnlesse there be one proposition vniuersall: for nothing can be deduced out of meere singulars.

If any demand which proposition in these two last arguments are vniuersall?

I answer, the assumption of them both be vniuersall: for that is a vniuersall, where the predicate is attributed vnto all, or the whole subiect; so as, so attribute vnto all, and vnto the whole subiect, is one and the same thing (in the iudge-

II.

12.

*iudgement of Aristotle*) *Prior. lib. I. cap. 1.* Now, the terme *man*, is attributed to *Socrates*, and *Heclor* wholly: so as, there is no part of *Socrates*, vnto which that terme doth not belong. If any obiekt, that *Socrates* is an individuall, and therefore that terme cannot be subiected in a vniversall proposition. I answer, If that terme did import no more but an individuall, then I grant the argument to be good, but in this place it doth not import a meere individuall: for then we must say: This *Socrates*, &c. which we may not, yea although we might say so, yet that terme imports more then an individuall; for he is spoken of as a man, and therefore as a species, not as this, or that individuall body, or numerickall subsistency. If this be true, then *Aristotles* rule is vniversall; els it comes too short; and he hath omitted one kinde of Syllogisme out of his *Logicke*, which I dare not grant.

I suppose, that, this precept is made cleere enough, therefore I passe to the next.

## CHAP. LI.

*Of an explicate Syllogisme  
in generall.*

*A Syllogisme is then explicate, when  
the proposition, assumption, and con-  
clusion, are orderly framed together.*

*Ramus.*

*In this kinde the proposition is alwayes  
generall, or proper, and the conclusi-  
on like the proposition, and assumpti-  
on, or the weaker of them.*


**A**ristotle hath not shewed vs the  
difference of explicate and con-  
tracted Syllogismes expressly; and in  
the thing: but (according to him)  
we must follow nature in every pre-  
cept of *Logicke*, and that is as much as  
if he had sayd so: for nature com-  
mands, that, some Syllogismes be ex-  
plicate, and not contract: because no  
third argument, that serues to proue  
a question that is vniversall or pro-  
per, can be put as an example of ei-  
ther

*r.*

ther of them; therefore there must be some Syllogismes explicate, that cannot be contracted: and there may be some contracted, that need not be explicated; and consequently ( according to nature ) some Syllogismes may be explicate, and some contract.

2. The presence of the two propositions, and conclusion, is a sufficient reason why we should call a Syllogisme explicate: for thereby it is untolded to the full. The first propertie, that belongs vnto the Syllogismes of this kinde, is this, viz. *The proposition is alwayes generall, if the conclusion be universal, or particular, if the conclusion be proper, then the proposition is proper also.* Now, this law followes the disposing of the third argument, with the question: not the will or device of man ( as we shall see by the particular instances; ) *The conclusion must be like the proposition, and assumption, when both of them are universal, and affirmative, or proper, and affirmative, then the conclusion must be so too, when the assumption is particular, and negative,*

sine, or proper and negative, or the proposition negative, then the conclusion must be accordingly; therefore, whensoever an explicate Syllogisme varies from any of these rules, it is false, and concludes nothing: nature sayes it must be thus, therefore when it is otherwise, nature is perverted, and we erre from truth. These rules, and no more but these, belong to an explicate Syllogisme in common.



CHAP. LII.

*Of the first kind of an explicate Syllogisme.*

*There are two kinds of an explicate Syllogisme: The first is where the argument alwayes followes, and one part is denied.*

*Ramus.*

**T**His kind of Syllogisme hath two properties: The one, that the third argument alwayes followes (that is) it

I

is the predicate, or consequent part, in the proposition, and assumption. The second propertie is, that either the proposition, or assumption, is alwayes denied. I say, either; because sometime the proposition is denyed, and sometimes the assumption indifferently; as the question and third argument require. If one be negative, it is enough. Therefore, in this figure negative questions (onely) are concluded. I say negative, either vniversall, particular, or proper.

2.

We haue this whole precept contained in *Aristotles* second figure: as the Reader may see, reported *cap. 49.* therefore I need not repeat it here. I will alledge some instances to shew the practice of this rule.

1. *Every wise man doth vse his reason well.*

*He that is overcome with passion,  
doth not vse his reason well.*

*Therefore he that is overcome with  
passion, is not a wise man.*

In this argument the proposition is an vniversall affirmatiue, the assumption,



tion, and conclusion is vniversall negative,

2. *They that knew the wisdoms of God, did not crucifie Christ.*

*The princes of the world crucified Christ.*

*Therefore the princes of the world knew not the wisdoms of God.*

This frame containes a proposition negative vniversall, an assumption affirmative speciall, and a conclusion negative speciall.

3.

3. *Judas that writ the Epistle, was the brother of Iames.*

*Judas Iscariot, was not the brother of Iames.*

*Therefore Judas Iscariot, writ not the Epistle.*

In this example, the proposition is affirmative proper ; the assumption and conclusion is negative proper. These three are sufficient to shew vs the vse of this rule ; therefore I will content my selfe with them, and passe to the next.

## C H A P. LIII.

*Of the second kind of an Explicate Syllogisme.*

*Ramus.*

*The second kinde is, when the argument goeth before, in the proposition: and followeth affirmed, in the assumption.*

I.

**T**His figure hath also two properties. The first: *the argument goeth before in the proposition (that is) it is subjected and thereby it hath the first place.* In the second property, *the argument followeth in the assumption. (that is) it is predicated in the assumption; and the assumption is affirmed, or affirmative: as if it were sayd, the argument is predicated affirmatively in the assumption.*

*Aristotle made this law, and calls it his first figure: as his owne words doe shew, related Cap. 49.*

2.

*It may be doubted, whether Aristotle or Ramus hath kept best order in placing the figures of a Syllogisme.*

gisme. I answer, it is not materiall, whether of them be first, or last: for, no one of them doth giue light, or knowledge to the other: neither doth it further our vse of them, when this is set before that, or that before this: *Aristotle* preferred the one, because all questions might be concluded in it: *Ramus* preferred another, because the argument is disposed with the question after a more single, or simple manner: therefore both did well so farre as they had reason, neither of them did better, because (as I sayd) their order doth neither profit, nor hinder their vse, therefore I haue said enough to satisfie the doubt, and will goe on to shew how this rule may be vsed.

*Whoſoever is borne of God, overcome-  
meth the World.*

*He that beleeueth on Christ, is borne  
of God.*

*Therefore he that beleeueth on Christ  
haſt overcome the World.*

In this example, all the parts are vniverſally affirmatiue, wherefore I

T 2

will

3.

will shew another.

*He that is a murderer, hath not eternall life abiding in him.*

*He that hateth his brother, is a murderer.*

*Therefore he that hateth his brother, hath not eternall life abiding in him.*

Here we haue the proposition, and conclusion vniversally negatiue, and the assumption vniversally affirmatiue. In the like sort, this rule is vlesfull, in all other questions that are concluded.

4

*Aristotle, is of opinion, that this onely is the forme or figure of a perfect Syllogisme: because, every question may be proved by this, and both the other may be referred vnto this, therefore they are made perfect by it. Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 4. Thus much must be granted, and so farre it is perfect; yea and the onely perfect figure. The second, and third figures, are no lesse agreeable to Aristotles definition of a Syllogisme, then the first; as he shall see that will examine them thereby: therefore they want nothing of that essentiall*

essentiall perfection, that is in the first, what can haue greater perfection then that, which every way agrees to the definition thereof; and consequently, they inferre their conclusions as necessarily as the first. The first figure onely hath perfection, essentiall, and accidentall. The second, and third haue perfection essentiall, but not accidentall, and this is the difference betweene them. By these things that are past, wee haue finished all those precepts, which teach vs, how to frame arguments together in a simple Syllogisme. In the next place, we must come to a compound Syllogisme, if we looke no further then *Ramus*, but we must looke further; else we shall make our art defectiue: for *Logicke* doth teach vs to iudge, as well as to dispose. If we must iudge, then we must looke for truth, or falshood, and consequently for precepts that shall teach vs how to finde out truth, and the severall kindes of it: For this, wee must consult with *Aristotle*, therefore in the next Chapter, I will

report his precepts, with as much brevity as I can.



# CHAP. LIIII.

## *Of a Demonstrative Syllogisme.*

I.

**I**N the first place, we must set downe the precepts which concerne necessary truth; which vsually is called *Science*: for, that is first in nature, time, excellency, and our apprehension, of that *Aristotle* sayth thus.

Science is  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Indemonstrable.} \\ \text{Demonstrative. Post.} \\ \text{lib. I. Cap. 3.} \end{array} \right.$

We haue delivered the precepts of Indemonstrable Science, in the matter of a definition, and distribution, wee must now come to the precepts of Demonstrative science: and first to the definition thereof.

2

But forasmuch as, to know is double



ble: viz: To vnderstand what, or wherefore, a thing is, and secondly, That a thing is, *Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 13.* therefore, both of them are defined by this one sentence.

*Demonstrative science, is that, which we haue by a demonstration. Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 4. lib. 2. cap. 3. Huius &c.*

This sentence is obscure in it selfe, therefore hee doth vnfold it in these words.

*A demonstration, is a Syllogisme, that consisteth of things necessary: that is to say, of propositions, and conclusion, that are necessary; and this is proper to a demonstration. I say both, because the conclusion may be necessary, when the medium is not necessary: but when the medium is necessary, the conclusion cannot be but necessary: even as truth, is alwayes collected from truth.*

*Wherefore whatsoever a man knowes by Demonstration, both, it must be necessary, and the medium also of the*

*Demonstration must be necessary; Otherwise we neither know what a thing is, nor that a thing is necessarily: but either we thinke we know, and doe not, or thinke we know not at all. Poster. lib. 1. cap. 6. Quoniam igitur &c.*

Thus farre the nature of demonstrative science, is set out in common.

4.

The proper nature of that science whereby wee vnderstand *what* or *wherefore* a thing is, is set out in these words.

*The medium is then necessary, when it consisteth of things true, first, immediate, better knowne, preceding, and cause of the conclusion.*

*Those are first, and true, which haue force to argue, not from others, but of themselves.*

*They ought to be true, because that which is not, cannot be knowne: they must be first, because they ought to be indemonstrable, and consist of their owne proper principles, we must not inquire of the principles of Science, wherefore they are so: but every one of them, even by it selfe, ought to be worthy of credit.*

*The*

The medium must containe the causes of the conclusion, seeing we know nothing unlesse wee understand the causes. The medium ought to consist of things preceding the conclusion, both in nature, and our knowledge: therefore the principium of a demonstration is an immediate proposition, viz. that hath none before it. Poster. lib. 1. cap. 4. & 6. Top. lib. 1. cap. 1. wherupō, demonstrations are made by definitions. Poster. lib. 1. cap. 33. and, they are the principles thereof. Poster. lib. 2. cap. 3. for a definition can no wayes be proved Poster. lib. 2. cap 4. 5 6. & 7. lib. 1. cap 9.

By this whole discourse we haue rules to know, what Syllogisme contains a truth simply necessary, and we are sent vnto them onely, whose third argument comprehends the causes of the conclusion, and such causes also, as are better knowne vnto vs then the conclusion it selfe. Wherefore, for further explication hereof, Aristotle doth shew vs what causes these be, and how they concurre,  
In

In these words :

*For as much as, we doe then know, when we understand the causes, and these be foure. 1. the forme. 2. the matter. 3. the efficient : and 4. the end.*

*Then the conclusion hath a necessary truth, when one of these causes is taken, and placed as a medium in two propositions with that Conclusion. And by Causes is meant, not onely the causes of those things that are, but also of those things that haue beene, or shall be hereafter. Post.lib. 2. cap. 11. & 12.*

6.

Now wee doe fully vnderstand, where to finde necessary truth in a Syllogisme. Our next labour must be, to set out these scientificall Syllogismes by other properties ; that we may know them the more easily, and certainly ; for that cause, *Aristotle* doth distribute a demonstration after this manner.

A

A demonstration, is {  
                                   { Universal.  
                                   { Particular.  
                                   { Affirmative.  
                                   { Negative. Poster. lib. 1. cap. 24.

*A demonstration universal, excels a particular: and an affirmative is better then a negative. cap. 24 25.*

This distribution followes the nature of a Syllogisme, for every demonstration is a syllogisme, though every syllogisme be not a demonstration. Poster. lib. 1. cap. 2. and is very vsefull to giue vs knowledge where to finde this necessary truth, and the degrees of it. To conclude, this matter of demonstratiue science, he sayth:

7.

*The first figure is fittest for a demonstration, yea, chiefly proper vnto this science, and it is to be sought out, onely by that. Poster. lib. 1. cap. 14.*

8.

Some perhaps will looke, that I should

should giue instances, to open the vse of these precepts: and it may seeme the more needfull, because some are of opinion, that, no example can be given answerable to this rule.

I answer; this conceit is very vaine: for, cannot any of the causes, or all of them together, serue to proue a sentence that is called into question? or cannot the causes be disposed with a question into two propositions? Without doubt they may. Also, it is most certaine, that, every proposition comprehends a necessary truth, wherein the effect is argued by the causes; for the effect is no more, but a comprehension of all the causes: and when the causes doe argue the effect, the effect is resolved into the causes; therefore when we know the causes we cannot but know the effect. And consequently, such propositions are necessary; and what they are, such the conclusion must be, that is lawfully inferred from them.

If there may be premises, and conclusion answerable to this rule, then

no



no doubt, there be examples of it, and we may shew them if need were, but I will saue that labour for this time, for diuers reasons. 1. *Aristotle* hath done that alreadie, *Poster. lib. 2. cap. 11.* so as, he that will, may make vse of them. 2. This kinde of knowledge cannot easily be discerned, seeing it is *very hard for vs to understand those principles of a thing that are true, first, and of the same kinde: as Aristotle doth admonish, Poster. lib. 1. cap. 9. Difficile autem &c.* 3. By a mans owne practice, and obseruation, he shall finde them, and their vse in naturall things: and in them onely: for in matters diuine, and spirituall, such arguments can haue no place. In them we vnderstand by faith, not by sence, and faith hath Gods authoritie for the principle thereof, not the nature or causes of the things themselues. I say, a man may finde them by practice, because *by sence we get memory, by the remembring the doing of the same thing often, we get experience, by our many times remembring, our experience is*

one:

one: amongst all these that we doe remember, there is one thing wherein mans minde doth rest satisfied above many: that which is one, and the same amongst the rest, becomes a principium of science, if it belong unto a thing that is. Thus much we learne from Aristotle, Poster. lib. 2. cap. 19. *Ex sensu, &c.*

9.


The *medians* of a demonstration, whereby wee know that a thing is, consists in some of these that follow.

1. Of the causes, but not the first, or immediate.
2. Of things mediate, and no cause: but such as are reciprocated, or mutually referred to each other.
3. Of a demonstration that shewes what a thing is.
4. Of things that are not reciprocated, yet it is better knowne, and yet no cause.
5. Of a superior science; as Geometry is to the Opticks, and Arithmetickes to musick.
6. Of other sciences whereof one is not placed under another, as Surgery, is unto Geometry; To know that a wound is healed sooner

ner, or later, belongs to the Surgeon: but to know the cause why it is healed sooner or latter, belongs to Geometry. 7. In a demonstration that sheweth what a thing is, sometimes also the medium is placed without the extreames, as when we say, why doth not the wall breath? Wee answer, because it is not a living creature: and these Syllogismes are alwayes made in the second figure; after this sort: whatsoever doth breath, is a living creature: But a wall is not a living creature. Therefore a wall doth not breath. Poster. lib. II. cap. 13.

Thus farre goe *Aristotles* precepts, to shew vs what Syllogismes containe necessary truth; and the degrees thereof. If any expect examples of these last: I answer, they may be given; because we may haue examples of the former, as I haue already proved. They may be given with more ease then the former; because the things contained in them are neerer

to our vnderstanding: but I will saue that labour, least I make my discourse ouer-long, and the Reader too idle. We vse that rule with most profit, which we vnderstand and practice together.



## C H A P. L V.

### *Of Syllogismes containing con- jecturall truth.*

I.

**I**N the former Chapter, I haue dispatched all the precepts that concerne a Demonstration. In this, I must set downe those, which teach vs how to finde out Syllogismes, that containe probable, and coniecturall truth. *Aristotles* precepts that concerne this kinde of truth, are these vnder-written.

*That Axiome is probable which seemes so to all, to many, or them that are wise, by certaine frequent notes, and cleerences. Top. lib. 1. cap. 1.*

*Those*

Those Accidents which agree to the subject by themselves, in the manner aforesayd: but in such sort as they may be, and not be attributed therunto, they (I say) cannot be a medium in a Demonstration: because they cannot inferre a conclusion that containes a necessary truth. *Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 6.*

These two precepts are all that I can finde in *Aristotle*, touching these Syllogismes: and I thinke, they are full and plaine enough, so as, wee neede not seeke for more, either precepts, or examples to set out their nature, and make vs vnderstand them, therefore, they shall passe without further search or explication.

From hence wee may inferre that thing we seeke for on this manner:

If Adjuncts or Accidents make a conjecturall truth, and no more, then a Syllogisme consisting of Adjuncts or Accidents, doth containe a conjecturall truth onely.

But wee haue the first from *Aristotle*, in the places alleddged, for he

excludes Accidents from a Demonstration, and esteemes them no more, but cleere notes, making an Axiome (seeme probable, therefore ( according to him ) Syllogismes consisting of accidents inferre but conjecturall truth.

3.

To concludethis point, we ought not to forget, that *Aristotle* giues vs rules of such Syllogismes, as hee calls *Contentions*, and a *Paralogisme*: his deed was good, because it doth some waies serue to giue vs vnderstanding, in the precepts of Syllogismes afore-sayd: but I will omit the sayd rules, because they tend to shew vs precepts by priuation or negation onely. *Aristotle* did well, because from him we haue the first formall Art of *Logicke*. I must omit them, in as much as all things that might explicate a precept, fitte not my present purpose, therefore here I will put a finall end to this matter.



## CHAP. LVI.

Of the first kinde of connex  
Syllogismes.

**H**itherto I haue supplied the oversight of *Ramus*, thereupon the nature of Art requires, that, I enter vpon the rules of a compound Syllogisme, *Ramus* doth define them all in this one short sentence.

I.

*A Syllogisme, is then compound, when the whole question makes one part of the proposition, affirmed, and compounded, and the argument makes the other part.*

*Ramus.*

*Aristotle* doth acknowledge compound Syllogismes, as I haue shewed *Cap. 48.* But hee doth not define them at all, (for any thing that I find) neither is it greatly needfull, for their nature will appeare well enough, when wee come to each speciall kinde.

2.

3.

In simple Syllogismes, the argument, and the question made two distinct propositions: in these, they make but one. In them, one thing was simply attributed to another: here the whole question, and argument is compounded together, which properties doe make them really to differ, in their maner or kinde of disposing. These compound Syllogismes are thus divided.

Ramus.

A compound Syllogisme, is  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Connexe.} \\ \text{Disiuncte.} \end{array} \right.$

A Syllogisme is then Connexe, when the proposition thereof is connexe, and it is of two sorts.

The first sort of connex Syllogismes, assumeth the antecedens, and concludeth the consequent.

4.

Aristotle doth call all compound Syllogismes by the name of Hypotheticall, because they inferre the conclusion upon the supposition of some part thereof.

thereof: & doth divide them into such  
as conclude according unto transumpti-  
on: and qualitie, (that is as *Pacius* vn-  
derstands it) when the minor is taken  
out of the maior; as in this example.  
If a man, then a living creature. But a  
man, therefore a living creature. And  
when it concludes by force of the qualitie  
of things disioyned: as in this example;  
It is either day, or night. But it is day.  
Therefore it is not night. He brings  
this at large. *Prior. lib. 1. cap. 23. & 29.*  
If we vnderstand *Aristotle* thus, he  
agrees wholly with *Ramus*, and in all  
reason we should so vnderstand him.  
In the last place alledged, he doth  
promise to explicate how many  
wayes a Syllogisme is made Hypo-  
thetically: but (as *Pacius* truely sayes)  
the place where he doth it, is not to  
be found. And I am of opinion, that,  
he did willingly neglect it, because  
he doth suppose, that, every question,  
and argument may be framed, and con-  
cluded in a simple Syllogisme: and thus  
himselfe teacheth, *prior. lib. 1. cap.*  
23.

5.

The parts of the proposition, in a connexe Syllogisme are called by the name of *antecedent*, and *consequent*; and that very fitly: for the one goes before, in place, and nature, the other follows accordingly; the one inferres, and the other is inferred.

*The antecedent is assumed*, when the words of it are barely repeated in the second proposition, or assumption. If affirmative, or negative there, then they are affirmative, or negative here.

*The consequent is concluded*, when the latter part of the proposition, is barely repeated in the Conclusion. We have examples of this kinde very frequent.

6.

*If God spared not the naturall branches, he will not spare thee.*

*But God spared not the naturall branches.*

*Therefore he will not spare thee.*

In this example, the former part of the proposition, is barely repeated in  
the

the assumption : and the latter part, in the conclusion. And thus the question, and the third argument, is alwayes disposed in this kinde of Connexe Syllogisines : sometimes the prooffe of the antecedent is assumed, not the antecedent it selfe : In that case, it must be reduced vnto this forme, an example of this is layd out in *Moses words, Numb. 12. 14.*

*If her Father had spit in her face,  
shee must be shut out.*

*But shee is leproous.*

*Therefore shee must be shut out.*

This example assumes not the antecedent, but the prooffe thereof, arguing the same from the greater to the lesse, thus, Her Father did it, because God did it. Her face is defiled with spittle : for it is Leprous.

This sort of Connexe Syllogisines, may easily be reduced vnto a simple, for it doth change the manner of disposing very little : Wee may frame it thus ;

7.

*He that spared not the naturall branches, hath no reason to spare thee.  
But God spared not the naturall branches.*

*Therefore he hath no reason to spare thee.*

8.

In the 1 Cor. 15. 12. we have an example of this kinde of Connexe, that seemes to be somewhat more difficult ; Where the Apostle reasons thus :

*If Christ be risen, then other men shall rise.*

*But Christ is risen : so I haue preached, and you beleene.*

*Therefore the bodies of men shall rise.*

I say, this example is more difficult then the former : for, the proposition hath two intire, and distinct simple axiomes in it : but it may be reduced, and brought into this forme.


*They that say, that Christ is risen, must say, that men shall rise.*

*But*



*But you beleue, and say, that Christ  
is risen: because I haue preached.  
Therefore you must say also, that men  
shall rise.*

And this is wholly agreeable to the  
Apostles disputation: for he argueth  
against them that denyed the last:  
but in his judgement they might not  
doe so; because they did confesse the  
first. I hope I haue made this cleere  
enough to our vnderstandings: there-  
fore I will passe to the next.



## CHAP. LVII.

*Of the second kinde of Connexe  
Syllogismes.*

*The second sort of a connex Syllogisme  
taketh away the consequent, that it  
may take away the antecedent.*

*Ramus.*

**T**O take away (in this place) im-  
porteth, the putting of a Contra-  
diction:

**I.**

dition: so as, the Contradictory to the latter part of the proposition, makes the assumption, and the Contradictory vnto the former part of the proposition, makes the Conclusion. The Apostle *Gal. 3. 18.* giues vs an instance of this precept.

*If the inheritance be of the Law, it is not of promise.*

*But it is of promise.*

*Therefore it is not of the Law.*

The assumption in this argument, is Contradictory, to the latter part of the proposition, That sayth, *the inheritance is not of promise.* The assumption sayth, *the inheritance is of promise.* In the like sort, the Conclusion is contradictory to the first part of the proposition. The one sayth, *the inheritance is of the Law.* The other sayth, *the inheritance is not of the Law.* This kinde, is easily (also) brought into a simple, thus:

*Whatsoever is by the Law, is not of promise.*

*But*

*But the inheritance is of promise.  
Therefore the inheritance is not of the  
Law.*

This kinde of Connexe hath but threetermes in it, viz. 1. *Inheritance.* 2. *Promise.* 3. *Law.* And the first is repeated, or twise subiected in the proposition, wherevpon this kinde is easily turned from compound to simple.

We haue an example *Gal. 2. 21.* that is not so easily conuerted.

2.


*If Iustice be by the Law, Christ is  
dead in vaine.*

*But Christ is not dead in vaine.*

*Therefore Iustice is not by the Law.*

I haue propounded this Syllogisme *cap. 44* and haue there shewed, how it may be made into a simple forme: therefore it is needlesse to repeate it here. The truth contained in these Syllogismes, isto be judged of, according to the precepts of a connexe axiome: if we take them as they are  
Connex.

Connex. But if we take them as simple syllogismes, then their truth must be judg'd of, according to the precepts of a simple syllogisme. Therefore we haue sayd enough touching their naturall vse.



## CHAP. LVIII.

### *Of the first kinde of a Disjunct Syllogisme.*

*Ramus.*

*A compound Syllogisme is then disjunct, when the proposition thereof is a disjunct axiome.*

*There are two sorts: The first doth take away the one, and conclude the other.*

I.

**B**Y taking away, and concluding, is here vnderstood Contradicting and repeating, in the same sort as I haue shewed, cap. 56. & 57. Aristotle calls these Hypotheticall; and so he well may: for the principall foundation of them, is a supposition: for one thing

thing is taken for granted, and that must be granted, or else they can conclude nothing.

By the word [*one*] is meant, not one terme; but one part of the opposition: for, we must remember, that, no arguments but opposites come into the Syllogismes of this kinde; now opposites are sometimes one, against one, and some other times many against one: so as, those many make one part, and the other one, makes the other part: therefore, it is truly sayd, one is taken away, when all those are contradicted that make one part of the opposition: and one is assumed, when those many are barely repeated. Again, that word *one*, is not vnderstood indifferently of either part of the opposition: for then, the contradicting of any one single terme, must inferre the concluding of all others that oppose that one: but that may not be: for onely one of them at once, can agree to the same subiect, in the same respect, part, and time. Therefore it is vnderstood of all the  
single

2.

single termes that are disioyned, except one: because from thence, that one that is not Contradicted, may well be Concluded: but where one single terme is opposed vnto another single terme, there the Contradicting of either of them indifferently, doth inferre the Concluding of the other.

3.

By this precept the proposition may be negatiue in some part, and therefore those arguments that are opposed as Contradictories, haue place in this kinde of arguing. I will bring instances of all sorts to make these things plaine.

1. *You must say, he is or he is not.*

*But you may not say, he is not.*

*Therefore you must say he is.*

The second terme opposed in the proposition is negatiue, and that is Contradicted in the assumption: the first terme in the proposition is affirmatiue, and that is concluded or repeated in the Conclusion.

We



We haue another instance of this.  
2 Sam. 24. 13.

4

*I must sustaine, either seven yeares famine, or three moneths pursue, or three dayes pestilence*

*But I will not sustaine, seven yeares famine, nor three moneths pursue. Therefore I will sustaine three dayes pestilence.*

This argument doth presume, that *David* must vndergoe one of these three, and no more, but that one. If that be granted, it doth inferre the Conclusion necessarily. If that be denied, it hath no force to Conclude. In the assumption, two branches of the disjunction (comprehended in the proposition) are Contradicted: The third branch (vntouched in the assumption) is barely repeated in the Conclusion. We may bring this argument into a simple Syllogisme, in this sort.

*He that may escape the famine, and sword,*

*sword, must indure the pestilence,  
But David hath libertie to escape the  
famine and sword.  
Therefore David must indure the pe-  
stilence.*

The proposition presumes, that one  
of the three must be indured, and no  
more but one of them. If that be  
granted, the whole argument is good,  
if that be denyed, it hath no force to  
proue.

5 I will adde one example more, that  
I may make this precept cleere to the  
vtermost.

*Socrates, is either iust, or iniust.  
But he is not iust.  
Therefore he is iniust.*

Here is supposed, that every man  
hath one of these two, and but one of  
these: and thereupon, it inferres the  
conclusion necessarily: otherwise not.  
Wherein it agrees with the two for-  
mer; It hath two single termes onely,  
opposed each to other; and it is in-  
different


different whether of them two had beene Contradicted in the assumption, and concluded, or barely repeated in the Conclusion: for the forme of Syllogisme, and force of truth, is the same in both: and this doth make it differ from the two former. If we desire to see it made a simple syllogisme, we must frame it thus.

*He that is not iust, is uniuert.*

*Socrates is not iust.*

*Therefore he is uniuert.*

This precept is now made plaine enough, therefore I proceed to the second sort of a disjunct Syllogisme.



CHAP. LIX.

*Of the second kinde of Disjunct Syllogismes.*

*A disjunct Syllogisme of the second sort, is, when the proposition is affirmative in all the parts: one is assumed in the assumption, and the rest*

*Ramus.*

*taken away in the Conclusion.*

1.

**B***Y assuming, is vnderstood a bare* Repeating, and taking away, is a contradicting: in the same sort as hath beene before let downe.

In this second kinde of disjunct Syllogisme: there are three properties. First, *The proposition is wholly affirmative.* Secondly, *One single terme onely of the opposition, is repeated in the assumption.* Thirdly, *The other part is contradicted in the conclusion.* therefore this forme doth really differ from the former. That concludes affirmatiues, and no negatiues: this concludes negatiues, and no affirmatiues. *Gal. Cap: 3. ver: 2. 3. doth yeeld vs an argument of this kinde.*

*Yee received the spirit, either by the Law, or the Gospell.  
But yee received it by the Gospell.  
Therefore yee received it not by the Law.*

2.

This disputation doth suppose two things:

things: first, They had the spirit. Secondly, one of these two, the law, or the Gospell gaue it them (not both together.) Those two things being granted, the argument cannot be denied. If either of them might be denied, the argument may not be granted. The assumption doth barely repeat the second terme opposed: and the conclusion doth contradict the first, I will adde this second instance.

*This action, is either supernaturally good, or supernaturally euill, or naturally good, or naturally euill.*

*But it is supernaturally good.*

*Therefore it is, neither supernaturally euill, nor naturally good, ner naturally euill.*

Here we finde first, diuers termes opposed in the proposition, one against many; and many against one. Secondly; They are all affirmatiue. Thirdly; The first terme is barely repeated in the assumption. Fourthly; The other three, are contradicted in

the conclusion; Fifthly, A supposition that every action hath one of these properties, and no more but one of them.

The reason why one opposite terme onely, is assumed; and the rest contradicted, is: because but one opposite, can be in the subject at once, and the presence of that, doth inforce the absence of the rest.

We may bring these into simple Syllogismes, after this sort.

*That act which is supernaturally good,  
is not supernaturally evill; nor nat-  
rally good, nor naturally evill.*

*But this act is supernaturally good.*

*Therefore it is, neither supernaturally  
evill, nor naturally good, nor natu-  
rally evill.*

4.

I doubt not, but this will suffice to shew the truth, and vse of this precept. It is needles for me to set forth what truth is contained in these Syllogismes; for if we take them as disjunctive, then they containe truth no other-



otherwise then as disiunctive axioms doe. If we take them as simple, then they must be referred vnto simple Syllogismes: therefore in the precepts of them, we shall know what truth is contained in these. I might also alledge the reason why *Ramus* doth prosecute all the precepts of Compound Syllogismes; and thereby iustifie him. And for what cause *Aristotle* did but name them, & not prosecute them; and so iustifie him also; but (I thinke) I haue done that sufficiently in the matter of Compound Axiomes. *Cap. 42.* they, and these, draw in one, and the same line: therefore I referre the Reader vnto that place. Repetitions are but lost labour.

Now we are come to an end of all the precepts of *Logicke*: so as, there is no more required, to make a Logician, then what hath beene sayd already. But that seemes not enough to *Ramus*, for he brings another member of this art, and calls it *Method*: but I omit the same of purpose; for  
divers

divers reasons. 1. No precepts of *Logicke* can teach it, because even ( according to him ) *Method* is no more, but the orderly placing of sentences together. But the precepts of *Logicke* cannot teach that, it being no more, but the generall nature of art, as wee haue already found *Cap. 1.* ( I say of art simply, abstracted from all particulars, and not applied to *Rhetoricke*, *Logicke*, or any other; as we do when we say *Rhetoricke* is an art, &c. ) 2. If any precepts of *Logicke*, haue power to teach the orderly framing of sentences together, then they must be, either some that are past, or some that are yet to come: if we must haue recourse to these, then their Authors, and places must be. named. But that is impossible. If the precedent precepts do teach it, then we haue done enough already, and can doe no more, except wee will repeat the same things againe. 3. If we define, and distribute according to the precepts of a definition and distribution, *Cap. 34. &c.* We cannot place definitions,

nitions, and distributions, nor any other sentences that depend vpon them, vnduly and out of order; for then the most generall will come first, and the most speciall will come last : and this is all the Method *Ramus* required.

4. He alledges *Aristotles* authoritie for method ; but altogether without cause ; for he alledgeth no place, nor words, and I am sure he cannot. *Aristotle* calls all the precepts of *Logicke* a Method, whereby wee come to know, how to discusse. *Top. lib. 1. cap. 2. lib 8. cap. 12. prior. lib. 1. cap. 31.* therefore he did neuer meane to make *Method*, one member of his Art, distinct from the rest : seeing therefore we haue nothing to say touching *Method*, I must here put an end to the whole Worke.

F I N I S.

in predicabilia clarum est. et  
omnem illam quam vocant Euphyrianam  
istis subijungere.

substantia 8

Incorporea | corporea  
Spiritus | corpus

composita | Simplex  
compositum | elementum  
compositum

8 Innatum Innatum  
Animatum Vides  
Animatum

Sensibile | Insensibile  
Animal | Planta

8 Animal  
Rationale | Irrationale  
Homo | Brutum

Homo  
Socrus  
Plato  
Cesar

nam

For. hac serie substantialia  
genus, et duo infima s  
Corpus, compositum, et anim  
genera subalterna inter  
corporea simplex composit  
Animalia animalia sensib  
sensile sunt omnes differentie  
et rationale irrationale  
et c.

Idem predicabilia clariora sunt  
artorem illam quam vocant rhyrianam  
istis subijuncto.

substantia &

Incorporea | corporea

Spiritus | corpus

compositum | Simplex  
compositum | elementum  
compositum

& Inanimatum | Animatum

Animatum | Vides

Animatum

Sensibile | Insensibile

Animal | Planta

& Animal

Rationale | Irrationale

Homo | Brutum

Homo

Soem

Plato

Cesar



nam

Hic hac serie substantialia  
genus, et omnia inferiora sunt  
Corpus, compositum, animatum  
genera subalterna in corpore  
Corporalia simplex compositum  
Animatum inanimatum sensibile  
sensibile sunt omnes differentie  
et rationale irrationale  
et cetera.